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ABSTRACT 
Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers Using 
Descriptive Experience Sampling 
 
by 
 
Aadee Mizrachi 
 
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Research suggests there are anatomical asymmetries of the human brain 
associated with right-hand or left-hand preference.  In addition, left-handedness has been 
related to a wide range of psychological and physical problems.  Despite these 
relationships, little is known about the inner experience of left-handers.   
The present study, a replication of Mizrachi (2010) using a larger sample, used 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) with three objectives: 1) examine the inner 
experience of left-handers; 2) compare the results of the present study to the results of 
Mizrachi (2010); and 3) compare the inner experience of left-handers  to that of the 
general population as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).   
Of 256 volunteers who completed the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI), 10 
identified as being left-handed were invited to participate in the DES sampling of their 
inner experience.  All agreed to do so and engaged in five days of DES sampling.  
The findings suggest that the inner experience of left-handers is quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from the inner experience of the general population.  Left-handers 
experience sensory awareness, words experienced without semantic significance, and 
multiple experience at a substantially higher frequency than the general population.  Left-
  iv 
handers experience inner seeing, inner speech, and feeling substantially less than the 
general population.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Approximately 10 percent of the western population is left-hand dominant such 
that they use their left hand for writing and other one-handed activities (Medland, Duffy, 
Spurdle, Wright, Geffen, Montgomery, & Martin, 2005).  Differences in anatomy and 
behavior between left- and right-handers have been observed since the 1800s (Herron, 
1980).  However, little, if anything at all, is known about the inner experience of left-
handed individuals or about whether differences exist between the inner experience of 
left-handed and right-handed individuals.  The present study sought to explore these 
characteristics and differences in inner experience using a methodology designed 
specifically to reveal inner experience in as detailed a manner as possible, Descriptive 
Experience Sampling (DES).   
The following review of the literature is divided into four parts: handedness, left-
handedness and other constructs, left-handedness and cognition, and left-handedness and 
self-awareness.   
Handedness 
There are several characteristics that distinguish human beings from other species.  
Among them are higher-order cognitive processes and handedness.  In fact, humans 
appear to be the only species that exhibit a strong preference for the use of one hand over 
the other (Martin & Jones, 1999).  Aside from this unique aspect of handedness which 
distinguishes humans from other species, handedness has been of particular interest in 
psychology due to the behavioral differences between left- and right-handers (Martin & 
Jones, 1999).   
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Hand movements are extremely important in the physical experience of human 
beings.  The majority of what people do they do with their hands (Hammond, 2002).  
Hammond (2002) defines handedness as “a fundamental behavioral characteristic that is 
integrated into our everyday activities,” (Hammond, 2002, p. 285).  Although many 
people identify handedness with the hand that is used to write, handedness is actually a 
construct that involves a variety of activities and modalities.  Individuals who 
consistently use the left hand to write may perform a variety of other activities with the 
right hand.  Thus individuals may be identified as consistent- or mixed-handed.  Chemtob 
and Taylor (2003) found that approximately 66% of the population are consistent right-
handers whereas only approximately 4% of the population are consistent left-handers 
(Chemtob & Taylor, 2003).  The authors report that the remaining 30% of the population 
are mixed right-handers (Chemtob & Taylor, 2003).  Thus, the majority of the population 
are either consistent or mixed right-handers.   
Interest in handedness dates back to the 1800s; however, it is likely that interest in 
this area existed throughout history.  For example, there are references to left-handedness 
in the Old Testament (Herron, 1980).  Early theories regarding handedness include 
structural asymmetry, dynamic balance, and blood supply.  Such theories focused on 
asymmetrical arrangements of internal organs or the asymmetrical distribution of blood 
supply throughout the body.  More recently, focus shifted to the brain when localization 
of speech in the left cerebral hemisphere was identified in the 19th century by Paul Broca 
(Herron, 1980). 
 The relationship of handedness and brain asymmetry continues to be of 
considerable interest and brain anatomical asymmetries are thought to underlie hand 
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preference (Phillips & Sherwood, 2005).  Humans use their hands asymmetrically which 
reflects asymmetrical neural control.  For example, the dominant hand typically plays a 
manipulative role while the non-dominant hand plays a stabilizing role.  Research shows 
that the primary motor cortex is larger in the dominant than non-dominant hemisphere 
(Hammond, 2005).  The primary motor cortex is important in controlling movements and 
guiding the direction and amplitude of muscle forces involved in successive movements 
(Phillips & Sherwood, 2005).  It may be that the difference of the primary motor cortex in 
the right- and left-hemispheres leads to the behavioral asymmetries that result in 
handedness (Hammond, 2005).    
Handedness has been associated with variation in size of the corpus callosum.  
The corpus callosum connects the two cerebral hemispheres and plays an integrative role 
in functional hemispheric specialization.  Some postmortem and magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) studies show the total corpus callosum is larger in left-handed 
individuals.  The size differences of the corpus callosum are believed to be an indicator 
for strength or quality of interhemispheric connections; thus, left-handed individuals 
might have an advantage regarding interhemispheric communication (Westerhausen, 
Kreuder, Sequeira, Walter, Woerner, Wittling, Schweiger, & Wittling, 2004).   
Anatomic brain asymmetry surrounding the planum temporale has been the focal 
point of much research and has received the most attention in terms of handedness 
research (Beaton, 1997).  The planum temporale is a roughly triangular region located in 
the posterior temporal lobe involved in speech sound processing.  The presence of a 
larger planum temporale in the left-hemisphere was first introduced by Pfeifer in 1920 
and von Economo and Horn in 1930.  In 1968, Geschwind and Levitsky confirmed this 
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presence (Sequeira, Woerner, Walter, Kreuder, Lueken, Westerhausen, Wittling, 
Schweiger, & Wittling, 2006).   
Relationship of Left-Handedness to Other Constructs 
It is widely believed that handedness is indicative of hemispheric dominance such 
that left-handers are right-hemisphere dominant and vice versa (Hicks, Bautista, & Hicks, 
1999).  Because of the right hemisphere’s involvement in attentional, visuospatial, and 
affective processing, left-handed individuals have been linked to domains that rely on 
these abilities, including fine arts, music, architecture, and mathematics among others 
(McNamara, Clark, & Hartmann, 1998).  In addition, left-handedness has been related to 
a wide range of psychological and physical problems.  Observations that there are a 
higher percentage of left-handed individuals in certain groups than in the general 
population have led to such associations (Coren, 1993).  This section will review how 
left-handedness relates to an assortment of psychological and physical problems.   
Criminality 
A documented association between left-handedness and criminality can be traced 
back to the early twentieth century.  In 1903, Cesare Lombroso found a disproportionate 
number of left-handed criminals.  Notable left-handed criminals include Billy the Kid, 
Jack the Ripper, John Dillinger, and the Boston Strangler (Coren, 1993).   
Current literature suggests that behavior of left-handed and right-handed 
individuals differs and that hemispheric dominance is involved in the development of 
delinquency.  Similarly, research suggests that individuals who commit crimes have less 
left-hemisphere dominance and rely more on emotional and impulsive right-hemisphere 
responses (Gabrielli & Mednick, 1980).   
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Starting in 1972, Gabrielli and Mednick (1980) examined 265 Danish children 
drawn from a perinatal cohort of 9,125 children born between 1959 and 1961 in 
Copenhagen.  Investigators obtained psychiatric hospitalization records of the parents.  
Children of schizophrenic parents (n = 72) and psychopathic fathers or character-
disordered mothers (n = 72) were included in the study.  The remaining subjects had 
parents with no previous psychiatric background (n = 121).  These children were 
intensively examined using psychological, neurological, medical, psychophysiological, 
and social-family measures.  Handedness was evaluated through the neurological and 
psychological assessments.  In 1978, the investigators checked the Danish police register 
to determine which children had had problems with the law.  The investigators found that 
64.7% of the children identified by the neurologist as strongly left-handed were arrested 
at least one time since the evaluation whereas only 29.5% of right-handers were arrested.  
The authors concluded that left-handedness was a predictor of delinquency (Gabrielli & 
Mednick, 1980). 
Bogaert (2001) evaluated the relationship between non-right-handedness and a 
history of criminal and/or sexual offending in a large sample of males (N > 8000).  The 
sample consisted of investigations conducted at the Kinsey Institute for Sex and 
Reproduction in Indiana.  After Bogaert controlled for parental income, year of birth, and 
age he found that males with a history of criminality and/or sexual offending had elevated 
rates of non-right-handedness.  However, handedness was no longer significant when 
Bogaert controlled for education.  Bogaert suggested that the relationship between 
education and criminality may be due to the educational difficulties non-right-handers 
face.  However, education was not related in the pedophilia-handedness association 
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which suggests a different mechanism may be involved in this relationship.  Bogaert 
concluded that the effects were small; thus non-right-handedness should not be used as a 
predictor of criminality (Bogaert, 2001).         
Schizophrenia 
Communication between the hemispheres is especially important in mental 
disorders such as schizophrenia.  It has been suggested that individuals with 
schizophrenia may have an increase in left-hemisphere activity, a decrease in right-
hemisphere activity, diminished interhemispheric communication, or a combination of 
the three (Ornstein, 1997).    
 An excess of non-right-handedness has been found in studies of schizophrenia.  In 
2001, Sommer and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis on studies on lateralization in 
schizophrenia published between January 1980 and December 1999.  The authors 
grouped mixed-handedness and left-handedness together into a non-right-handedness 
group.  Meta-analysis on handedness studies showed that the incidence of non-right-
handedness was significantly higher in schizophrenic patients than in healthy subjects.  In 
addition, a follow-up study on children showed that pre-schizophrenic subjects were 
significantly more non-right-handed than were the general population.  The authors 
suggested a potential genetic mechanism may play a role in schizophrenia (Sommer, 
Aleman, Ramsy, Bouma, & Kahn, 2001).   
 Verdoux and colleagues (2004) explored how Schneiderian first-rank symptoms 
are related to handedness and speech disorder in psychotic subjects (Verdoux, Liraud, 
Droulout, Theillay, Parrot, & Franck, 2004).  Schneiderian first-rank symptoms are 
symptoms identified by Kurt Schneider that are more likely to be found in schizophrenia 
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than other disorders, including the following: third person auditory hallucinations, 
thought broadcasting, delusional perception, running commentary, and thought echo 
(Botros, Atalla, & El-Islam, 2006).  Verdoux et al. (2004) recruited patients admitted to 
the university department of the Bordeaux psychiatric hospital who had at least one 
positive psychotic symptom over the last month.  The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
was used to assess handedness.  Greater left-handedness was associated with higher 
Schneiderian scores (Verdoux et al., 2004). 
Dream Content 
Due to hemispheric variation and dominance, some researchers have assumed that 
dream content would vary as a function of handedness.  McNamara, Clark, and Hartmann 
(1998) hypothesized that the dream content of left-handers would be more visual, 
affective, and bizarre than the dream content of right-handers.  They recruited 420 
undergraduate students to complete questionnaires.  Of those, 109 reported a recent 
dream.  Participants were asked to complete the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI) 
and were given a blank page to describe their dream.  Dream content was evaluated by 
two research assistants who were blind to the hypothesis of the study, the identity, and 
the handedness of the participants whose dream content they were scoring.  Seventy-nine 
of the 109 subjects who reported a recent dream were right-handed and 30 were left-
handed, as indicated by the EHI.  Researchers found that the dreams of left-handers 
contained more high imagery nouns, more affective words, and were more fictional.  
Dreams of right-handers more accurately reflected their everyday lives.  The authors 
concluded that handedness does play a role in dream characteristics.  They reported that, 
if their results could be replicated, it would imply a right-hemispheric advantage in 
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processing unusually vivid dreams and a left-hemispheric advantage in processing 
mundane dreams (McNamara et al., 1998).  
In 1999, Hicks, Bautista, and Hicks replicated McNamara et al.’s findings.  They 
recruited 203 college undergraduates to participate in their study.  Participants completed 
the Briggs-Nebes Handedness Scale and the Spadafora and Hunt Dream Scale, which 
measures seven types of dreams: lucid dreams, archetypal dreams, fantastic nightmares, 
prelucid dreams, control dreams, post traumatic nightmares, and night terrors.  Hicks and 
colleagues (1999) found that dream types stressing the vividness of the dream experience 
were more significantly related to handedness.  More specifically, left-handers had 
significantly more lucid dreams (vivid dreams during which the individual realizes he/she 
is dreaming) and fantastic nightmares (highly vivid and upsetting dreams which are 
remembered in detail) than right-handers.  The results of this study were consistent with 
McNamara et al. (1998) and support the idea that left-handers display right-hemispheric 
talent (Hicks, Bautista, & Hicks, 1999). 
Learning 
Although an association exists between visuospatial, attentional, and affective 
processing abilities and left-handedness, left-handedness has also been associated with 
learning disabilities (McNamara et al., 1998).  In 1982, Geschwind and Behan explored 
the relationships between left-handedness and the frequency of developmental learning 
disorders as well as migraine and immune disease.  Geschwind and Behan (1982) 
compared the incidence of these conditions in strongly left-handed subjects to strongly 
right-handed subjects.  In their first study, the investigators developed a questionnaire 
containing questions about the personal and family history of the participant as well as a 
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modified version of the Oldfield Handedness Inventory.  Left-handers reported 
significantly more developmental learning disorders such as dyslexia and stuttering than 
did right-handers.  Left-handers also reported more family members with learning 
disorders than did right-handers.  These results are consistent with previous findings 
suggesting a relationship between left-handedness and learning disabilities (Geschwind & 
Behan, 1982). 
Even when no learning disability is present, left-handers and right-handers 
perform differently.  Ward, Alvis, Sanford, Dodson, and Pusakulich (1989) evaluated the 
tactuo-spatial ability in subjects as a function of handedness.  They recruited 78 self-
identified right-handed and 75 self-identified left-handed undergraduate students to 
participate in their study.  Handedness was also assessed by the Lateral Dominance 
Questionnaire.  Subjects were blindfolded and learned a finger maze with either their 
dominant hand or nondominant hand.  Investigators assessed transfer to the untrained 
hand.  They reported a left-hand advantage in comparison with the right.  Acquisition by 
the left-hand required fewer trials for both right- and left-handed subjects.  This finding 
suggests a left-handed (right-hemisphere) advantage with tactuo-spatial tasks (Ward, 
Alvis, Sanford, Dodson, & Pusakulich, 1989). 
Physical Well-Being 
Immune disease has also been associated with left-handers and their relatives.  
Geschwind and Behan (1982) found that left-handed subjects reported a significantly 
higher frequency of immune disease than did right-handed subjects.  In addition, left-
handers had significantly more relatives with immune disease, specifically thyroid and 
bowel disorders.  Geschwind and Behan (1982) also evaluated the frequency of left-
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handedness in patients with immune disorders or migraines in neurological clinics in 
Glasgow and compared it to a general population group.  They found a significantly 
higher percentage of left-handers in patients with severe migraines.  They also found a 
higher percentage of left-handers in patients with myasthenia gravis, an autoimmune 
neuromuscular disease (Geschwind & Behan, 1982).   
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
Although most of the research on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has been 
conducted on war veterans, PTSD is also common in the general public.  Attempts to 
identify risk factors for PTSD other than exposure to trauma have indicated the 
importance of cerebral lateralization (Choudhary & O’Carrol, 2007).  Evidence suggests 
that the right-hemisphere of the brain is involved in experiencing negative emotion such 
as fear as well as in the avoidance of behavior.  Behavioral, electrophysical, and 
neuroimaging studies show comparative left-hemisphere hypoactivation and  
right-hemisphere hyperactivation in individuals with PTSD (Choudhary & O’Carrol, 
2007).  
In an attempt to better understand risk for developing PTSD, researchers proposed 
that a greater risk for developing PTSD in right-handers is associated with reduced 
cerebral lateralization for language.  Furthermore, a lesser degree of cerebral 
lateralization for language in right-handed people was associated with the following 
characteristics: female gender, familial left-handedness, and mixed lateral preference 
(Chemtob & Taylor, 2003).  According to this neuropsychological hypothesis, the right-
hemisphere in the brain is more involved in emotion regulation and detection of danger.  
Thus cerebral organization of right-handers with less cerebral lateralization for language 
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may give more weight to right-hemisphere input during ongoing cognitive processing 
cognitive processing (Chemtob & Taylor, 2003).   
An investigation with Israeli combat veterans indicated an association between 
mixed lateral preference among right-handed veterans with a vulnerability to combat-
related PTSD.  The study found a 65% rate of PTSD in mixed-handed veterans and a 
43% rate in consistent right-handed veterans.  Chemtob and Taylor (2003) replicated 
these findings in a sample of U.S. Veterans.  They explored the relationship between the 
occurrence and severity of PTSD with degree of lateral preference (mixed versus 
consistent) as well as parental left-handedness in right-handed Vietnam veterans. 
Chemtob and Taylor (2003) found that veterans with mixed lateral preference were more 
likely to have PTSD than were veterans with consistent lateral preference (Chemtob & 
Taylor, 2003).  Although these findings suggested a relationship between increased left-
handedness and increased PTSD symptomatology, they could not distinguish whether the 
results were due to mixed-handedness or left-handedness (Choudhary & O’Carroll, 
2007). 
In 2007, Choudhary and O’Carroll explored laterality and experience of trauma in 
a healthy sample as well as laterality and PTSD in a civilian population.  The authors 
hypothesized that there would be more leftward lateral preference in individuals with 
PTSD.  They recruited 596 individuals from the University of Sterling to participate in 
their study.  The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory and the Coren Inventory were used to 
measure lateral preference.  To assess PTSD, the authors distributed the Posttraumatic 
Diagnostic Scale (PTDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997) and, in some cases, a 
clinical interview.  The severity of reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal symptoms was 
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measured and summed.  Fifty-one participants met all the criteria for a diagnosis of 
PTSD with relatively more left-handers (15%) than right (8%).  Strong left-handers had a 
higher incidence of PTSD than did strong right-handers or mixed-handers.  Left-handers 
also had significantly higher scores for arousal symptoms of PTSD.  Thus, the authors 
found that leftward lateralization in handedness is associated with PTSD symptoms and 
prevalence.  They offered a possible explanation for this finding: left-handers may 
experience emotional events differently.  In addition, they suggested more research on the 
potential differences between left- and right-handers is necessary to further explain this 
phenomenon (Choudhary & O’Carroll, 2007). 
Left-Handedness and Cognition 
Actions are essential to human functioning and allow people to accomplish a 
variety of goals from eating and sleeping to buying a car and taking a vacation (Lozano, 
Hard, & Tversky, 2007).  Traditionally, action and perception have been considered to be 
separate domains with perception viewed as preceding action (Gallese, 2007).  Such 
traditional approaches viewed connections to the outside world as being of little 
importance to the mind and perception—that is, an individual’s perceptual and motor 
systems were considered to be input and output devices that did not impact cognitive 
processes or mental representations (Wilson, 2002).  This mode of thinking viewed 
cognition as relying on amodal abstractions that exist independently of physical 
operations.  This idea is based on the popular computer metaphor which makes the claim 
that the human mind’s software is independent of the body and brain hardware 
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). 
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Recently, there has been a shift towards a more holistic view of the mind and the 
body termed embodied cognition.  The basic idea of embodied cognition is that 
cognitions consist of simulations of bodily experiences (Casasanto, 2009).  According to 
this perspective, interactions with the physical space and world influence an individual’s 
thought processes and mental representations (Markman & Brendl, 2005).  Therefore the 
particular experiences an individual has with the environment effect cognition; thus 
individuals with different physical characteristics who inevitably interact with the word 
differently must also think differently (Casasanto, 2009).  Considering embodiment is an 
important aspect of understanding cognition, interest in this area has been increasing for 
the past thirty years (Markman & Brendl, 2005).   
As mentioned above, embodiment suggests that physical interactions with the 
world directly impacts cognition.  A growing body of research on embodied cognition 
shows that social and emotional information processing and the body are closely linked 
such that our actions influence the way we understand the world (Lozan, Hard, & 
Tversky, 2007).  More specifically, physical and bodily experiences are a requirement for 
perception (Gallese, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005).  In this respect, one’s cognitions are 
dependent upon the experiences one has with the world.  Furthermore, cognitions can be 
considered mental simulations of physical experiences (Casasanto, 2009; Lyre, 2008).   
One area emerging as a topic of interest in embodiment is handedness.  Inherent 
physical differences between left- and right-handers have sparked interest regarding the 
potential differences between in mental representations of abstract concepts.  Some of 
these studies will be discussed below.   
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Interest in handedness and cognition is two-fold.  In an attempt to explore the 
relationship between handedness and cognitive processes, researchers interested in 
handedness have referred to theories of embodied cognition.  Similarly, researchers 
interested in embodiment have expressed interest in handedness and the differences 
between left- and right-handed individuals: if individuals’ cognitions are influenced by 
bodily experiences, then people with different bodies and different bodily experiences 
must also think differently.  Individuals who are dominant with their right hand interact 
with the world in a way that is different from individuals who are dominant with their left 
hand.  Considering the differences regarding manual performance between left- and right-
handers, it is likely that right-handed individuals have more practice manipulating certain 
aspects of objects thus their understanding of that specific object is experientially 
different than left-handed individuals.  The reverse is also likely to be true.  Additionally, 
according to theories of embodied cognition, thinking about an action requires some 
mental simulation of how that action is carried out by the perceiver.  Therefore actions 
performed by the dominant hand should have qualitatively different mental 
representations in left- and right-handed individuals.  Casasanto (2009) termed this idea 
the body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009).   
  Casasanto (2009) conducted a series of five experiments to explore whether left- 
and right-handers differed in their mental representations of abstract concepts.  Casasanto 
(2009) was interested in how body-specificity may be important in the mental 
representation of abstract concepts.  Also of interest was how perceptuomotor simulations 
influence the mental representations of abstract concepts, such as deceit and honesty, 
despite the fact that such abstract concepts do not directly interact with individuals’ 
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perceptual and motor systems.  That is, these abstract concepts have not been perceived 
with senses or acted upon with muscles (Casasanto, 2009).  
According to Casasanto (2009), abstract concepts are mentally represented 
through the use of mental metaphors.  Mental metaphors, to some degree, are conditioned 
over time such that individuals make associations between emotional states and physical 
experiences that usually co-occur (e.g., standing tall is usually associated with feeling 
good and slouching down with feeling bad).  Through conditioning, mental metaphors 
such as positive is up and negative is down are established over time.  Mental metaphors 
are reflected in the physical world through linguistic metaphors.  After an association 
between a physical experience and an emotional state has been established, a mental 
metaphor is encoded through linguistic metaphors (Casasanto, 2009).   
Studies show that metaphors from the physical world influence mental 
representations of a variety of notions.  Examples of these include valenced concepts, 
time, power, and number.  Mental metaphors enable individuals to identify, compare, and 
contrast abstract concepts even without the use of linguistic metaphors (Casasanto, 2009).  
Casasanto (2009) aimed to explore whether handedness influences individuals’ judgment 
and the embodiment of mental metaphors.  Casasanto (2009) conducted five experiments 
to test the associations between valence and horizontal space in left- and right-handers 
(Casasanto, 2009).   
Casasanto (2009) concluded that there is a body-specific association between 
horizontal space and valence.  Casasanto found that right-handers’ responses were 
consistent with the mental metaphor of Good is Right whereas left-handers responses 
were consistent with the mental metaphor Good is Left.  The majority of participants’ 
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responses were consistent with the Good is Up metaphor regardless of their handedness.  
Considering left-handers have more interaction with the left resulting in more comfort 
and positive feelings toward the left aspect of objects/tasks therefore, handedness does 
influence individuals’ judgment.  The same is true for right-handers and the right.  This 
result supports the notion that the relationship between valence and horizontal space is 
body specific such that individuals experience positive valence depending on their 
interaction with physical space or the world (Casasanto, 2009). 
 Casasanto (2009) found significant differences between left- and right-handers in 
terms of emotional valence and lateralized physical action.  His research is consistent 
with the internalization of the Good is Left or Good is Right mental metaphors and 
supports the body-specificity hypothesis.  People with different bodies, in this case hand 
preference, develop different mental representations including abstract concepts and in 
the absence of using their hands (Casasanto, 2009).   
Although Casasanto’s (2009) findings are interesting and an important 
contribution to the literature in that they support the idea that embodiment influences 
mental representations of abstract concepts, there are some flaws in this research.  
Casasanto provided participants with pre-determined items on a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire which ignores the fact that there is very little, if anything at all, known 
about the mental life of left-handers as a group.  Most of the research conducted 
throughout time has been developed for or evaluated under the assumption that the 
respondents are right-handed.  There have not been any documented explorations of 
cognition as it is experienced by left-handers.  The cognitive experience of left-
handedness needs to be explored before aspects of experience can be calculated and 
 17 
quantified.  Casasanto (2009) also neglected to explore mental representations as they 
naturally occur.  It is possible that Casasanto targeted a characteristic of experience 
(emotional valence) in his study that the participants do not typically experience.  
Additionally, Casasanto (2009) inferred the presence and characteristics of mental 
representations in his study and did not actually observe them.  A way to approach the 
exploration of cognitive embodiment and handedness while attending to the difficulties 
previously mentioned is to use an exploratory, open-ended method that provides 
participants with the opportunity to relay their own, unique experiences (mental and 
physical) as they happen to them in their everyday lives.   
  Jones and Martin (1997) and McKelvie and Aikins (1993) explored the 
relationship between handedness and memory.  Jones and Martin (1997) asked subjects 
to recall the direction the head of Queen Elizabeth II faced on British and Canadian coins.  
They found that left-handers had a higher frequency of recalling the correct rightward 
direction of the Queen’s head than did right-handers (as cited in Martin & Jones, 1999).  
Thus handedness effects do appear to influence cognition.   
Martin and Jones (1999) conducted five experiments to evaluate the assumption 
that cognitive processes are independent of handedness.  They examined whether 
handedness effects on coin head recall also extend to coin head recognition using the coin 
head illusion.  All coins in Britain bear the profile of Queen Elizabeth II’s head facing the 
observer’s right.  Despite numerous interactions with coins, when asked to recall the 
direction of the Queen’s head, most people recall her head facing the left (Martin & 
Jones, 1999).   
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The results of Martin and Jones (1999) indicated a significant difference in 
recognition performance between left- and right-handed participants for memory of faces 
strongly oriented to the left or right.  In the first experiment, the authors found that the 
proportion of participants (from the University of Oxford) who recognized the image that 
accurately represented the Queen’s head on the British coin was significantly higher for 
left-handed participants than for right-handed.  In the second experiment, the authors 
found that this effect of handedness on memory for the orientation of a coin also exists 
when an experimental stimuli has only been seen on a single, controlled occasion.  The 
authors found that left-handed participants recognized right-facing heads better than 
right-handed participants, whereas right-handed participants recgonzed left-facing heads 
better than left-handed participants.  The authors reported that left-handers have an 
advantage in remembering right-facing heads whereas right-handers have an advantage 
remembering left-facing heads.  The authors suggested this difference is due to a 
mnemonic handedness effect with both material encountered in everyday life (such as a 
coin) and stimuli presented on one occasion in controlled conditions (Martin & Jones, 
1999).   
To test if there is an underlying effect of handedness on the physical drawing of 
an object, Martin and Jones (1999) conducted a fourth experiment.  They asked 
participants to “draw a quick sketch of your mother’s head in profile” and “draw a quick 
sketch of your bicycle,” (Martin & Jones, 1999, p. 273).  The proportion of rightward 
sketched bicycles did not differ between left- and right-handed participants; however, the 
proportion of rightward sketched heads was significantly higher for left-handed 
participants than right-handed (Martin & Jones, 1999).    
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The first four experiments in Martin and Jones’s (1999) study did not explore the 
subjective experience of the participants.  In their fifth experiment, they set out to 
investigate whether there is a correspondence between underlying motor processes and 
reports of mental experience.  This experiment involved recall, drawing, and mental 
drawing of Diana, Princess of Wales (a person whom the authors believed all the 
participants would be familiar with).  In the recall condition, the authors found no 
significant main effect of handedness but they did find a significant main effect of 
orientation and a significant interaction between handedness and orientation.  They 
concluded that left-handers were better at recalling the right-facing head than right-
handers whereas right-handers were better at recalling the left-facing head than left-
handers.  For the drawing condition, the proportion of participants who drew right-facing 
heads was significantly higher for left-handers than right-handers.  For the mental 
drawing condition, the proportion of participants who drew right-facing heads was 
significantly higher for left-handers than right-handers (Martin & Jones, 1999).  The 
authors concluded that a significant contralateral handedness effect exists on the contents 
of mental drawing thus asymmetric motor processes are activated during an entirely 
introspective task (Martin & Jones, 1999).   
Martin and Jones (1999) suggested that the motor image theory underlies the 
handedness effects of the above mentioned findings (Martin & Jones, 1999).  According 
to the motor image theory, “the brain processes that are involved when specific 
movements are performed should also be activated in the absence of the physical 
movements themselves,” (Viggiano & Vannucci, 2002, p. 1482).  If an object is being 
physically held by the left hand, then the significant parts of that object should be stored 
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into memory with the same spatial position and direction as it was experienced with the 
left hand (Viggiano & Vannucci, 2002).   
Viggiano and Vannucci (2002) investigated whether handedness and the 
directionality of objects impacts performance on drawing and visual objects 
identification.  In their first experiment, the authors found a handedness effect for animals 
and vehicles.  When drawing animal heads, right-handers exhibited a leftward preference 
whereas left-handers exhibited a rightward preference.  With regard to the anterior part of 
vehicles, right-handers exhibited a leftward preference whereas left-handers exhibited a 
rightward preference.   In the second experiment, the authors found a handedness effect 
in reaction times associated with correct identification of mobile objects (animals and 
vehicles) and animals.  Right-handers were faster at identifying mobile objects facing the 
left than mobile objects facing the right whereas the reverse was found in left-handers.  
Right-handers were faster at identifying animals facing the left than facing the right 
whereas the reverse was found in left-handers.  The authors concluded that mental 
representations involved in tasks such as object drawing and visual processes contain a 
directionality description of elements relevant to the object (Viggiano & Vannucci, 
2002).  A handedness effect was only found for two categories of objects (animals and 
vehicles) with the common features of asymmetry and motion (Viggiano & Vannucci, 
2002).  These findings are consistent with the idea of embodied cognition in that 
handedness influences individuals’ perceptions. 
Left-Handedness and Self-Awareness 
 Aside from some knowledge surrounding the difficulty left-handers have using 
items or tools designed for the right-handed person (e.g., desks, notebooks, can openers, 
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etc.) and some research exploring the associations between left-handedness and 
psychological and physical disorders, little is known about the inner experience of left-
handers.  The role of handedness has not been directly observed in studies of 
consciousness; however, studies have explored the role of hemispheric activity in self-
awareness and consciousness.   
Evidence suggests that tasks associated with the left- and right-hemisphere differ 
in electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings.  Ehrlichman and Wiener (1980) recorded the 
EEGs of subjects while they performed covert mental tasks.  The authors found the 
occurrence of EEG asymmetry related to left- and right-hemisphere tasks.  Their 
strongest finding involved covert verbalizations: the directions of all relationships were in 
accordance with the literature on hemispheric specialization.  Verbalizations were more 
strongly associated with left-hemisphere amplitude.  Ehrlichman and Wiener (1980) also 
suggested that EEG asymmetries reveal cognitive differences between visuospatial and 
verbal tasks.  The authors concluded that more research is necessary to identify accurate 
variation in hemispheric functioning (Ehrlichman & Wiener, 1980).      
Some of the research on self-awareness has focused on covert verbalizations, or 
inner speech.  Morin (2005) defined self awareness as “the capacity to become the object 
of one’s own attention, where the individual actively identifies, processes, and stores 
information about the self” (Morin, 2005, p. 116).  According to Morin, the self is 
involved in awareness through cognitive processes of imagery and inner speech.  Inner 
speech has been indicated in such tasks as verbal self-guidance, problem solving, and 
memory.  Morin argued that the role of inner speech in self awareness has been 
overlooked.  Inner speech allows an individual to become more aware of his/her 
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independent existence and mental states.  Morin argues that inner speech plays a 
fundamental role in self-awareness such that inner speech facilitates self-reflection 
through verbally communicating with oneself.  Furthermore, Morin suggests that without 
inner speech apprehending one’s inner life becomes difficult.  Morin compared inner 
speech to a flashlight illuminating the room of self-awareness—that is, inner speech 
makes self-awareness much more vivid and clear.  Due to the role of the left prefrontal 
lobe in self-reflection and inner speech, Morin suggested that the left-hemisphere is 
involved in self-awareness (Morin, 2005).  
Lindell (2006) argued that the left-hemisphere is not solely involved in language 
processing.  Lindell reported that “though there is no question that the left hemisphere is 
the superior language processor, a growing body of research has demonstrated significant 
linguistic ability in the “nonverbal” right hemisphere” (Lindell, 2006, p. 131).  Research 
shows that right-hemispheric language dominance directly increases with degree of left-
handedness.  Lindell focused on the 95% of the population in which the right-hemisphere 
lacks the ability to generate productive language.  Lindell reviewed a body of evidence 
suggesting right-hemispheric involvement in language processing.  The left-hemisphere 
is involved in propositional speech whereas the right-hemisphere is involved in 
nonpropositional speech involving the “holistic construction of automatic, formulaic, and 
context-bound utterances (e.g., counting, nursery rhymes, days of the week); 
verbalizations that neither involve the generation of new ideas nor the processing of such 
ideas into original, grammatical utterances” (Lindell, 2006, p. 133).  Lindell reported that 
the right-hemisphere is involved in the prosody of speech, including changes in pitch and 
rhythm.  The right-hemisphere is also efficient in recognizing words that represent a 
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concrete referent, such as giraffe, whereas performance declines when the word 
represents an abstract concept, such as faith.  Lindell’s findings suggest that both 
hemispheres play a role in language processing and production (Lindell, 2006).  
Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson, and Barnacz (2005) examined the role of the 
right-hemisphere in self-awareness and the theory of mind.  They reported that assessing 
consciousness in the right-hemisphere tends to be difficult because the traditional speech 
areas are located in the left-hemisphere; thus the right-hemisphere cannot verbalize its 
consciousness.  The authors report that theory of mind and self-awareness are related in 
that one must have an understanding of one’s own mind to be able to understand the mind 
of another.  Theory of mind “involves the recognition that other minds are possible, and 
the individual may be privy to thoughts of another” (Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson, 
& Barnacz, 2005, p. 695).  The authors hypothesized that the right-hemisphere is active 
in higher-order consciousness (Keenan et al., 2005).   
In 2001, Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, and Pascual-Leone used an fMRI to explore 
cortical correlates during face recognition.  They found that the right prefrontal cortex 
was active in participants during self-recognition, supporting the idea that self-
recognition results from right-hemisphere activity (Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001).  Similarly, Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herman, Falkai, Maier, 
Shah, Fink, and Zilles (2001) used fMRI to investigate the neural mechanisms of taking 
one’s own perspective and taking someone else’s perspective.  Vogeley et al. (2001) 
found that self-perspective was associated with an increase in right temporoparietal 
activity as well as activity in the anterior cingulate cortex.  Theory of mind was 
associated with an increase in anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex 
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activity.  In addition, there was an interaction of both self-perspective and theory of mind 
in the right prefrontal cortex (Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herrman, Falkai, Maier, Shah, 
Fink, & Zilles, 2001).  Research suggests that there are differential mechanisms in terms 
of consciousness and that the right-hemisphere is more involved in processing of the self 
(Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, & Pascual-Leone, 2001).   
Research regarding the localization of self-awareness is inconsistent.  
Investigators have focused on certain tasks and attributed the localization of self 
awareness to their respective cerebral hemisphere.  Studies have employed EEG 
recordings, fMRIs, etc. to explore this phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTROSPECTIVE MEASURES 
Understanding Inner Experience 
Thinking is one of the most fundamental phenomena in psychology, but despite 
its importance, efforts to understand and explain this phenomenon have been 
unsuccessful (Aanstoos, 1983).  Cognitive scientists have inferred cognitive processes 
through the development of performance measures.  Clinical psychologists have relied on 
the self-reports of their clients during interviews or on questionnaires (Davison, Navarre, 
& Vogel, 1995). The questionnaire approach is limited by its retrospectiveness when 
trying to access an individual’s stream of thought (Singer, 1975).  Recall biases that 
affect the reliability of self-report and questionnaire data include: 1) participants tend to 
remember events that are more recent; 2) more salient experiences are likely to be 
recalled; 3) participants have a tendency to recall events that make them consistent with 
their view of how the world functions (Smyth & Stone, 2003; Yoschiuchi, Yamamoto, & 
Akabayashi, 2008); 4) recall can be influenced be experiences that happen after the 
situation to be recalled; and 5) recall may be impacted by the participant’s current mood 
(Smyth & Stone, 2003).  In addition, participants may misunderstand the questionnaire 
instructions (Smyth & Stone, 2003; Yoschiuchi et al., 2008). 
The need for alternative methods of examining the study of ongoing behavior and 
everyday experiences arose from the limitations of laboratory studies.  Investigators 
called for a method that could provide ecological validity for the behavior of interest, aid 
in the understanding of ongoing behaviors, explore the interaction between situation and 
personality, and restore interest in the study of the individual (Hormuth, 1986).  In an 
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effort to reduce the recall biases of self-report and questionnaire measures and the lack of 
ecological validity of laboratory studies, psychologists have developed procedures to 
access the inner world of individuals (Davison et al., 1995).  A variety of these measures 
will be discussed below.   
Think-Aloud Methods 
Think-aloud methods are designed to access an individual’s cognitions.  This 
involves an individual’s reporting aloud the thoughts that occur while he/she is 
completing a problem-solving task.  The goal of this method is to provide information 
about the content and process of an individual’s cognitions.  Think-aloud methods have 
been used since the 1940’s to explore problem solving and, more recently, to study other 
types of spur-of-the-moment thought (Klinger, 1978).  Modern think aloud methods 
consist of recording participants’ verbalizations of their cognitions while engaged in a 
designated activity.  Their responses are then evaluated in an attempt to understand an 
individual’s ongoing thought process (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997; Singer, 1975).   
Think-aloud measures have been criticized for several reasons.  The situation 
itself is unnatural.  Because individuals can verbalize only one thought at a time, only a 
small portion of what is going on inside the participants’ mind is captured (Klinger, 
1978).  In addition, the task itself may influence the behavior of the participants (Davison 
et al., 1995).  For example, evidence suggests that thinking out loud results in spending 
more time on a content theme (Klinger, 1978).  Lastly, cognitions that are of low 
frequency but high significance may not be captured (Davison et al., 1995). 
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Thought-Sampling   
Thought-sampling is a method for exploring thought content that tries to avoid 
some of those pitfalls.  An experimenter will interrupt individuals during whatever 
activity they are engaged in and will request a narrative description of their consciousness 
before the interruption (Klinger, 1978).   
In vivo thought sampling.  
Klinger developed a thought-sampling approach that incorporated randomness 
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979; Klinger, 1978-79).  Participants in this method are to carry a 
beeper and, when the beeper sounds, freely record their thoughts or rate their inner 
experience using a Thought Sampling Questionnaire.  The questionnaire consists of 
variables such as length of thought, vividness, and level of trust of their own memory.  
Participants may also use tape recorders to dictate their thoughts (Kendall & Korgeski, 
1979).  This method allows the researcher to compare non-retrospective data about the 
participant’s cognitions with the participant’s impression of his/her thought pattern 
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979). 
During his original study in 1978-79, Klinger used the thought-sampling 
technique to investigate the differences between fantasy and directed thought.  He 
differentiated between two types of thought: operant thought processes, which are 
directed or task-oriented, and respondent processes, which are random daydreams or 
undirected thought.  Through the use of thought-sampling, he showed the importance of 
current concerns as foreshadowing the content in the stream of consciousness (Klinger, 
1978-79; Singer & Kolligian, 1987).  Klinger recruited 20 college students who 
completed a series of questionnaires and interviews, underwent training for reporting 
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their inner experience, maintained a structured diary describing their lives in detail, and 
participated in a thought-sampling procedure every few weeks (Klinger, 1978-79).   
Klinger used two types of thought-sampling methods.  One took place in the 
laboratory; participants listened to two 15-minute prose narratives simultaneously 
through earphones.  The passages had been altered on both channels on 12 different 
points to relate to a concern of the participant on one channel and relate to something 
irrelevant to the participant on the other.  Klinger provided trained participants with a 
portable beeper that went off at random intervals.  The randomness of the beeper allowed 
Klinger to conclude that he was actually capturing a random collection of cognitions 
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979; Klinger, 1978-79).  A tone was sounded 10 seconds after the 
end of each altered passage, at which point the tape was stopped and participants reported 
the thoughts that were occurring to them the moment before the tone sounded.  
Participants completed a Thought-Sampling Questionnaire which consisted of a narrative 
description of the mental content and ratings of variables.  The additional variables 
included: duration of thought, specificity, directedness, simultaneous thoughts, 
detailedness, visualness, auditoriness, attentive to cues, recall of cues, controllability, 
confidence in recall of thought, usualness, and strangeness.  Lastly, participants rated 
their ability to accurately rate the variables.  In total, 936 thought samples were collected 
over a series of 78 listening sessions (Klinger, 1978-79).   
The second sampling model occurred outside of the laboratory and provided 285 
thought-samples over a series of 24 days.  Only 12 of the student participants completed 
this portion.  Participants were provided with a device that sounded randomly (“beeper”).  
The beeper sounded roughly once every 40 minutes.  Participants were to carry the 
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beeper with them during their daily routines for a total of 24 waking hours.  They were 
also provided with a pad of Thought-Sampling Questionnaires to be completed.  When 
the beeper sounded, participants filled out a Thought-Sampling Questionnaire that was 
almost identical to the laboratory questionnaire (Klinger, 1978-79).   
Klinger reported that the distribution of thought properties outside of the 
laboratory (the second sampling model) more likely represent typical human experience 
than the laboratory model.  He reported outside of the laboratory thoughts tended to be 
more specific, more focused on the present, more directed, and more tied to immediate 
stimuli than thought inside the laboratory.  There appeared to be little difference with 
regard to vividness of imagery between the two settings.  Klinger found that the majority 
of the participants had operant thought processes with some respondent elements.  
Participants rated operant thoughts as more specific, controllable, more relevant to 
setting, and more recallable.  Most thoughts were visual, brief, and related to ongoing 
activity.  Most thoughts involved ongoing activity and consisted of typical kinds of 
content; however, more than one fifth involved unusual or distorted features which were 
mostly visual and brief (Klinger, 1978-79).  Furthermore, Klinger reported that his 
findings provide strong evidence that waking thought varies along three dimensions: 
respondentness, stimulus independence, and fancifulness.  He suggested a need to clearly 
differentiate between the terms “daydreaming” and “fantasy.”  Based on his findings, 
Klinger reported that a “daydream” should be redefined as “thought that is respondent, 
stimulus-independent, and fanciful.” (Klinger, 1978-79, p.112).  Deliberate daydreams or 
daydreams intentionally started for purposes such as self-entertainment or self-arousal 
should be redefined as “thought that is operant, stimulus-independent, and fanciful” (p. 
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112) and mind wandering about one’s own life should be redefined as “thought that is 
respondent, stimulus-independent, and unfanciful” (Klinger, 1978-79, p.112). 
More recently, Zotter and Crowther (1993) investigated cognitive characteristics 
of bulimic, nonbulimic, repetitive dieting, and nondieting women on two randomly 
selected days using in vivo thought-sampling.  After screening and training were 
completed, participants received a three inch by five inch spiral notebook and an alarm 
that signaled every 30 minutes.  Participants were told to record the thought they were 
having and the activity they were engaged in at the moment just before the alarm 
sounded.  The researchers found that bulimic women report a significantly greater 
amount of eating or weight-related thoughts than do nonbulimic and nondieting women.  
In addition, the thoughts of bulimic women are more likely to be of negative affect than 
the other women.  Zotter and Crowther reported that their findings were consistent with 
theoretical models of bulimia nervosa such that bulimics are more preoccupied with 
thoughts of food, eating, weight, and shape (Zotter & Crowther, 1993).     
Thought-sampling method.  
A thought-sampling (or thought-and-mood sampling) method was developed by 
Hurlburt to access and quantify an individual’s mental life (Hurlburt, 1980).  Participants 
were given a random interval sound generator and told to carry the generator with them 
from the moment they woke up in the morning until the time they went to bed for three 
consecutive days (Hurlburt, 1979).  Participants were then interrupted at random intervals 
and self-reported the thought that was occurring at the moment of interruption, what they 
were doing, and the time of day (Hurlburt, 1979; Hurlburt, 1980).     
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Unlike retrospective methods, thought-sampling involves an immediate 
description of an actually occurring thought.  This technique aims to gain ecologically 
valid data of thinking and behavior by eliciting responses from individuals in their natural 
environments.  Individuals respond to random beeps and record their thoughts along with 
any additional inner or outer experiences that were occurring at the time of the beep.  
Participants respond by either completing a quantitative questionnaire, providing a short 
written narration of their experience, or a combination of the two (Hurlburt, 1997).  This 
process is repeated until a series of single-thought descriptions are acquired.  An 
investigator rates the series of single-thought descriptions on rating scales (Hurlburt, 
1980).  The primary goal is for the investigator to quantify the aspects of the individual’s 
thinking or thinking and mood (Hurlburt, 1997).   
Articulated Thoughts During Simulated Situations 
 In 1983, Davison, Robbins, and Johnson developed an alternative approach to the 
think-aloud paradigm.  They evaluated the approaches developed by both Hurlburt and 
Klinger and acknowledged that in-vivo thought sampling had potential in terms of 
eliciting the participants’ immediate concerns; however, they reported the technique 
lacked in ability to control or be knowledgeable about the actual stimuli the participants 
were reacting to.  In addition, the questionnaire format restricted the breadth of cognition 
obtained.  In response to these limitations, they proposed a need for a better method of 
exploring cognition (Davison, Robins, & Johnson, 1983).   
Davison et al. (1983) identified four main features necessary in a cognition 
exploring method including: 1) allowing for open-ended verbal responses that would 
capture the participant’s ongoing thought process as opposed to retrospective reporting; 
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2) the experimenter should present realistic and complex stimuli to the participants as 
well as have the capability of manipulating the stimuli; 3) both anxiety-provoking and 
neutral stimuli should be presented to the participants; and 4) the procedure should not be 
time-consuming or expensive.  They introduced a model they believed met those 
requirements: Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison et al., 
1983). 
ATSS offers an alternative to structured questionnaire methods (Davison, Haaga, 
Rosenbaum, Dolezal, & Weinstein, 1991).  Davison et al. (1997) refer to ATSS as a 
“paradigm” because of its generality and lack of specificity in terms of procedures and 
technology (Davison et al., 1997).  The procedure involves participants’ listening and 
responding to audio-taped conversations intended to mimic a complex event.  Participants 
listen to a 15-25 second audio-recording and are asked to imagine that the event is real 
and that they are a part of it.  The researchers tell the participants that they are interested 
in the thoughts and feelings occurring during the situation.  Following the recording are 
30 seconds of silence.  During the silent 30 seconds, the participants verbally report what 
they are thinking and/or feeling (Davison et al., 1983).  Participants are told to say as 
much as they can until the 30 seconds are over (Davison et al., 1997).  After the report, 
another 15-25 second segment is played, followed by the participants’ 30-second report, 
and so on.  Participants’ verbal reports are tape-recorded to be analyzed later (Davison et 
al., 1983).   
Davison et al. (1997) reported that ATSS compliments the in vivo random 
sampling of cognitions demonstrated by Hurlburt (1979).  Furthermore, they report that 
the flexibility of ATSS allows researchers to evaluate cognitions in situations that would 
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be impractical, unethical, or too complex to study in vivo (Davison et al., 1997).  Because 
of the unstructured response format of ATSS, respondents are provided an opportunity to 
engage in open-ended responding.  This format increases the likelihood that the 
researcher is actually capturing the scope of the participants’ cognitions without limiting 
them to experimenter-selected options.  The authors state that “thinking aloud that 
immediately follows each brief segment taps cognitions as close to on-line as possible” 
(Davison et al., 1997, p. 952).  By dividing the ATSS stimulus tapes into short segments, 
participants’ retrospective responding with generalized thinking patterns is reduced 
(Davison et al., 1997).  Due to the specificity of the audiotaped hypothetical situations 
presented to the participants, Davison et al. (1997) reported that ATSS provides 
situational specificity and experimental control in assessing cognitions.  The researcher 
can confidently relate certain thoughts with certain situations as well as compare 
categories of thought across individuals.  Researchers can also evaluate thoughts that are 
of importance but which only occur in infrequent situations (Davison et al., 1997).   
 For example, Eckhardt, Barbour, and Davison (1998) evaluated the associates of 
anger arousal in a community sample of 88 married men.  The men were grouped into 
one of three groups; maritally violent (MV), maritally distressed-nonviolent (DNV), and 
maritally satisfied-nonviolent (SNV).  The participants completed an assessment packet 
consisting of a State Anger Scale, Survey of Personal Beliefs, and Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale.  Upon completion of the assessment packet, the participants listened to 
tape-recorded instructions informing them of the ATSS procedure.  Three stimulus 
situations were included: two anger-inducing scenarios (overheard conversation and 
jealousy), and one control.  Each scenario was divided into eight 30-second segments.  
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The researchers found that MV males articulated more aggregate irrational beliefs and 
cognitive biases during anger arousal than did nonviolent males.  In addition, ATSS was 
more successful in discriminating between the groups as compared to the questionnaires.  
The researchers concluded that the fact that ATSS measures cognition while participants 
are enduring affective arousal is a significant strength in support of the method (Eckhardt 
et al., 1998).   
Thought-Listing 
 Brock and Greenwald developed a self-report tool called the thought-listing 
procedure in the late 1960s.  This procedure allows for eliciting either spoken or written 
listings.  Participants are asked to list all the thoughts they were having when presented 
with a stimulus or a communication or problem of topic.  It is assumed that participants 
are able to distinguish thoughts elicited by the stimulus from other thoughts (Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1981).  Thought-listing differs from thought-sampling in that the listing occurs 
immediately after the event rather than at an interruption during the event. 
Cacioppo, Glass, and Merluzzi (1977) used thought-listing to study the social 
anxiety of male participants prior to interacting with a female confederate.  They found 
that male participants who scored high on The Social Avoidance and Distress Scale 
provided more negative self-statements (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1977; Davison et 
al., 1997). 
Forerunners to Modern Sampling 
 Flugel’s method. 
  In 1925, Flugel proposed a method that would study the affect of individuals in 
their normal, every day life.  Flugel observed affect at intervals varying from two minutes 
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to two hours.  The nature and duration of the day’s activities largely determined the 
length between the intervals.  Flugel’s method had two main goals: 1) to quantify the 
length and amount of pleasurable activities and unpleasurable activities experienced by 
individuals, and 2) to describe the mental states such as sensations, moods, emotions and 
thoughts that are related to the incidences of pleasures or unpleasures (Flugel, 1925).   
Participants in Flugel’s study were instructed to keep a detailed record of their 
pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences and the accompanying emotions.  
Furthermore, they were told to make frequent entries as to provide a more accurate 
description of the state.  Participants rated the amount of their pleasure or unpleasure 
from -100 to +100.  A rating of +100 indicated the most pleasure whereas a rating of -100 
indicated the most intense unpleasure.  A rating of zero indicated indifference.  
Participants also reported the content of the activity/experience as well as a description of 
the activity/experience.  They were instructed to record their affective states for at least 
30 days.  In addition, they were given a list of questions to answer regarding their opinion 
of the captured affective states (Flugel, 1925).   
Experience sampling method.  
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) was developed by Csikszentmihalyi, 
Larson, and Reed to explore the activities and experiences of individuals in a natural 
setting (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987).  ESM provides an opportunity to explore the 
activities, thoughts, and feelings of individuals in the moment rather than retrospectively 
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982).  ESM participants respond to random or quasi-
random beeps which signal the participants to report various aspects of their experience 
on the Experience-Sampling Form (ESF).  ESF is a questionnaire designed to access the 
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internal and external situation of the participant at the time of the signal.  The form 
consists of a variety of items, including open-ended questions regarding the location of 
the participant, activities the participant is engaged in, content of cognitions, and time.  
Likert-type items measure the participant’s motivation, activation, cognitive competency, 
and affect (Csikszentmihaly & Larson, 1987).   
An example is discussed to illustrate the use of this method.  The earliest 
investigation using ESM began at the University of Chicago in 1975.  Csikszentmihalyi 
et al. (1977) sampled 25 adolescent (age 13-18) volunteers in the Chicago area.  The 
participants completed self-report forms at random times throughout a week, cued by an 
electronic paging device that sounded a beep at a predetermined, quasi-random schedule.  
The schedule consisted of five to seven signals per day during normal waking hours.  
Each participant was given a book of 50 self-report forms which consisted of four groups 
of items.  The first group consisted of open-ended questions involving the participant’s 
location at the time of the beep, the activity they were engaged in, any other activities 
going on, and who they were with.  The second group inquired why the participant was 
doing the aforementioned activity.  They were to check one of three choices, including an 
obligation to do it, a desire to do it, or lack of something else to do.  The next group of 
items was designed to evaluate the quality of the participant’s interaction with his/her 
environment.  Participants were to respond to these questions on a 10-point scale ranging 
from “low” to “high.”  Questions included their challenges during the activity, their skills 
in the activity, and their level of control over the activity.  The last group consisted of 13 
items designed to access semantic differences between mood and physical experiences.  
Participants rated their state at the signaled moment on 7-point scales of adjectives.  The 
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ends of each scale consisted of extreme opposites.  The authors found that their sample 
spent most of their time in conversation with their peers or watching television 
(Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977).   
Johnson and Larson (1982) used ESM to investigate characteristics of the daily 
lives of normal-weight bulimic women.  They compared the overall moods, mood 
fluctuation, social isolation, and amount of food related behavior of 15 bulimic patients 
with 24 normal controls.  Each participant provided self-reports of 40 to 50 random 
moments in her life.  Johnson and Larson (1982) found that bulimic women report 
negative mood states significantly more often than do normal women.  Bulimic women 
experienced more dysphoria and mood fluctuation than did normal women.  Overall, 
bulimic women as a group were significantly more sad, lonely, irritable, passive, weak, 
and constrained than the normal group.  The two groups did not differ on items related to 
excitement and alertness (Johnson & Larson, 1982). 
Ecological momentary assessment.  
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) was developed as a way of assessing 
variations in behavior across time and situations (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).  Shiffman, 
Stone, and Hufford (2008) argued that the typical scientific emphasis on global 
assessments and retrospective reports limit both scientists and practitioners from 
obtaining a complete and accurate depiction of an individual’s behavior (Shiffman, 
Stone, & Hufford, 2008).  EMA allows subjects to report their experiences in their real 
world (Shiffman et al., 2008).  EMA attempts to capture momentary reports of 
psychological, behavioral, and physiological aspects in an individual’s natural 
environment (Smyth & Stone, 2003).  Collection of many momentary reports allows the 
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researcher to arrive at a general picture of the participant’s characteristics.  The inductive 
approach of EMA uses sampling of many immediate, momentary instances to create a 
summary of the particular phenomenon of interest (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).   
In EMA individuals are signaled in their natural environment to immediately 
report on a specific construct over repeated intervals (Smyth & Stone, 2003).  For 
example, individuals may be asked to report on current or recent psychological states, 
environmental conditions or behaviors.  Individuals are usually signaled multiple times a 
day for a period of days or weeks (Smyth & Stone, 2003).  Although EMA is similar to 
ESM, EMA collects more diverse information and uses more flexible measures compared 
to the self-report measures, checklists, or brief open-ended questions collected in ESM.   
Smyth and Stone (2003) maintained that EMA and other data capturing 
techniques were developed in response to the concern that retrospective recall of self-
reported experiences in orthodox science are faulty.  One of the concerns deals with 
retroactive reconstruction or the influence the outcome of an event has on the recall of the 
actual event.  By signaling an individual to immediately report on a specific construct, 
EMA helps control for retroactive reconstruction.  Another concern with orthodox data 
collection measures deals with ecological validity or generalizability of research 
conducted in the laboratory.  There is concern that data collected solely in the laboratory 
may lack generalizability.  Participants’ behaviors or psychophysiological processes may 
differ in contrived situations such as the laboratory from their own natural environments.  
Some situations may also be too difficult or unethical to recreate in the laboratory.  EMA 
signals participants in their natural environment thus reducing ecological validity and 
generalizability concerns (Smyth & Stone, 2003).  
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EMA studies vary depending on the behavior of interest to be studied. 
Longitudinal designs using the EMA method have been used to study stress and coping, 
depression, asthma, chronic pain, personality traits and negative affect, as well as eating 
disorders (Smyth, Wonderlich, Crosby, Miletnberger, Mitchell, & Rorty, 2001). Shiffman 
and Stone (1998) report that EMA has great potential to enhance the understanding of 
how behavioral factors effects disease (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).             
Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis, Arnow, and Wilfley (2007) tried to identify 
the motivation behind binge eating in binge eating disorder through an exploration of the 
antecedents and consequences of binge eating using EMA.  They gave 33 females with 
binge eating disorder a handheld computer for seven days and asked them to specify their 
present hunger, emotions, and binge status when the computer signaled them to do so.  
Investigators found more negative mood and hunger in prebinge than nonbinge times.  
Negative mood was highest after the binge.  Because of the heightened negative mood 
following a binge, Stein et al. (2007) proposed that further research is necessary to 
explore the reinforcing aspects of a binge.  The authors suggested an escape from self-
awareness as a potential benefit of bingeing (Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis, 
Arnow, & Wilfley, 2007). 
Descriptive experience sampling.  
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a descriptive 
sampling method designed to explore and describe inner experience.  Hurlburt and 
Akhter (2006) define inner experience as “anything that is going on in awareness at the 
particular moment defined by the beep” (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, p. 274).  DES was 
developed by Hurlburt and grew out of his thought-sampling and cognition-sampling 
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methods.  DES was a response to the many problems and inadequacies of other methods 
of introspection (Wheeler & Reis, 1991).  Hurlburt sought to describe real inner 
experience data by capturing participant’s cognitions at random moments (Hurlburt, 
1997; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).   
DES is designed to capture inner experience as it occurs in the natural 
environment (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Hurlburt and Akhter referred to the real events 
that are really being experienced by real people as “pristine experiences.”  They reported 
that “pristine experiences” are important aspects of consciousness research and 
psychology and general (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).   
DES is not only designed to provide high fidelity descriptions of individuals’ 
inner experiences, but to discover patterns of experience within individuals and across 
individuals within groups.  At any point in time, an individual has a countless array of 
possible experiences.  These experiences may be external such as temperature, tastes, and 
smells.  They may be interoceptive, proprioceptive, or kinesthetic such as pressures, 
itches, and tickles.  These potential experiences may also be inner events such as images, 
feelings, and thoughts.  At any moment, a person generally chooses one (sometimes 
more) of these possibilities to create his or her pristine experience.  One individual may 
have an emotional experience while someone else, in the same situation, might have a 
visual image.  The goal of DES is to catch these pristine experiences in flight (Hurlburt & 
Akhter, 2006).  Inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, inner images, feelings, and sensory 
awareness are examples of frequently found characteristics that have emerged across 
subjects using DES (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Heavey, 
2006).   
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 The method of DES has been refined throughout the years; however, the main 
aspects of the method remain.  A participant wears a beeper in his or her everyday 
environment.  The beeper sounds at random intervals averaging six beeps per three hours.  
The beeps are delivered through an earphone and prompt the participant to pay attention 
to the experience that was ongoing at the last undisturbed moment before the beep.  The 
participant is asked to immediately record the details of his/her experience in a notebook 
or other form of recording device.  Within 24 hours of capturing a certain number of 
experiences, usually six, the participant will meet with a DES investigator for an 
expositional interview.  This interview is designed to aid participants in providing high 
fidelity descriptions of their sampled experiences.  Upon completion of the interview, the 
investigator writes the description of the participant’s inner experience at each sampled 
beep.  This process is repeated over several sampling days, usually four to eight, until 
approximately 20 to 50 samples of experience have been collected (Heavey & Hurlburt, 
2008; Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).   
DES is an idiographic procedure that produces a characterization of a specific 
person’s experiences (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).  Some DES studies collect samples 
from a group of participants that have some commonality.  In this case, the investigator 
reviews each idiographic characterization to see if the participants have any significant 
characteristics in common.  Thus, DES may be used in one of two ways: 1) as a purely 
idiographic procedure used to capture the inner experience of one individual, or 2) as a 
sequence of idiographic procedures with an ultimate, nomothetic purpose (Hurlburt & 
Akhter, 2006).   
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For example, Jones-Forrester (2009) used DES to explore the inner experience of 
13 individuals with bulimia nervosa.  Participants were given a small beeper that sounded 
a 400 Hz tone at random intervals ranging from one minute to one hour.  Participants 
were provided with a small spiral notebook to record notes on their inner experience 
when the beep signaled.  Participants were instructed to wear their beeper for 
approximately three hours (to allow for six beeps) during their daily activity.  Participants 
were interviewed using the DES expositional interview method within 24 hours of 
collecting their six beeps.  The DES expositional interview consisted of detailed 
questions to allow for an accurate depiction of the participant’s experience at the moment 
of each beep.  Participants repeated the sampling/interview process approximately six 
times each.  Jones-Forrester summarized the salient characteristics of each individual as 
well as the salient characteristics of the group.  She found that all the participants had 
attention that was divided, which she referred to as fragmentation.  Additionally, Jones-
Forrester reported that the inner experience of individuals with bulimia nervosa was 
characterized by unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, inner seeing, poorly differentiated 
affect that is confused with cognition, and the presence of interfering phenomena (Jones-
Forrester, 2009).    
DES Compared to Other Methods 
Various methods of exploring the subjective experiences of individuals have been 
reviewed.  This section will review the differences between those approaches and how 
DES may add to the understanding of the inner experience of left-handers. 
The think aloud paradigm attempts to understand the emotions and cognitions of 
individuals as they occur.  Think aloud studies are not retrospective in that investigation 
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occurs while the participants are in the moment.  In addition, participants’ reports are 
recorded verbatim so that details are not missed.  This approach provides a detailed report 
of the internal processes of the participants.  DES is similar to the think aloud paradigm 
in that they are both interested in a detailed depiction of the inner world of individuals.  
The think aloud paradigm uses the participants’ verbal narrative of their experiences as 
the primary mode of data.  Unlike think aloud studies that explore preselected events, 
DES explores single, momentary experiences.  DES randomly samples participants in 
their natural environment whereas think aloud studies occur in experimental conditions.  
The fidelity of the think aloud results are limited by the amount that can be narrated while 
an activity is ongoing; that generally results in a gloss on cognitions, or perhaps 
cognitions and emotions.  By contrast, DES has no time constraints.  It aims at a 
particular moment, and will take as long as is required to elaborate all the salient details 
of that momentary experience, thus allowing complex characteristics of an individual’s 
inner experience, including thoughts, feelings, sensations, and multiple simultaneous 
instances thereof to emerge.  Furthermore, the DES focus on iterative immersion in the 
method facilitates the bracketing of presuppositions necessary to high fidelity 
descriptions. 
Thought-sampling methods spontaneously explore thought content.  
Experimenters interrupt participants as they are engaging in a task and solicit for a 
narrative description of their thought content before the interruption.  In Vivo Thought 
Sampling uses a beeper to randomly sample the inner experience of participants.  When 
the beeper sounds, participants complete a Thought Sampling Questionnaire, rating 
characteristic of their thoughts on Likert-type scales.  Similarly, Thought-and-Mood 
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Sampling also randomly explores the cognitions of individuals as they occur in their 
natural environment; however, it also accesses their moods.  DES is similar to Thought 
(and Mood) Sampling in that both randomly sample participants in their natural 
environments.  Unlike DES, Thought Sampling has participants rate their cognitive 
experiences on a questionnaire.  Unlike Thought (and Mood) Sampling, DES explores all 
aspects of an individual’s inner experience, not only their thoughts and/or moods.    
 ATSS is a broader approach to accessing the cognitions of individuals than 
thought-sampling and the think-aloud paradigm.  ATSS studies are conducted in a 
controlled laboratory setting.  Individuals listen and react to a series of tape-recorded 
simulated situations.  ATSS is useful in that it allows investigators to explore cognitions 
during infrequent or complex situations.  Individuals provide open-ended responses to the 
simulations.  In this sense, ATSS is similar to DES because both allow participants to 
present the full range of their inner experience.  Unlike DES, ATSS is conducted in a 
laboratory setting and explores only the cognitions of the participants.  And, perhaps 
most importantly, ATSS aims at simulations whereas DES aims at pristine, naturally 
occurring experiences.  There are some situations where simulations are doubtless 
faithful copies of pristine experiences, some situations where they are not.  
Unfortunately, at this stage it is unknown which is which. 
 Thought-listing is a self-report procedure which elicits participant’s thoughts 
directly after an event.  This is different from DES in that thought-listing is conducted in 
a controlled, laboratory setting.  Additionally, the investigators in thought-listing studies 
explore the thoughts surrounding certain situations from individuals.  These lists are all 
retrospective and are aimed only at thoughts with no careful attention paid to the 
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bracketing of the participants’ or the investigators’ presuppositions about the existence of 
or nature of thoughts. 
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) and Ecological Momentary Assessment 
(EMA) use beepers to interrupt individuals, randomly or at a set time, during their 
naturally occurring lives.  At the moment of beep, participants complete a questionnaire 
which solicits feedback about their location, mood, environment, and other general 
characteristics at the time of the beep.  These methods provide an overview of who, what, 
when, and where people spend their time as well as what they think and how they feel.  
DES is similar to ESM and EMA in that both use beepers to sample experiences in the 
naturally occurring lives of individuals.  DES differs from ESM and EMA by working to 
bracket presuppositions individuals have about the nature inner experience.  Beliefs about 
what one will find in a particular person’s inner experience are set aside as to not 
contaminate what is there to be discovered.  DES does not have a set of predetermined 
questions that may limit the scope of inner experience elicited.  In this way, DES is both 
open ended and “open beginninged” (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).   
DES is unlike Thought-Sampling methods, ESM, and EMA in that it is a 
qualitative method that provides qualitative descriptions and not quantitative analysis.  
DES has an open-ended approach in that it allows the participants to develop their own 
descriptive language for their inner experience.  DES does not constrict participants’ 
descriptions of their inner experiences by having them answer questions based on a 
predetermined concept or construct.  The participant and the DES investigator together 
develop apprehensions of experience over the course of several iteratively improving 
interviews.  In addition, the participant and investigator together identify salient 
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characteristics of the participant’s inner experience.  After these salient characteristics 
specific to a certain participant’s inner experience have been identified, the investigator 
may identify nomothetic regularities that occur among those who share a certain 
similarity (Hurlburt, 1997).   
For example, the differences between thought-sampling, ESM, EMA, and DES 
can be seen in the motivation for and findings of their respective studies.  To illuminate 
the differences between the methods, four studies of bulimia nervosa, one a thought 
sampling study, one an ESM study, one an EMA study, and one a DES study will be 
discussed.   
Zotter and Crowther (1994), in the study described above in the In Vivo Thought 
Sampling section, used in vivo thought-sampling to explore the cognitive characteristics 
of bulimic, nonbulimic, repetitive dieting, and nondieting women on two randomly 
selected days.  Participants were provided with an alarm that sounded every 30 minutes.  
They were instructed to record the time, the thoughts they were having, and the activity 
they were engaged in the moment before the alarm sounded.  Investigators found that 
bulimic women reported significantly more eating and weight-related thoughts than 
nonbulimic or nondieting women (Zotter & Crowther, 1994).   
Johnson and Larson (1982) used ESM to explore the characteristics of the daily 
lives of normal-weight bulimic women.  They investigated the overall moods, mood 
fluctuation, social isolation, and amount of food related behavior of bulimic patients as 
compared to normal control.  Bulimic and normative women were provided with an 
electronic pager that sounded randomly.  The sounding of the pager prompted the 
participants to fill out a self-report questionnaire which asked about their situation and 
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subjective experiences at that moment.  Johnson and Larson (1982) found that bulimic 
women report negative mood states significantly more than normal women.  In addition, 
bulimic women experienced more dysphoria and mood fluctuations, were more sad, 
lonely, irritable, passive, weak, and constrained than normal women (Johnson & Larson, 
1982).   
Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis, Arnow, and Wilfley (2007) used EMA to 
investigate the motivational factors behind binge eating in individuals with binge eating 
disorder through exploring the antecedents and consequences of binge eating.  The 
participants reported more negative mood and hunger during prebinge than nonbinge 
times.  Additionally, negative mood was at its peak after the binge (Stein et al., 2007).   
Jones-Forrester (2009) used DES to explore the inner experience of individuals 
with bulimia nervosa.  Participants were instructed to wear a beeper that randomly 
sounded in their natural environment.  They were instructed to record all that was in their 
awareness at the moment of each beep.  Jones-Forrester found that fragmentation of 
awareness, sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, inner seeing, poorly 
differentiated affect, and interfering phenomenon characterized the inner experience of 
the participants (Jones-Forrester, 2009). 
All four studies presented involved the use of a sounding device to prompt 
participants into giving accounts of their subjective experience.  DES is different in that 
its lack of specificity allows for a more broad and accurate depiction of participants’ 
inner experience.  For example, the thought sampling study specifically instructed 
participants to record their cognitions the moment before the beep.  This approach is 
similar to DES in that it allows participants to freely respond as opposed to answering a 
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series of preset questions or questionnaires.  Thought sampling is different from DES in 
that it is designed to explore the thoughts of the participants whereas DES is designed to 
capture all that a participant experiences.  In this way, thought sampling studies limit 
their potential findings.  Although cognitions are important aspects of experience, they 
are not all of experience.  Though DES studies may educe the cognitions of an individual, 
they are not limited to them.   
 The EMA and ESM studies both instruct participants to answer a series of 
predetermined questions.  This approach assumes that all individuals share common 
experiences which, in turn, limits the scope of experiences to be captured.  Unlike the 
thought sampling study which focused on the cognitions of the participants, the ESM and 
EMA studies focused on behavioral factors.  Although the focus is different, emotions 
and cognitions versus behavioral factors, thought sampling, ESM, and EMA studies are 
similar in that they all narrow the potential findings of the study by specifying a 
particular aspect of experience.  Though DES may find similar results to the three 
mentioned studies, it is not limited to them.   
DES has an advantage over the other measures of introspection in that it allows 
for a more in-depth investigation to the inner world of participants.  Unlike the findings 
on the emotions and cognitions of individuals with eating disorders in thought-sampling, 
ESM, and EMA studies, Jones-Forrester found that bulimic individuals as a group had 
more fragmentation of awareness, sensory awareness, images, and perceptual awareness 
than feelings, thought/feelings, feeling fact of body, and preoccupation with weight, 
shape, or food, and cognition (Jones-Forrester, 2009).  This is a finding that studies 
exploring cognitions and emotions would not have been able to discover.   
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Commonly Found Characteristics of Inner Experience 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) explored the inner experience of a stratified random 
sample of college students.  They were interested in surveying the naturally occurring 
phenomena in the inner experience within and across people.  They administered the 
Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994), a measure of 
psychological distress, to 407 students taking introductory psychology courses at an 
urban university.  They stratified the 407 SCL-90-R scores into 10 strata and selected a 
random sample of three participants from each stratum.  Then they used DES to explore 
the inner experience of these 30 participants (16 female and 14 male).  Participants were 
asked to participate in three days of DES sampling and interviewing with six samples per 
day.  Samples from the first day were discarded as this day is considered as training.  The 
first five samples were used on the second and third days of sampling unless one of those 
samples were unusable, in which case the sixth sample was used in its place.  After the 
researchers gained an understanding of the experience occurring at each beep, they coded 
the experience according to the codebook developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999).  
The codebook describes 16 forms of inner experience.  The researchers were aware that, 
because DES is an exploratory procedure, it was possible that either none of the 
codebook identified phenomena would occur or that new phenomena would emerge.  
After completion of sampling, Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not discover new 
frequently occurring characteristics of inner experience.  They did find that five 
characteristics that occurred with substantial frequency (22% or higher) in the inner 
experience of their participants: inner seeing (34%), the experience of seeing things that 
are not immediately present in the external environment, was the most frequently 
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occurring main characteristic and had a within-participant frequency that ranged from 0% 
to 90% (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); feeling (26%), the direct experience of emotion, 
occurred frequently across Heavey & Hurlburt’s (2008) sample and had a within-
participant range of 0% to 90%; inner speech (26%), experienced to be like outer speech 
except it happens internally and is usually experienced as being in the person’s own 
voice, had a within-participant frequency ranging from 0% to 75%; sensory awareness 
(22%), the attending to a particular sensory aspect of one’s internal or external 
environment where the sensation itself is the focus of one’s perception, had a within-
participant frequency ranging from 0% to 100% and was the least frequent of the five 
main characteristics (along with unsymbolized thinking) in Heavey and Hurlburt’s 
sample; and unsymbolized thinking (22%), the thinking of a thought without conveyance 
of that thought in words, images, or any other symbolic representation had a within-
participant frequency ranging from 0% to 80% and was the least frequently occurring of 
the main characteristics in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) sample along with sensory 
awareness (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  
The next most frequently occurring phenomena included inner hearing (3%) or 
paying attention to auditory characteristics of an internal phenomenon and just doing 
(2%) or being engaged in an activity with no awareness of thinking about it as well as no 
other aspects of inner experience present at the moment.  In fact, the remaining 11 
characteristics (partially worded speech, unworded speech, worded thinking, imageless 
seeing, inner hearing, just doing, just talking, just listening, just reading, just watching tv, 
and multiple awareness) occurred with much less frequency than the main five (3% or 
less) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).    
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DES and Left-Handedness 
 To date, there has only been one study that has used the DES method to 
understand inner experience in left-handers.  This study was a Master’s thesis in which 
the present author (Mizrachi, 2010) used Descriptive Experience Sampling to explore the 
inner experience of six left-handed participants (four male and two female participants).  
Mizrachi (2010) compared her results to those of Heavey & Hurlburt (2008) and 
suggested that sensory awareness may be more frequent in left-handers than in the 
general population, that inner speech (and words in general) may be less frequent in left-
handers than in the general population.  Additionally, when words were experienced by 
left-handers, they had atypical presentations.  For example, they were not explicitly 
attended to for their function or meaning, or they were just happening—that is, they were 
being spoken outside of awareness.  Feelings also occurred at a lower frequency in 
Mizrachi’s left-handed participants than the general population.  Participants expressed 
emotions through the tone of their speech, and understood that some of their thoughts 
were emotionally valenced, rather than actually experiencing an emotion (Mizrachi, 
2010).   
 In addition to the experience of five main characteristics discovered by Heavey 
and Hurlburt (2008), novel characteristics of experience emerged across Mizrachi’s 
(2010) left-handed participants.  Left-handed participants’ inner experience had a 
relatively high frequency of searching (i.e., being actively involved in the searching of 
something), and concentrated doing (i.e., carefully and concentratedly engaged in a 
physical activity).  Just doing occurred with greater frequency in the sample of left-
handers than in the general population.  This suggests that left-handers engage in 
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activities outside of their awareness with more frequency than the general population.  
Finally, left-handed participants had multiple experiences more frequently than did the 
general population (Mizrachi, 2010).   
  
 53 
CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
 This section will review the method used to examine the inner experience of left-
handers in this study.  This study consisted of three phases: the screening phase, the 
orientation phase, and the sampling phase.  The participants, instruments and procedures 
used in each phase will be described below.   
Phase 1: Qualification Phase 
During the qualification phase, the researcher asked volunteers in psychology 
courses at an urban university to complete the qualification battery, which consisted of 
informed consent, a brief demographic questionnaire, and the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI, a measure of handedness).  Volunteers received 0.5 research credits to 
meet a course requirement upon completion of the qualification battery.  The volunteers 
who exhibited moderate to strong left-handedness based on their scores on the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI laterality quotient less than -40) during this phase were 
contacted via telephone to participate in the orientation phase.  Volunteers who were 
contacted and agreed to participate in the orientation phase arrived at the Experience 
Sampling Lab in the Central Desert Complex of the UNLV campus.   
Participants  
Two-hundred and fifty-six students taking psychology courses at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) participated in the screening phase of the present study.  
Volunteers received 0.5 research participation credits upon completion of this phase. 
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Instruments  
The Demographic Questionnaire, devised for this study, asked students to provide 
their name, date of birth, address, sex, e-mail address, home phone number, cellular 
phone number, preferred phone number, race/ethnicity, marital status, education level, 
employment status, a permanent address/phone number, and handedness.  
The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) was used to identify 
left-handed individuals invited to enter the Phase 3.  The EHI, a brief 10-item handedness 
questionnaire, is the most widely used handedness questionnaire and was developed to 
provide a simple and brief method for assessing handedness in neuropsychological and 
other clinical and experimental work.  The EHI was tested for reliability by Oldfield on 
over 1100 young adults (Lehnkering, Strauss, Wegner, & Siegmund, 2005; Oldfield, 
1971).  On the EHI, participants are asked to indicate their hand preference on the 
following activities: writing, drawing, throwing, scissors, toothbrush, knife (without 
fork), spoon, broom (upper hand), striking match (match), and opening box (lid).  In 
addition, participants are asked to indicate which foot they prefer to kick with and which 
eye they use when only using one.  Participants are asked to put a plus sign in the column 
corresponding to their preferred side (left, right) and to place two plus signs in the 
appropriate column if they never try to use the other hand unless absolutely forced to.  If 
they are indifferent, they are asked to put one plus sign in each column.  To score the 
laterality quotient of the EHI, the number of plus signs in the left column is subtracted 
from the number of plus signs in the right column; that difference is divided by the total 
number of plus signs and multiplied by 100.  Scores range from -100 (strongly left-
handed) to +100 (strongly right-handed).  Cutoff scores for handedness used in the 
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literature are variable.  However, Oldfield (1971) reported that laterality quotients 
between +31 and +40 in his subjects were indicative of marked deviations from truly 
right-handed behavior (Oldfield, 1971).  Assuming that the reverse is also true, scores 
less than -40 would indicate truly left-handed behavior; we therefore chose -40 as a cutoff 
score for left-handedness.   
Procedures  
The researcher briefly described the study to students taking psychology courses 
at UNLV and asked for volunteers to complete the qualification battery.  After informed 
consent was explained and obtained, volunteers completed the qualification phase 
package.  Volunteers received participation credit (0.5) to meet a course requirement.  
The questionnaire was collected and scored.  Volunteers who completed that qualification 
battery, consented to be contacted, and who exhibited left-handedness based on their 
scores on the EHI were invited to participate in Phase 2.   
Phase 2: Orientation Phase 
 Ten individuals who in Phase 1 were identified as left-handed were invited to 
participate in Phase 2.  All of the volunteers who were contacted agreed to participate in 
Phase 2.  During this phase, the investigators explained the sampling method used in 
Phase 3.  Participants were given a consent form to sign if they wished to participate in 
Phase 3 and be videotaped.  If participants consented to participate in Phase 3 (all did so), 
they completed the Symptom Checklist 90-R (SCL-90-R), a measure of overall 
psychological functioning.  They were also given a beeper and notebook used in Phase 3.  
Participants received 0.5 research credit for completion of this phase.  
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Participants 
Ten individuals who in Phase 1 said on the demographic questionnaire that they 
are left-handed and who scored less than -40 on the EHI were contacted via telephone to 
participate in Phase 2.  Participants received 0.5 research credit for participating Phase 2.  
Recruitment continued, selected from those eligible, until 10 left-handed participants had 
been advanced to Phase 3.   
Instruments 
The Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a 90-item 
inventory designed to provide an outline of both an individual’s symptoms and their 
intensity.  The items are scored on a five-point Likert scale indicating the rate of 
occurrence of the symptom.  It is designed to measure symptoms on nine different 
subscales including: somatization, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, 
depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism.  The 
SCL-90-R may be administered to individuals 13 years of age and older and takes 
approximately 12 to 15 minutes to complete (Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & 
Covi, 1973).   
Procedures  
The purpose of Phase 2 was to orient qualified participants to the sampling phase 
of the study (Phase 3) and to administer the SCL-90-R.  Respondents met in the DES lab 
at the UNLV campus and were invited to complete informed consent and the SCL-90-R.  
They were informed of confidentiality and Informed Consent for the Orientation and 
Sampling Phases was obtained.  Participants were advised that they may discontinue 
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sampling at any time and without penalty.  Should a participant had chosen to withdraw 
from the study, they were to receive one research credit per each attended meeting.   
The investigators explained the nature of the DES method in detail to the 
participants.  Participants were given a three inch by five inch spiral notebook to record 
their experiences and a pocket-sized beeper programmed to beep at random intervals.  
They were instructed on the mechanisms of the device: how to turn it on and off, adjust 
the volume, and how to reset it.  They were instructed to wear this beeper the 24-hours 
before the next meeting as to have “fresh beeps” for the expositional interview.  
Participants were told to capture their naturally occurring experience at the last 
undisturbed moment before the beep occurred and record their experience in a notebook.  
They were informed of confidentiality and told to skip any samples they did not feel 
comfortable reporting (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006). 
At their consent, participants were videotaped during the remaining interviews. 
They were asked to schedule a convenient time to meet with the investigators in the 
Experience Sampling Lab located in the Central Desert Complex at UNLV.  Participants 
received 0.5 research credit for this phase of the study. This phase of the study took 
approximately half an hour to complete.   
Phase 3: Sampling Phase 
 Ten participants who agreed to participate in Phase 3 individually met with two 
DES investigators approximately five times in the DES lab.  All of the participants who 
participated in Phase 2 agreed to participate in Phase 3 and be videotaped.  Participants 
arrived at the Experience Sampling Lab.  During the sampling phase, the participants 
took the beeper with them and wore the beeper until it beeped six times (approximately 
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three hours) but were free (and encouraged) to engage in their normal daily activities 
while they wore the beeper.  When the beep occurred, the participants were to write a few 
notes about what was happening in their inner experience when the beep sounded in the 
small notebook provided by the researcher.  Within 24-hours of collecting the six beeps, 
the participants were interviewed regarding their inner experience during the beeps by the 
investigators at the Experience Sampling Lab.  This interview was a detailed inquiry into 
the characteristics of the experiences that were occurring at the moment of each beep.  
This interview lasted approximately one hour and was videotaped for future examination 
by the researchers.  This sampling/interview procedure was repeated four more times. 
Participants received four research credits for participating in this phase of the 
experiment.  Recruitment continued, selected from those eligible, until 10 left-handed 
participants had completed the sampling phase.  
Participants were advised that they may discontinue sampling at any time and 
without penalty.  Should a participant had chosen to withdraw from the study, they were 
to receive one research credit per each attended meeting.  During the participants' last 
meeting, the investigators collected the beeper and the notebook from the participant, 
though the participant was to keep the notes that they wrote down.  Participants were 
debriefed during the last meeting.  Videotapes of the sessions were transferred to DVD, 
given a number to identify the participant, and stored in a locked filing cabinet in the lab 
area. 
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Participants  
Ten volunteers taking psychology courses at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
aged 18 years and older, who were identified as left-handed in Phase 1, and who agreed 
to participate in Phase 2, participated in Phase 3.   
Apparatus  
The participants received a random-interval-generating device (beeper) developed 
by Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002).  The pocket-sized beeper is rectangular in shape 
and emits a 700-Hz tone at random intervals that can be heard from an earphone.  The 
random intervals were programmed for this study to range from a few seconds to one 
hour with an average of 30 minutes.  The volume of the beeper is adjustable and the beep 
can be stopped by pressing a button.  The participants also received a pocket-sized spiral 
notebook for recording notes describing their inner experience at the last undisturbed 
moment before the beep sounded (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002). 
Procedures  
Participants took the beeper with them and were asked to wear the beeper until it 
beeped six times (approximately three hours) during a time of their preference.  Within 
24-hours of collecting the beeps, the participants individually met with two DES 
investigators approximately five times in the DES lab at the University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas (UNLV) campus.  This phase of the study consisted of five, one-hour long 
expositional interviews, with the exception of the last meeting.  During the expositional 
interviews the DES investigators interviewed the participant about the samples collected 
the previous 24 hours.  The last meeting also included a thorough debriefing after the 
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expositional interview.  Participants received four research credits for participation in this 
phase. 
Meetings 1-5: Expositional Interviews and Debriefing 
 Meetings 1 through 4 were one-hour long expositional interviews.  Each 
participant met with two investigators (Mizrachi and her advisor Hurlburt) to discuss the 
participant’s recently collected samples of inner experience.  Both investigators were 
present during each interview.  During the expositional interview, the investigators 
essentially engaged in conversations with the participant in an effort to discover the 
phenomenology of the participant’s inner experience.  There is, essentially, only one 
legitimate topic in this conversation: what did the participant experience at the moment of 
the beep?  The expositional interviews do not have a standard format although, typically, 
the participants consult their notes about their beeps and attempt to describe to the 
investigators their recently sampled experiences.  The expositional interview is an 
unstructured interaction, and the participant typically initially provides a variety of  
reports about such things as: a) the background or context of the experience, b) the 
situation (who they were with, who was there, etc.), c) the activity they were engaged in 
(watching TV, driving, etc.), d) the experience that occurred before the moment of the 
beep, e) the experience that occurred after the moment of the beep, and f) the ongoing 
experience at the moment of the beep.  The aim of the expositional interview is to focus 
as exclusively on f) as possible, and to allow other aspects only to the extent that they 
assist in the apprehension of f).  This is a collaborative process in which the investigators 
work together with the participant to come to a high fidelity apprehension of the 
participant’s pristine inner experience.  Within each interview, the lead interviewer on 
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each beep was alternated.  This is an iterative process which takes place over several 
interviews.  With each successive interview the participant may become more skillful at 
identifying their at-the-moment-of-the-beep inner experience and filtering out extraneous 
material.   
   Due to the iterative nature of the expositional interviews, the first expositional 
interview is considered to be a training exercise rather than an opportunity for data 
collection.  During that first interview, participants are frequently surprised by the 
amount of detail sought by the DES investigators, and therefore have difficulty answering 
the questions posed by the investigators.  After struggling through this first interview, and 
hearing the kinds of details the investigators probe for, participants may become better 
able to observe their own inner experience.  The remaining expositional interviews 
consist of the same kinds of questions aimed at the participant’s experience as were asked 
in the first interview; however, participants are now likely to be better observers of their 
inner experiences and more proficient in describing them.   
 Meeting 5 included both an expositional interview and a debriefing, where 
participants’ participation was discussed and participants had the opportunity to ask 
questions.  Participants received research credit for their completion of the study.   
Data 
 The aim of this study was to apprehend randomly sampled experiences from left-
handed individuals and then discover the characteristics of each of those samples.  The 
unit of data collected in this study is therefore the sample of inner experience.   
 DES, including the description writing of the participants’ inner experience 
samples as well as the rating of the samples, is a collaborative process.  Upon completion 
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of each interview, one investigator (Mizrachi) wrote a high fidelity description of the 
participant’s inner experience during each beep.  Mizrachi then sent these descriptions to 
her advisor and co-investigator (Hurlburt) to review and revise the descriptions, if 
necessary.  Hurlburt sent his revised descriptions back to Mizrachi to be reviewed for 
final approval.  If there were disagreements between the investigators, the videotape of 
the interview was reviewed.  Upon approval of the written beep descriptions, Mizrachi 
then rated the inner experience characteristics during each beep.  She then sent the ratings 
to Hurlburt to review and agree or disagree.  If there were disagreements, the videotape 
of the particular interview was reviewed and the investigators discussed the beep until 
they came to an agreement.   
Upon completion of sampling, Mizrachi considered the participant’s entire set of 
samples of inner experience and discovered the characteristics of experience that 
emerged as salient across samples.  This resulted in an idiographic description of each 
participants’ experience.  Upon completion of the idiographic description, Mizrachi sent 
the idiographic chapter to Hurlburt for review.   
 After completion of the sampling process with all 10 participants as well as 
completion of the 10 idiographic descriptions, the samples of experience from all 
participants were collaboratively considered to discover whether there are patterns, 
forms, and/or characteristics that emerged as salient across participants and that differ 
from the experiences of the general population as described by Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008) and elsewhere.  The characteristics of inner experience from the present study 
were also compared to the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010).  This resulted in a 
nomothetic characterization of the experience of left-handers’ experience.  Upon 
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completion of the nomothetic characterization, Mizrachi sent the across-participant 
chapter to Hurlburt for review.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 This study was aimed at exploring the inner experience of left-handed 
participants; toward that end, 10 left-handed college students participated in Descriptive 
Experience Sampling (DES).  Their characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Demographics 
 
Participants 
 
“AH” “BP” “CL” “DH” “NT” “MM” “MO” “KA” “JS” “TS” All 
EHI 
Laterality 
Quotient 
 
-100 
 
-75 
 
-75 
 
-73 
 
-68 
 
-67 
 
-53 
 
-53 
 
-50 
 
-45 
 
-65.9 
Age 18 18 18 18 28 18 18 21 19 35 21.1 
Gender M F F M M F F F F M  
Ethnicitya H AA C C B E H B C C  
SCL-90-R 
GSI Raw Score 
GSI T-score 
Norm Groupb 
 
0.06 
41 
A 
 
0.53 
59 
A 
 
0.005 
30 
A 
 
0.79 
56 
B 
 
0.19 
50 
A 
 
1.53 
61 
B 
 
0.37 
55 
A 
 
0.71 
61 
A 
 
0.51 
58 
A 
 
0.32 
55 
A 
 
0.50 
52.9 
Number of 
samplesc 
20 
(9%) 
20 
(9%) 
18 
(8%) 
24 
(11%) 
23 
(11%) 
20 
(9%) 
23 
(11%) 
21 
(10%) 
24 
(11%) 
24 
(11%) 
217 
(100%) 
Note. aAA is African-American, B is Biracial, C is Caucasian, E is Ethiopian, H is 
Hispanic. bNorm A is adult nonpatients, norm B is adolescent nonpatients. cFirst day 
samples excluded (considered training).   
 
 Participants were administered the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI), a 
quantitative assessment of handedness, to evaluate their handedness laterality.  The EHI 
consists of 10 items evaluating the hand preference of a variety of activities.  Completion 
of the EHI yields a laterality quotient ranging from +100 to -100 (Oldfield, 1971).  
Negative laterality quotients are associated with left-handedness whereas positive 
laterality quotients are associated with right-handedness.  The absolute values indicate 
degree of handedness with larger values signifying stronger handedness in either 
direction.  Variations exist in the literature regarding the cutoff points of handedness; 
however, the present study used laterality quotients of -40 to -100 as indicators of left-
handedness.  Table 1 shows that our participants’ EHI scores ranged from -100 to -45, 
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with four near -100, strongly left handed, and six clustering around -50, moderately left 
handed.   
Participants also completed the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 
1994), a self-report inventory aimed at reflecting the psychological symptom patterns of 
various respondents (community, medical, and psychiatric).  The SCL-90-R is a self-
report inventory consisting of 90 items with a five point rating scale of distress from 0 
“Not at All” to 4 “Extremely.”  Scoring is based on nine symptom dimensions: 
Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety, 
Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism.  The Global Severity 
Index (GSI) is one of three global indices of distress intended to summarize the level of 
symptomatology and distress.  The GSI is the best indicator of the current level or depth 
of distress combining both the number of symptoms reported along with the intensity of 
experienced stress.  Overall, an individual’s severity of symptoms can be assessed 
through elevations in the GSI thus the GSI should be used when only one summary 
measure is reported (Derogatis, 1994).   
The participants’ GSI raw scores and T-scores on the SCL-90-R are also 
presented in Table 1, which shows that participants’ GSI T-scores ranged from 30 to 67. 
In general, when compared to adult nonpatient norms, T-scores above 63 are indicative of 
clinically significant psychological difficulties (Derogatis, 1994).  Two of the 
participants, DH and MM, had T-scores in this range.  When compared to adolescent 
nonpatient norms, DH’s GSI raw score converted to a T-score of 56 suggesting his 
symptoms are not clinically significant.  When compared to adolescent nonpatient norms, 
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MM’s GSI raw score converted to a T-score of 61 suggesting her symptoms are not 
clinically significant.    
Organization 
 The main results of this study, the descriptions of left-handers’ experience, are 
organized on two levels: 1) idiographically, within each individual participant; and 2) 
collectively, across all participants.  The next 10 chapters (Chapters 5 through 14) are 
idiographic descriptions of the inner experience of each individual participant as 
discovered by DES.  Following the idiographic chapters, Chapter 15 describes the 
patterns and emergent characteristics of inner experience across all ten participants and 
compares the results from the present study to the literature.   
 The intent of idiographic analyses is to explore the characteristics of an 
individual’s inner experience as thoroughly as possible.  In DES, idiographic analyses are 
performed through a consideration of all the samples of inner experience collected by a 
participant and then describing those characteristics.  Ten left-handed participants 
participated in the present study; thus the investigators created 10 idiographic 
descriptions.  Each idiographic analysis is presented in its own chapter (Chapters 5-14); 
the chapters are presented in descending order of degree of left-handedness as measured 
by the EHI (that is, the most left-handed participant is presented first).    
 Following the idiographic analyses, an across-participant description considering 
all the samples of inner experience from all participants was prepared; it is provided in 
Chapter 15.  The aim of this across-participant description is to discover the salient 
characteristics and patterns of the inner experience in left-handers.  The results of the 
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present study are also compared to the results of Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) and 
Mizrachi (2010).   
In 2008, Heavey and Hurlburt explored the inner experience of a stratified 
random sample of college students.  They found that five characteristics occurred with 
substantial frequency (22% or higher) in the inner experience of their participants: inner 
seeing (34%), the seeing something in one’s imagination that is not actually there; feeling 
(26%), the direct experience of emotion; inner speech (26%), the innerly speaking words 
usually in one’s own voice; sensory awareness (22%), the attending to a particular 
sensory aspect of one’s internal or external environment where the sensation itself is the 
focus of one’s perception; and unsymbolized thinking (22%), the thinking of a thought 
without conveyance of that thought in words, images, or any other symbolic 
representation.  The remaining characteristics occurred with much less frequency than the 
main five (3% or less) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).   
In 2010, Mizrachi examined the inner experience of six left-handed participants. 
Mizrachi (2010) found the main characteristics identified by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) 
occurred in her left-handed participants; however, they occurred in varying degrees.  
Sensory awareness occurred with a frequency of 35%; inner seeing 24%; unsymbolized 
thinking 20%; inner speech 9%; and feeling 4% (Mizrachi, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 5 
“AH” 
AH was an 18 year-old Hispanic male who sampled with us in September and 
October 2010.  AH received a laterality quotient of -100 on the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); that is the maximally negative EHI score, indicating he 
is strongly left-handed.  He received a GSI raw score of 0.061 (a T-score, compared to 
nonpatients, of 41) on the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; 
Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting the absence of clinically significant 
psychological difficulties. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
AH sampled on five separate occasions, collecting 24 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants and AH declined to speak 
about one sample, 20 of AH’s samples count towards his inner experience.  The 
following characteristics will be discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 14 samples 
(70%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 13 samples (65%); multiple experience, 
occurring in 6 samples (30%); emotion, occurring in 4 samples (20%); inner speech, 
occurring in 4 samples (20%); inner hearing, occurring in 3 samples (15%); feeling, 
occurring in 3 samples (15%); not semantic words, occurring in 2.5 samples (13%); and 
infrequently occurring characteristics.   
Sensory Awareness 
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in AH’s 
inner experience, occurring in 14 of 20 samples (70%).  Here is an example:  
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Sample 5.4.  AH was driving and the grey jeep in front of him had a Chicago 
Bears tire cover on it.  At the moment of the sample he focused on the appearance 
of the bear and its shadings, noting the orange and blue in the logo.  AH was also 
thinking about his favorite team, the Raiders, beating the Chargers and that the 
Raiders had not beaten the Chargers since 2003.  This thought was centered on 
the notion “since 2003” but AH was not sure if the specific words, “since 2003” 
were present in his experience or if it was just the idea.  
In this sample, AH was attending to the visual characteristics of the Chicago Bears tire.   
Six of AH’s sensory awareness samples involved movement or spreading of a 
sensory phenomenon.  Here are examples: 
Sample 3.3.  AH was innerly speaking the words “I’m hungry!” as he was about 
to place a bowl of spaghetti and meatballs into the microwave.  His inner speech 
had an emphatic tone.  He was also feeling his entire inside and outside lower 
abdomen grumbling, moving around, and tingling.  At the same time, he was 
seeing the food in his bowl and smelling the cold meat and sauce.   
In this sample, the sensory awareness experienced in his lower abdomen involved some 
movement.  Here is another example: 
Sample 4.5.  At the moment of the sample, AH experienced the sides of his head 
throbbing.  He experienced the throbbing as originating in the inner portion of his 
head and extending outwards toward his skull.  The pain was concentrated in the 
temporal area and faded outwards toward the rest of his upper cranium.  The 
throbbing was rhythmic, about once a second.  The beep sounded when the 
throbbing was at its maximum level.  He was also slightly seeing the video game 
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2K11, however, the throbbing was by far more central in his experience (an 
estimated ratio of 99:1).   
Not only did AH experience throbbing, the throbbing involved spreading or movement 
from the inner portion of his head outwards towards his skull. 
In three of his sensory awareness samples, AH experienced multiple and separate 
sensory awarenesses occurring simultaneously.  Here is an example:  
Sample 3.5.  AH was standing outside.  At the moment of the sample, he was 
drawn to the gloomy, gray colors of the clouds.  That is, he was paying particular 
attention to the color of the clouds, not their shape or their significance 
(implications for weather, etc.).  He also smelled the rain.  He was also feeling 
relaxed and calm which was experienced by a sensation of relaxedness throughout 
in his upper body.  He described this relaxedness sensation as a “dropping down” 
sensation similar to sinking into a bed.  He may also have been thinking, I love 
this weather.  This thought was not present in words or images. He was unsure if 
this thought was in his experience at the moment of the sample or after the 
sample. 
In this sample, AH attended to the colors of the clouds (sensory awareness), the smell of 
the rain (sensory awareness), and a “dropping down” sensation throughout his upper 
body (sensory awareness).   
Two of AH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of 
words.  Here are the samples: 
Sample 3.4.  AH was putting juice in the refrigerator.  At the moment of the 
sample, his attention was powerfully grabbed by the word “Ketchup” on the label 
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of a ketchup bottle.  His focus was on the entire word “Ketchup” without 
attending to any particular aspect of its appearance or to its meaning or 
significance.  That is, AH had no particular relation to the ketchup at that time—
was not planning on using it, etc.—and no particular interest in the ketchup itself.  
The meaningless word “Ketchup” overtook him, unbidden, by surprise, so to 
speak, as he was involved with the juice.  He was also thinking whether he should 
go do bench presses or not.  This thought was not experienced in words or 
images. 
Sample 4.2.  AH was sitting in his car looking at the Monopoly game board he 
had received at McDonalds.  At the moment of the sample he was looking at the 
black “$50”, which was superimposed over the two brown properties.  He was 
focused on the font, boldness, and black color of the “$50.”  He was also thinking 
he could actually win fifty dollars.  This thought was not present in words or 
images and had no location. 
In these samples, words/numbers were present in AH’s experience; however, he was not 
attending to the words/numbers for their significance.  Rather, AH was drawn to their 
appearance.   
Two of his sensory awareness samples involved imaginary phenomena.  In these 
samples, AH was attending to sensory qualities of imaginary experiences.  Here is an 
example: 
Sample 2.1.  A second or so before the beep, AH’s phone had made a sound  
indicating that a text message had arrived.  At the moment of the sample, AH was 
innerly hearing something like an echo of the text message notification sound.  
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The innerly heard sound was a “faded version” of the real sound; the innerly 
heard sound was repetitive like an echo but there were no pauses between each 
repetition—that is, it seemed like a continuous fading in volume and perhaps in 
some other way across time.  This innerly heard sound seemed to be spreading 
throughout his mind, unlike the original actual sound which occupied a specific 
portion of experienced real space.  He was also thinking the text message was 
from his friend Lucy, but this was substantially less salient in his experience than 
the hearing of the fading sound.  Also less salient in his experience was being 
interested in the text message.  This was perhaps both a thought and a feeling, a 
wondering what the text message said, and he was unable to describe the feeling 
of interested any more than saying it had no physical characteristics.   
In this sample, AH was attending to the auditory characteristics of an innerly heard text 
message notification sound.  Similar to the spreading/movement samples described 
above, the innerly heard sound involved spreading throughout his mind.   
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Unsymbolized thinking occurred in 13 of AH’s samples (65%).  Although 
variations of unsymbolized thinking occurred frequently in AH’s inner experience, he did 
not have any clear, textbook examples of unsymbolized thinking.  All of his samples fell 
into one of three categories: some kind of thinking secondary to something else 
(primarily sensory awareness), the presence of multiple possibilities, and about what to 
do next.   
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 In the majority (seven) of his unsymbolized thinking samples, the thinking was 
occurring secondary, and sometimes tertiary, to another phenomenon.  Here is an 
example: 
Sample 3.6.  AH was flexing his left arm and was looking at it in a mirror.  At the 
moment of the sample, AH was seeing his left arm from the elbow to the 
shoulder.  He was noticing the cut of his tricep and bicep.  He was also thinking to 
himself, Are my arms getting bigger? This thought was not experienced in words 
or images and was a general wondering and was not as present as the noticing of 
the visual characteristics.   
In this sample, AH was primarily attending to the noticing of the cut of his tricep and 
bicep.  The thought, Are my arms getting bigger? was secondary to this noticing.  Here is 
another example: 
Sample 5.2.  AH was watching the movie Night at the Museum, Part 2, the scene 
where Ben Stiller was describing his glow-in-the-dark flashlight.  At the moment 
of the sample, AH was absorbed in the lime green color of the glow-in-the-dark 
flashlight.  He was also thinking that the glow-in-the-dark flashlight was a good 
idea and wondering about if it would sell.  This thought was not experienced in 
words or images or other symbols, and was not as present as the noticing of the 
lime greenness. 
Similar to sample 3.6 described above, the unsymbolized thought in this sample 
(wondering if a glow-in-the-dark flashlight would sell) was secondary to another 
experience.  In both of these samples, sensory awareness was the primary experience.
 Five of AH’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved the presence of multiple 
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possibilities.  In these samples, there was a sense of multiple possibilities; however, the 
possibilities themselves were not articulated.  Here are examples: 
Sample 2.4.  AH was looking for a particular pair of pants.  At the moment of the 
sample, AH was innerly seeing clothes hanging on a hanger and a laundry basket 
on the floor of his laundry room.  He was seeing this as if he were standing in the 
doorway looking left inside his laundry room.  He saw the clothes in shades of 
black and white, but did not differentiate the particular articles of clothing that 
were hanging.  This inner seeing somehow represented where he had last seen his 
pants. Simultaneously he was wondering where could they possible be?  He 
experienced this thought as not in words or images.  There was a notion present of 
the places that they could be (in his closet, in his mother’s house, in his father’s 
house, and so on); however, whereas there was an implication of specific possible 
places, the specific places themselves were not present in his experience. 
Sample 5.6.  At the moment of the sample, AH was listening to his friend talking 
on the phone about a gift for AH’s brother’s birthday.  He was also thinking of 
what he should get his brother for his birthday.  This thinking seemed aimed at 
deciding among several specific things that he might give him (a DVD set of a 
TV show, some music) but the things themselves were not directly present to AH 
at the moment of the sample.  That is, it was as if there were several things “out 
there,” not specified at the moment of the sample but also not absent, and AH was 
waiting for one of them to “coalesce” or “advance” or “become salient.”     
 75 
In these samples, there was an experienced suggestion of a list of possibilities; however, 
the members of the list were not articulated or directly present in AH’s experience at the 
moment.  Here is another example: 
Sample 3.2.  At the moment of the sample, AH was thinking that he had to choose 
something to do tonight, out of many options available to him.  There were no 
words or images to be thought, he was just knowing he had to choose something.  
He experienced time pressure or urgency about making this choice; that he had a 
limited amount of time to make his choice about what to do later.  It was unclear 
whether this urgency was a mental feeling or a thought/feeling or some type of 
thought.  The phrase “thinking that he had to choose something to do tonight” is a 
meta-awareness, in the sense that “choosing something to do” would be more 
straightforward.  In this case, the meta-awareness is correct: he was indeed aware 
of his choices.   
In this sample, the options were not quite as present as in the others.  Additionally, it was 
difficult to determine whether AH was experiencing a thought, feeling, or some 
combination of a thought and a feeling.  It is hard to know if this difficulty was an 
accurate reflection of AH’s experience or if it is a reflection of AH’s difficulty 
articulating his experience.  This sample was counted as unsymbolized thinking.  
 One of AH’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved thinking about what to do 
next: 
 Sample 2.2.  AH was putting back a bottle of hot sauce in the pantry.  At the 
moment of the sample AH was thinking about what he was going to do next.  
Included in this thinking was the sense that he had a lot of homework to do.  This 
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thinking did not include words, images, or any other symbolic representation.  He 
was also experiencing a slight feeling of pressure by the idea of not knowing what 
to do.  This was a mental feeling.  Also in his experience was the visual seeing of 
the hot sauce bottle.  The notion that he has a lot of homework to do and 
wondering what he was going to do next were the most salient aspects in his 
experience (he estimated 80%) compared to the mental pressure (10%) and seeing 
the hot sauce bottle (10%). 
Multiple Experience 
 In six of AH’s inner experience samples (30%), multiple, separate, and distinct 
phenomenon were simultaneously occurring.  Examples of this have already been 
described above.  In sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section 
above, AH was thinking about what he was going to do next, feeling pressure, and seeing 
a hot sauce bottle.  In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section 
above, AH was seeing the word “Ketchup” on a ketchup bottle and thinking about 
whether or not he should work out.  In sample 4.5, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, AH was experiencing the sides of his head throbbing and 
seeing the video game 2K11.  In sample 5.4, also described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, AH was focused on the appearance of a bear on a tire cover 
and thinking about his favorite football team beating another team.  Here is another 
example: 
Sample 4.1.  AH was at McDonald’s waiting on his food order to come out.  He 
was wondering when his food was going to come out, and this thought had no 
specific words, images, or other symbols to it.  He was also re-hearing a series of 
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beeps that he had heard a few seconds earlier.  The innerly heard beeps were 
about a third of a second apart, and there were five or six beeps in the series.  As 
far as he knew, this innerly heard series did not differ from what he had externally 
heard, but he did not have clear recollection of the actual beeps.  AH heard the 
beeps in the interior of the top half of his head (roughly inside the cranium), 
circulating in a way that he could not specify.  He was also seeing his 
McDonald’s tray with coffee on it, though this was a very small part of his 
awareness. 
In this sample, AH experienced multiple, separate, and simultaneous experiences, 
including an unsymbolized thought (wondering when his food was going to come out) 
and an inner hearing (re-hearing a series of beeps).   
Emotion 
 In four of AH’s inner experience samples, an affective process was ongoing 
outside of his direct experience (20%).  All of his emotion samples involved inner words, 
either spoken or heard, with an emphatic tone.  Three of these examples have already 
been described above.  In sample 3.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, 
AH was saying “He’s escaping!” with an emphatic tone, though he was not experiencing 
an emotion at the moment of the sample.  In sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, AH was innerly saying “I’m hungry!” with an emphatic tone.  
He was not, however, experiencing an emotion at the moment of the sample.  In sample 
5.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, AH was innerly saying “Ugh!” 
with a strong emphasis indicating he found the color he was seeing repulsive.  AH was 
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not experiencing feeling repulsed at the moment of the sample, however.  Here is the 
other example: 
Sample 4.3.  AH had been playing 2K11 (a basketball video game).  At the 
moment of the sample, he was innerly hearing “I want to win!!!”  The words were 
innerly heard in his own voice with a hyper-dramatic emphasis.  He was also (but 
with much less emphasis) seeing the basketball on the screen. 
Despite innerly hearing the words with a hyper-dramatic emphasis, AH was not 
experiencing any feeling at the moment.  
Inner Speech 
 Four of AH’s samples involved inner speech (20%).  In all of these samples, the 
inner speech involved an emotional or emphatic tone.  Here is an example: 
Sample 3.1.  AH was watching the movie Shawshank Redemption and the warden 
had just asked the inmate, “well?”  At the moment of the sample, AH was innerly 
saying, “He’s escaping” (a fact known to AH because he had seen the movie 
before).  This was said with some emotional emphasis.   
In two of his inner speech samples, AH’s innerly spoken words were commenting 
on some internal or external event.  One example has already been described.  In sample 
3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, AH was saying “I’m 
hungry!”  In this sample AH was also feeling his lower abdomen grumbling, moving 
around, and tingling.  At the moment, it was as if AH actively surveyed his body and 
came to the conclusion that he was hungry.  Rather than automatically processing the 
grumbling of his abdomen, AH innerly commented on the process perhaps in an attempt 
to integrate the grumbling into his experience.  Here is the other example:  
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Sample 5.5.  AH was driving behind a white truck with a white horse trailer. At 
the moment of the sample, AH was thinking that he was going to be late.  He 
innerly said, “I’m going to be late!” in an angry/frustrated tone.  He also felt 
frustrated, which was experienced as a quivering sensation originating at the base 
of the back of his neck and fading outwards to his shoulders and down his spine. 
AH was also just beginning to sweat, which was experienced as a tingly and 
evenly spaced sensation across his forehead right along his hairline.  He was also 
seeing the whiteness of the horse trailer (as opposed to the trailerness of the 
trailer), but this was the least salient aspect of his experience. 
In this sample, it was as if AH had surveyed his environment and came to the conclusion 
that he would be late.  Rather than automatically processing this notion, AH commented 
on it.   
One of AH’s inner speech samples was not clearly an inner speech sample.  In 
this sample, AH was sighing: 
Sample 5.1.  AH was driving and, at the moment of the sample, he was staring at 
a trash can to his right.  He was captivated by the blue color of the trash can, 
which was a bright blue of about medium hue.  He was also seeing the 
symmetrical white lettering in the middle of the trash can, but his attention was 
directed at the blue color.  He was innerly saying, “Ugh!” to himself in his own 
voice with strong emphasis indicating that he found the color repulsive.   
Similar to samples 3.3 and 5.5 described above, the innerly said “Ugh!” involved an 
emphatic tone. 
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 All of AH’s inner speech samples, including sample 5.1 which is not clearly inner 
speech, are said with some kind of emotional tone.  In fact, all inner words in AH’s 
experience whether innerly spoken or heard (e.g., inner hearing sample 4.3) are 
emotionally charged in their expression, but not in experience.  That is, even though 
AH’s voice sounds emotional, he does not feel emotion at the moment.   
Inner Hearing 
 In three of his inner experience samples, AH was experiencing inner hearing 
(15%).  In sample 4.3, described in detail in the Emotion section above, AH was innerly 
hearing “I want to win!!!” with a hyper-dramatic emphasis.  His other two inner hearing 
samples involved an echo or rehearing of something that he had already heard.  Both 
examples have already been described.  In sample 2.1, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, AH was innerly hearing a “faded version” of the text message 
notification sound.  In sample 4.1, described in detail in Multiple Experience section 
above, AH was innerly hearing beeps of a McDonald’s machine.  The innerly heard 
beeps were a rehearing or echo of a series of beeps he had actually heard a few seconds 
prior.   
Feeling 
 Three of AH’s inner experience samples involved feelings (15%).  Two of his 
feeling samples included strong bodily sensations.  Here is an example: 
Sample 2.3.  AH was taking a test for a music class online and had been looking 
through his music book trying to find the answer to the question around what year 
did white and black gospel differentiate?  At the moment of the sample, he was 
looking at the time indicator on his computer that showed he had only five 
 81 
minutes left to complete the exam.  The notion of having only five minutes to 
complete four questions was in his experience without words, images, or any 
other symbolic representation.  More centrally in his experience he was feeling 
nervous, experienced as “nerves shaking” concentrated around his spine in his 
lower back.  “Nerves shaking” meant multiple tingling sensations along and near 
his spine, more or less the kind of sensation that could be produced by fingers that 
were softly and lightly independently drumming rapidly inside and outside of his 
lower back area.  The feeling gradually faded away as it moved away from his 
spine in his lower back but did not reach his extremities or the front of his trunk.   
In this sample, AH was feeling nervous which was experienced as tingling sensations 
along his spine.  Similarly, in sample 5.5 described in detail in Inner Speech section 
above, AH felt frustrated which was experienced as a quivering sensation originating at 
the base of his neck.  In these samples, it was difficult to tell if AH’s feelings were 
manifested as bodily sensations or whether AH primarily experienced the bodily 
sensations and then concluded that he must be experiencing a feeling.   
One of AH’s feeling samples did not include a clear example of feeling.  In 
sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was 
experiencing a slight mental feeling of pressure.  Whether or not “pressure” should be 
considered feeling is difficult to determine and dependent upon one’s definition of 
feeling.  That is, pressure is not a feeling in the same way as happy, sad, and frustrated 
are feelings.   
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Not Semantic Words 
In three of his samples, words were present in AH’s experience; however, the 
meanings of the words were not.  In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness 
section above, AH was drawn to the word “Ketchup” but was not cognizant at all of its 
semantic nature.  That is, he was drawn to the visual display (which could be said to be 
the word “ketchup”) but it was not a word that drew his attention—it was rather 
something that was seen.  In sample 5.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section 
above, AH was seeing lettering on a trash can but the meaning of the lettering was not in 
his experience at the moment (he was attending to the blue color of the trash can and the 
whiteness of the letters, not the wordness of the letters).  In sample 4.2, described in 
detail in Sensory Awareness section above, AH was attending to the font, boldness, and 
black color of the $50 on the McDonalds’ Monopoly game board.  Although AH was 
attending to the visual characteristics of the $50, he did have some thinking that he could 
actually win fifty dollars.  It is hard to determine if this sample is semantic or not 
semantic—that is, it is partially not semantic and partially semantic.  Thus this sample 
was counted as .5 for a total of 2.5 not semantic samples (13%).     
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
Inner seeing.  
AH’s inner experience involved two samples of inner seeing (10%).  In sample 
2.4, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was looking for a 
pair of pants and was innerly seeing clothes hanging on a hanger.  Here is the other 
example: 
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Sample 4.4.  AH was playing the video game 2K11 and his character (Michael 
Jordan) was shooting foul shots.  At the moment of the sample, AH was seeing 
the number 23 on Michael Jordan’s jersey on the screen.  The most prominent 
aspect of his experience was innerly seeing Michael Jordan doing the “jumpman” 
dunk.  He was seeing Michael Jordan (wearing his red jersey with white stripes 
and the number 23 in black) in the air with his right arm extended forward and 
legs spread apart.  He was seeing this from the side as if he was sitting in the 
bleachers and Michael Jordan was dunking in the basket to AH’s right; his back 
was toward AH.  The inner seeing was still.   
Anticipation.  
In one of his samples (5%), AH was experiencing a sense of something to happen.  
In sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was 
thinking about what he had to do next.  He also had a sense that he had a lot of homework 
to do. 
Discussion 
 Overall, AH seemed to be a motivated DES participant.  He was interested in the 
process of exploring inner experience as well as his inner experience.  AH frequently 
experienced sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and multiple experiences.    
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CHAPTER 6 
“BP” 
BP was an 18-year-old African-American female who sampled with us in October 
and November of 2010.  She received a laterality quotient of -75 on the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is strongly left-handed.  She 
received a GSI raw score of 0.53 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 59) on the 
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 
1973), suggesting the lack of clinically significant psychological difficulties.  
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
BP sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 25 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 20 of BP’s samples counts her 
inner experience characteristics.  The following characteristics will be discussed: inner 
speech, occurring in 8 samples (40%); sensory awareness, occurring in 5 samples (25%); 
not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples (25%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 3 
samples (15%); happening of, occurring in 3 samples (15%); inner hearing, occurring in 
2 samples (10%); words present, occurring in 2 samples (10%); infrequently occurring 
characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.   
Inner Speech 
 Inner speech was the most frequently occurring characteristic in BP’s inner 
experience, occurring in 8 of her 20 samples (40%).  All of BP’s inner speech samples 
consisted of her own voice.  Five of BP’s inner speech samples involved innerly saying a 
statement.  Here is an example:  
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Sample 2.4.  BP had been looking at one of two triangles on her classroom board 
and had realized she was looking at the wrong triangle.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was innerly saying “I was focusing on the wrong triangle.”  She was 
also seeing the correct triangle on the board.  
In this sample, BP’s inner speech similar to outer speech. 
Two of BP’s inner speech samples involved innerly asking a question.  Here are 
the examples: 
Sample 2.6.  BP had read a Twitter post that said the singer Faith Evans died 
when the rapper Notorious B.I.G (“Biggie”) died.  At the moment, BP was innerly 
saying “Did she really?”  The innerly spoken words conveyed the message that 
BP did not believe what the post had said. 
Sample 5.5.  BP was innerly saying “Why is he still talking about the same 
thing?” referring to her teacher.  There was nothing else in her experience. 
One of her inner speech samples involved a recollection: 
Sample 5.1.  BP was driving and saw a little girl walking with a violin.  At the 
moment, BP was seeing the little girl.  She was seeing all of the little girl and not 
paying attention to any particular aspect of her.  BP was also innerly saying “I 
remember when I played the violin.”   
One of her inner speech samples involved an inner speaking and a separate 
inner hearing of unrelated phenomenon: 
Sample 4.2.  BP had heard a Brian McKnight song, and, before the moment of the 
sample, she had been innerly hearing this song and innerly signing along to it.  At 
the moment, she had stopped singing and was innerly saying “I know the beeper 
 86 
is about to go off.”  This was a declarative, flat sentence that was as clear as if she 
had said it out loud.  The meaning of the innerly said words were in BP’s 
experience.  The sentence was about BP—about what she knows—and not the 
beeper—when it will go off.  At the same time, BP continued innerly hearing the 
Brian McKnight song.  She was not innerly singing at the moment of the sample. 
 One of BP’s inner speech samples involved an attempt at problem solving: 
Sample 2.2.  BP had been doing her math homework on the computer.  At the 
moment, she was innerly saying “196 plus ___,” where the blank would 
eventually hold the solution to the problem.  She was aware of how the solutions 
should visually look; that is, she was trying to create a solution that looked in the 
right way, not a solution that followed some rule or that followed some verbal 
instruction.  And by “looked in the right way” we mean that it had the proper 
visual characteristics.  That is, if she were performing a sum, she would create a 
column of numbers, not because the rule says to create a column but because she 
had learned that when solving this kind of problem, you have to create something 
that looks like a column of numbers.  So far it only involved “196 plus___.” 
Sensory Awareness 
 BP’s inner experience consisted of five sensory awareness samples (25%).  All of 
her sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of words/letters/numbers.  
We have already seen one example, sample 2.2 described in detail in Inner Speech 
section above.  In this sample, BP was aware of the visual characteristics of a solution.  
The solution itself was not in her experience; however, she was aware of what it should 
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look like.  Two other sensory awareness samples involved attending to the visual 
characteristics of seen words: 
Sample 4.4.  BP was looking at a list of songs on the computer screen as the songs 
were being downloaded.  In her experience, she was attending to the visual 
characteristics of the display as it scrolled up.  She was absorbed in the way the 
list looked. She was not attending to the list for what it represents. 
Sample 5.3.  BP was reading a page in her UNLV Planner.  At the moment, she 
was seeing the phrase “feeling more confident and connected.”  BP was seeing all 
of the words in the phrase without understanding.  BP understood that the 
meaning would come to her later; however, at the moment of the sample the 
meaning was not present, she was just seeing the words.     
BP’s other two sensory awareness samples involved attending to the auditory 
characteristics of heard words.  Here are the examples: 
Sample 4.1.  Her grandmother was talking about not wanting Sarah Palin’s 
daughter to be on the Dancing with the Stars anymore, but at the moment her 
words as a meaningful sentence was not part of BP’s experience.  Instead, BP was 
hearing the vocal/auditory characteristics of her grandmother’s voice.  That the 
voice was speaking meaningful words was not relevant—only the sound of the 
voice. 
Sample 5.4.  BP was listening to her teacher talk about the government being a 
hard job.  In her experience, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of the 
words he was saying.  BP was not tracking the meaning of the words.  BP had 
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somehow zeroed in on the words “hard job” but recognized them as objects of 
emphasis and not for content. 
In all of these samples, the meanings of the written or spoken words were not in BP’s 
awareness at the moment of the sample.  All that she was attending to was the sensory 
quality of the words. 
Not Semantic Words 
 BP’s inner experience consisted of a rare phenomena relating to words.  In five of 
BP’s samples, words were present; however, BP was not attending to the words for their 
meaning.  All five of her samples involved the sensory awareness of words either seen or 
heard (25%).  In these samples, BP was attending to either the auditory/vocal and visual 
characteristics of words rather than attending to their meaning.  Three of these samples 
involved attending to the visual characteristics of words.  For example, in sample 2.2 
described in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was trying to create a solution that 
had the proper visual characteristics.  She was not aware of the solution itself, she was 
only aware of how it should look.  In sample 4.4, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, BP was attending to the visual characteristics of a list of songs 
on the computer screen.  In sample 5.3, described in Sensory Awareness section above, 
BP was seeing a phrase in her planner; however, the meaning of the phrase was not in her 
experience.  Two of these samples involved attending to the auditory characteristics of 
words heard.  In sample 4.1, described in detail Sensory Awareness section above, BP’s 
grandmother was talking and BP was attending to the vocal/auditory characteristics of her 
grandmother’s voice.  In sample 5.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section 
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above, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of her professor’s speech; she was 
not attending to the meaning of the words he was saying.    
Unsymbolized Thinking 
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in three of BP’s samples (15%).  Here are 
examples: 
Sample 4.5.  BP was reading a status on Twitter.  At the moment, she was reading 
“I miss having a best friend.”  The meaning of this sentence was immediately, 
automatically a part of the reading process.  She was also thinking that she misses 
seeing her best friend.  This was a thought without words, images, or any 
symbolic representation. 
Sample 4.6.  She had just read a Facebook status and was in the act of clicking the 
Like button.  At the moment of the sample, she was still thinking about what the 
status had said.  The act of clicking the Like button was not in her experience.   
In this sample, BP was thinking about the status she had read on Facebook earlier, the 
thought did not include any characteristics.   
One of BP’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved the unfolding of words, BP 
experienced the words unfolding or coming to her rather than her creating the words.  
Here is the example: 
Sample 3.1.  Before the moment of the sample, BP had thought about and figured 
out what she was going to say in a phone claim to replace her grandmother’s 
phone.  At the moment of the sample, she was typing the phrase it won’t go to 
another screen unless (the beep sounded as she was typing the word unless).  The 
notion it won’t go to another screen unless was present in her experience; 
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however, the words themselves were not in her experience.  The thought was 
unfolding as she was typing the words, but it seemed there were no words in this 
thought—that is, there was a temporal unfolding of the thought in synch with the 
typing of the words, but the experienced thought did not, apparently, include the 
words rather it only included the idea the words represented.  She was also aware 
of typing with the intention of creating the words; she was not experiencing the 
physical aspect of the typing.     
Happening Of 
 In three of BP’s samples, there was an ongoing phenomenon; however, BP was 
not actively involved in the creation of the phenomenon (15%).  In these samples, she 
was more of an observer.  Two examples have already been described above.  In sample 
2.2, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was innerly saying a math 
problem and waiting for the solution to visually appear.  BP was not actively involved in 
creating the solution, experientially, she was just waiting for the solution to come to her 
and look the right way.  In sample 3.1, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking 
section above, BP was typing the sentence it won’t go to another screen unless.  At the 
moment, BP was seeing the sentence unfolding on the screen.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 3.3.  BP had been wondering if there was something wrong with the 
beeper.  At the moment, she was thinking I started it this morning.  The specific 
words were present in BP’s experience sequentially, that is they seemed to present 
themselves to her one after the other.  However they were not innerly spoken, 
heard, or seen.  In her experience, the words were presenting themselves to BP 
and she was not creating them. 
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In these samples, BP was not experiencing herself as the creator of the words rather she 
was more of an observer.  The words were just happening.   
Inner Hearing 
 Two of BP’s samples involved inner hearing (10%), one of which was of her own 
voice, a relatively rare phenomenon in right-handed people.  One example of inner 
hearing has already been discussed in Inner Speech section above: in sample 4.2, BP was 
innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song.  BP’s other sample of inner hearing involved the 
hearing of her own voice: 
Sample 2.3.  BP was in her math class.  At the moment, she was innerly hearing 
“is my calculator in degrees?” in her own voice.  She was confident that the 
experience was of hearing her own voice (as if played back by a tape recorder) 
rather than speaking in her own voice (talking into a tape recorder).  She was also 
reaching for her calculator but that was not in her experience.   
Words Present 
In two of BP’s samples, there were specific words present in her 
experience (10%); however, the words themselves were not presented in any symbolic 
representation.  One example, sample 3.1, has already been described in detail in 
Unsymbolized Thinking section above.  In this sample, the notion it won’t go to another 
screen unless was present as she was typing the words; however, the words themselves 
were not present in her experience.  In sample 3.3, described in detail in Happening Of 
section above, the words I started it this morning were sequentially presenting 
themselves to BP.  However, the words were not innerly spoken, heard, or seen.    
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Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
Multiple experience.  
Only one of BP’s samples involved multiple experience (5%).  In sample 4.2, 
discussed in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was innerly saying “I know the 
beeper is about to go off” and innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song.   
Computing.  
In one of her samples, BP was involved in mental calculation (5%): 
Sample 2.1.  BP had just dropped off her grandmother at work and was driving.  
She had been thinking about her ex-boyfriend’s cousin and was wondering how 
old she was when she had her child.  At the moment of the sample, the idea was 
she pregnant when she was sixteen? was in her experience without words, images, 
or any other symbolic representation.  BP was calculating how old her ex-
boyfriend’s cousin was when she had her child.   
Doing of.  
In one of her samples, sample 3.1 described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking 
above, BP was typing a sentence (5%).  At the moment of the sample, BP was 
experiencing the act of typing—that is, this was not just happening. BP was aware of the 
act of typing with the intention of creating the words on the screen.   
Words spoken out loud.  
One of BP’s samples involved saying something out loud to herself (5%).  Here is 
the example: 
Sample 3.2.  BP had been trying on pants and looking in the mirror at herself from 
a sideways stance.  At the moment of the sample, she was seeing her whole self in 
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the mirror.  She was also saying out loud to herself, “I like these,” in reference to 
the pants. 
Listening with comprehension.  
One of BP’s samples involved listening with comprehension—that is, BP was 
following along and attending to the meaning of spoken words (5%). Here is the 
example: 
Sample 4.3.  BP was watching an interview on TV with the singer Robin Thicke.  
At the moment, BP was absorbed in the interview.  She was being carried along 
by the interview, what the interviewer was asking and Robin Thicke’s responses.  
In this sample, the meaning of the sentences was immediately present as she heard 
them; this is distinctly different from sample 4.1 (discussed in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above), where the meaning did not accompany the words. 
Noteworthy Characteristics 
Feelings.  
BP did not have any experience of feelings in her samples.  Furthermore, the 
presence of emotion without being directly experienced did not occur in her inner 
experience either. 
Discussion 
 BP seemed to be a motivated DES participant.  BP had a difficult time elaborating 
on her individual samples.  However, overall, her samples seemed to be more 
straightforward and less complicated than the other participants in this study.  Her most 
frequently occurring characteristic was inner speech (40%).  She also experienced 
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sensory awareness and not semantic words frequently.  BP did not have any experience 
of feeling nor did any of her samples involve an ongoing affective process.   
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CHAPTER 7 
“CL” 
CL was an 18-year-old Caucasian female who sampled with us in September and 
October 2010.  CL received a laterality quotient of -75 on the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); indicating she is strongly left-handed.  She received a 
GSI raw score of 0.005 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 30) on the Symptom 
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting 
the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
CL sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 21 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 18 of CL’s samples counts her 
inner experience characteristics.  The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory 
awareness, occurring in 7 samples (39%); feeling, occurring in 6 samples (33%); inner 
seeing, occurring in 6 samples (33%); anticipation, occurring in 4 samples (22%); 
listening with comprehension, occurring in 2 samples (11%); inner speech, occurring in 2 
samples (11%); emotion, occurring in 2 samples (11%); and infrequently occurring 
characteristics.      
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic of CL’s inner 
experience, occurring in seven of her samples (39%).  Two characteristics emerged in 
CL’s sensory awareness samples, including attending to a bodily sensation and attending 
to the sensory characteristics of an innerly seen image.   
 96 
Two of CL’s sensory awareness samples involved paying attention to a bodily 
sensation.  Here are the examples: 
Sample 3.1.  CL was sneezing.  In her experience, she was innerly saying the 
words, “I’m sneezing,” in her own voice in a matter-of-fact tone.  She was also 
experiencing the sneezing sensation in her nose and squinting eyes. 
Sample 3.2.  CL was taking a shower.  At the moment of the sample, her eyes 
were stinging and she was annoyed.  The annoyance was a mental annoyance.  
Both the stinging and the annoyance were simultaneously experience, the stinging 
more prominent. 
In both of these samples, CL was attending to the sensory qualities of some bodily 
experience (sneezing sensation in nose and squinting eyes, stinging in eyes). 
Two of CL’s sensory awareness samples involved attending to the sensory 
characteristics of an innerly seen image.  Here is an example: 
Sample 2.3.  At the moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing herself in her 
English class.  She was seeing this from her own perspective, as if she were 
sitting in her class.  She innerly saw her paper, saw her notebook curved to the left 
on the table, her blue sharpie pen on the left, and her left hand.  She also saw the 
classroom walls in her periphery.  Something about the ugliness of the 
whitish/yellowish wall color was present in her awareness; however, she was 
mostly attending to the paper, pen, and her hands. 
In this sample, CL was drawn to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish classroom wall 
color.   
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Feeling 
 Feeling was found in six of CL’s inner experience samples (33%).  Four of her 
samples involved a mental feeling.  One example has already been described in detail in 
Sensory Awareness section above.  In sample 3.2, CL was taking a shower.  At the 
moment of the sample, CL’s eyes were stinging and she was annoyed.  The annoyance 
was a mental annoyance that was simultaneous to but less salient than the stinging.  Here 
are other examples: 
Sample 2.1.  At the moment of the sample, CL was worried.  This was a powerful 
mental experience that was contained within the mental realm—that is, CL 
understood herself to be feeling not thinking, and there was no experienced bodily 
aspect.   
Sample 4.2.  CL had completed a math problem on the computer and the math 
program had just indicated to her that her answer was incorrect.  At the moment 
of the sample, CL was innerly saying “what!?!” to herself in her own annoyed, 
frustrated, cock-sure voice, as if she knew the computer must be mistaken 
(although that was not explicitly being thought).  She was also annoyed that the 
computer indicated she was incorrect.  This was a mental annoyance.  CL was 
unable to describe her feeling annoyed more than saying that it was occurring 
mentally.  CL said that others would not have been able to recognize that she was 
annoyed.  CL was both innerly saying “what!?!” in an annoyed way and feeling 
annoyed at the moment of the sample.   
In this sample, the annoyance presented itself in two ways to CL, CL was innerly saying, 
annoyingly, “what” and more or less separately feeling annoyed.  However, despite the 
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multiple presentations of the annoyance, CL was sure that observers would not have been 
able to recognize she was annoyed.  That is, the experience of annoyance was contained 
within the mental realm.   
 In one of CL’s feeling samples, she was experiencing curiosity.  Whether 
curiosity should be called feeling is questionable.  Here is the sample:  
Sample 3.4.  CL had been thinking about the DES experiment and what the DES 
investigators expect to find in left-handers in general and particularly about CL 
herself.  At the moment of the sample, CL was mentally curious.  This curiosity 
was aimed at the DES experiment; however, the DES experiment was not in her 
experience at the moment of the sample.  CL was under the impression that the 
thought content, about the experiment and her own participation, had been 
explicitly present a few seconds earlier, but had now passed, leaving a sense of 
curiosity but no particular content.   
Unlike the abovementioned feeling samples, CL’s other two samples of feeling 
involved some bodily manifestation of the feeling.  Here is an example: 
Sample 2.2.  CL had launched her Macintosh computer in the Windows mode by 
mistake; it was about to load the Windows screen.  At the moment of the sample, 
CL was innerly seeing the screen of her Mac computer laptop.  She was seeing the 
start bar on the side of the screen, a large “W” on the screen, and three large 
icons.  She was also seeing the silver frame of the screen.  She saw three icons, 
but the icons were not detailed enough to see the writing on them.  She was seeing 
the screen straight ahead.  This was an accurate rendition of the screen that would 
be coming on her real computer in a few seconds.  CL was also experiencing a 
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bodily frustration located in the middle of her chest that was actively spreading 
outwards on both sides.  The innerly seen image was more salient in her 
experience.  Regarding her feeling, CL said she “felt it, but it wasn’t that big of a 
deal.”     
In this sample, CL’s feeling (frustration) was spreading from the middle of her chest 
outward.  Similar to this, her other bodily feeling also involved movement.  Here is the 
example:  
Sample 2.4.  CL was talking to a woman on the phone.  The woman had helped 
CL come up with a solution for a problem CL was having.  At the moment of the 
sample, CL was experiencing relief.  This was experienced as the release of 
tension from her upper body as if a weight had been lifted off of her shoulders.  
She was also taking in what the woman was saying.  The relief was more salient 
in her awareness.   
Inner Seeing 
 Inner seeing occurred in six of CL’s inner experience samples (33%).  Here is an 
example: 
Sample 5.1.  CL had been looking in a magazine at a picture of a laptop case she 
wanted to purchase, trying to determine if her laptop would fit in it.  At the 
moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing her left hand placing her silver 
laptop into a laptop case that was black and white with polka dots.  She was 
seeing the computer halfway into the case.  She was also seeing the brown 
wooden kitchen table the computer was on and the white tile floor underneath the 
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table.  She was not paying particular attention to the colors.  The things seen were 
moving.   
Four of her inner seeing samples included sensory awareness.  One example, 
sample 2.3, has already been described in the Sensory Awareness section above.  In this 
sample CL was drawn to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish classroom wall color in her 
inner seeing.  Here is another example: 
Sample 3.3.  CL had told her sister, Amy, where to find quarters in her room.  CL 
was innerly seeing the drawer of her dresser.  She was seeing the drawer half 
open, seeing at the left side of the drawer a pink box with quarters and pennies, 
the orange lid to the pink box, and an empty perfume bottle.  The pink box and 
orange lid were distinctively pink and orange.  Something about their color was 
important.  The inner seeing was in motion though nothing in the image was 
moving.  The inner seeing was a simplification of what was actually in the 
drawer—that is, her real drawer has those things in it as she saw them, but also 
has other objects that were not included in the inner seeing.  CL had a sense that 
she was seeing what Amy would see if she looked into the drawer, although this 
sense was not differentiated from the seeing itself.  Simultaneously, CL was also 
expecting to hear Amy’s voice (because CL knew that Amy would not be able to 
find the quarters).  This was some kind of mental expectation, as if she knew that 
Amy would be calling out soon; that is, this was not a listening-for or perking-up-
her-ears-for Amy’s voice.   
In this sample, CL was drawn to the pink and orange color of the innerly seen box.   
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 Two of CL’s inner seeings included involvement with her external environment.  
For example, in sample 2.2 described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was innerly 
seeing her computer screen in the way that would actually exist in her external 
environment, but was not yet in that state.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 5.5.  CL was putting makeup on in the bathroom.  She heard the movie 
her sister had started playing in the living room.  CL had seen this movie many 
times and, at the moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing the scene that she 
was actually hearing.  Her experience was of seeing the movie, with the dialogue 
and sounds being provided by the actual hearing.  As far as she could tell, the 
innerly seen movie was identical to the actual movie (although she didn’t claim 
they were identical—she simply didn’t know of any differences).  She was seeing 
an overcast scene with a girl walking and pulling off her wig on a corner with a 
taxi behind her.  CL was innerly seeing what seemed to be all the details of the 
real movie scene.  She was taking in the whole scene but mostly attending to the 
main character.  She was also hearing the audio of the movie playing.  So she was 
both innerly seeing the scene of the movie and hearing the actual audio from the 
movie.   
In this sample, CL’s inner experience is directly involved with her external environment.    
Anticipation 
In four of her samples CL was anticipating something happening (22%).  In 
sample 2.2, described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was innerly seeing an 
accurate rendition of the screen that would be coming on her real computer in a few 
seconds.  In sample 3.3, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, CL was 
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expecting to hear her sister’s voice, as if she knew her sister would be calling out for her 
soon.  In sample 4.1, the frozen emotion described in detail in Emotion section below, CL 
was waiting for something to happen.  In one of her samples, CL was anticipating finding 
something.  Here is the example: 
Sample 5.2.  CL was searching through her closet for a particular pair of shoes.  
She was visually looking for them.  She was also mouthing (nothing audible in 
either her imagination or real world) words to a song playing on her iTunes; 
however, this was happening automatically and not in her experience.  All that 
was in her experience was the searching for the shoes. 
In this sample CL was actively searching for a pair of shoes in her closet.  
Listening with Comprehension 
In two of her samples (11%), CL was listening with comprehension.  In sample 
2.4, described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was talking to a woman on the 
phone and taking in what she was saying.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 4.3.  CL was talking to her friend, Christy, on the phone.  At the moment 
of the sample, she was listening with comprehension to what Christy was saying.  
There was nothing else in her experience at the moment.  When she surveyed 
herself after the moment, she discovered that she was calm in her body and 
shoulders, and was breathing deeply in relaxation (because of what Christy was 
saying), but that was not in her experience at the moment of the sample. 
In these samples, CL was following along and taking in what was being said.   
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Inner Speech 
 Inner speech occurred two times in CL’s inner experience (11%).  Both samples 
involved CL’s own voice.  In sample 3.1, described in detail Sensory Awareness section 
above, CL was innerly saying “I’m sneezing,” in her own voice.  In this sample, CL was 
actively surveying, and commenting, on a bodily process rather than automatically 
integrating this process as part of her experience.  Her other inner speech sample 
involved an emphatic tone.  In sample 4.2, described in detail in Feeling section above, 
CL was innerly saying “what!?!” to herself in her own annoyed voice.   
Emotion 
 During two of CL’s inner experience samples, an affective process was ongoing; 
however, CL was not directly experiencing a feeling at the moment (11%).  One example 
has already been described in detail in Listening with Comprehension section above.  In 
sample 4.3, CL was calm and relaxed; however, she did not experience this at the 
moment.  She only knew herself to be calm and relaxed after the moment of the sample 
when she surveyed her body.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 4.1.  CL had been doing her homework when a truck quickly pulled into 
her driveway and she had seen someone head for her garage.  A wave of pure fear 
had overtaken her, but at the moment of the sample, she was in a suspended 
animation state, frozen, anticipating, waiting to hear something, as if her senses 
were oriented to anything that might happen in the garage, and she was waiting 
for something to happen.  Apparently the fear was suspended at the moment of 
the sample, so that at the exact moment of the sample nothing is experienced, an 
anticipatory void aimed at the garage.    
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In this sample, CL had been taken over by fear although, at the moment of the sample, 
the fear was frozen and not experienced.  CL was somehow able to suspend her fear at 
the moment.   
In both of these samples, there was a clear emotional state (calm and relaxed, 
fear) that had been experienced either prior to or would be experienced after the moment 
of the sample; however, at the moment, CL’s experience did not include the feeling.  Her 
feelings appear to be separate, and oftentimes secondary, characteristics that can be 
turned off and on at her will.   
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
 CL had seven characteristics that each only occurred one time in her inner 
experience samples (6% each).   
Not semantic words. 
In one of her samples, words were present in CL’s experience; however, the 
meanings of the words were not.  In sample 5.3, described in detail in Words Present 
section below, CL’s eyes were aimed at the word magnificent; however, the word or its 
definition were not in her experience at the moment of the sample. 
Happening of.  
In one of her samples, CL was drawing lines and attending to the drawing of the 
lines; however, the watching of the lines unfold was a happening kind of experience.  
Here is the sample:   
Sample 4.4.  CL was adding lines to a palm tree she had drawn.  She was paying 
attention to the drawing of the lines and watching the lines unfold.  
Simultaneously, she was also wondering when the beeper would sound.  This was 
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a thought without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.  The palm 
tree was experientially more in her awareness than the wondering (an estimated 
ratio of 60:40).  
This experience is unusual in the sense that, even though she was making the lines, it was 
as if the lines were coming out of her pen—that is, the lines were driving the pen, rather 
than the pen driving the lines.   
Words present.  
In one sample, words were present in CL’s experience without any symbolic 
characteristics:  
Sample 5.3.  CL had been reading a magazine and looking at the word 
magnificent, the last word in a sentence.  Her experience was of the word 
magnificent, not of the sentence that contained the word.  At the moment of the 
sample, CL was innerly seeing a cartoon pink elephant.  The elephant was seen 
from the right side, aimed towards the right but looking back at her.  She was 
seeing the pink elephant with a black outline; the remaining of her imaginary 
visual field was black. The words pink elephant were also present in her 
experience, separately from the innerly seen cartoon pink elephant.  The words 
were present in pink, bold letters without any spaces.  The word pink and letter e 
in elephant were all capitals, PINKElephant.  The words were present in her 
experience but, despite their visual characteristics (color, font, etc.), she was not 
innerly seeing them, hearing them, or saying them.  CL said that, although she 
does not see the words pink elephant, she knew they were there in that way.  Both 
the seeing of the cartoon pink elephant and the pink words pink elephant were 
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present in her experience at the same time but separately.  Her eyes were still 
aimed at the word magnificent, but that was not in her experience at the moment. 
In this sample, the words pink elephant were present in CL’s experience with specific 
visual characteristics; however, she was not seeing them (nor was she hearing them or 
saying them).  That is, somehow the visual characteristics of the words were present to 
CL even though there was no visual experience of the words.  That may seem impossible, 
but the investigators questioned CL carefully on this point, and this was the joint 
conclusion.  
Focus on words (rather than sentences).  
In one of her samples, sample 5.3 described in detail in Words Present section 
above, CL’s eyes were aimed at a word (magnificent), which happened to be the last 
word in a sentence.  Her experience was of the word and not of the sentence that 
contained the word.  During the expositional interview, CL was unable to recall the 
sentence that contained the word.  CL’s experience seems to be of words rather than 
sentences.   
Multiple experience.  
In one of her samples, CL was experiencing multiple, distinct phenomenon.  In 
sample 4.4, described in detail in Happening Of section above, CL was drawing a tree 
and watching the lines unfold.  Simultaneously, she was wondering when the beeper 
would sound. 
Inner hearing.  
CL’s inner hearing sample involved innerly hearing a hummed version of a  
commercial tune:   
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Sample 2.5.  CL was innerly hearing a hummed version of a commercial tune.  It 
was as if a hummed, simplified version of the tune was replaying in her head.  
There were no words or instruments, just humming.  She was experiencing this as 
if it were the commercial.  She was not experiencing the doing of the humming, 
rather this was an inner hearing of the humming. 
Unsymbolized thinking.  
In sample 4.4, described in detail in Happening Of section above, CL was 
wondering when the beeper would sound.  This was a thought without words, images, or 
any other symbolic representation.   
Discussion 
 CL seemed to be a motivated subject.  She expressed interest in DES and 
appeared to have gained clarity and self-awareness from the process.  Most of CL’s inner 
experience samples consisted of one characteristic.  Sensory awareness, feeling, and inner 
seeing were her most frequently occurring inner experience characteristics.   
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CHAPTER 8 
“DH” 
DH was an 18-year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us in October and 
November of 2010.  He received a laterality quotient of -73 on the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating that he is strongly left-handed.  
He received a GSI raw score of 0.79 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 67) on the 
Symptom Checklist -90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 
1973), suggesting the possibility of psychological difficulties.  When comparing DH’s 
GSI raw score to adolescent nonpatients he received a T-score of 56, however.   
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
DH sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 30 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 24 of DH’s samples counts his 
inner experience characteristics.  The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory 
awareness, occurring in 11 samples (46%); inner seeing, occurring in 9 samples (38%); 
unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 7 samples (29%); inner speech, occurring in 7 
samples (29%); not semantic words, occurring in 4 samples (17%); multiple experience, 
occurring in 4 samples (17%); emotion, occurring in 3 samples (13%); feeling, occurring 
in 1 sample (4%); infrequently occurring characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.   
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in DH’s inner 
experience, consisting of 11 samples (46%).  Here are examples: 
Sample 2.6.  DH was playing the guitar.  At the moment of the sample, he was 
seeing his left hand and feeling the strings with his left hand to make sure his left 
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hand was in the right position.  He was feeling the strings more than the looking 
(an estimated 70:30).  He was also hearing the sound he was making as his right 
hand strummed.  The seeing/feeling of his left hand was most salient in his 
experience (an estimated 70:30).   
Sample 5.5.  DH was looking down at the kitchen table at two magazines stacked 
on top of each other.  At the moment of the sample, he was seeing a part of a 
man’s arm in a photo on the bottom magazine.  DH was mostly attending to the 
veins on the man’s arm from the bicep down towards his hand, the way the veins 
bulged and their significance of muscularity.   
Three of DH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of 
words.  Here are examples: 
Sample 3.3.  He had heard a song on the radio and had been trying to figure out 
what the song was.  He had gone to Yahoo Search and typed in the portion of the 
lyric that he could remember.  At the moment, he was seeing an array of bold and 
unbolded words on the computer screen.  He was paying attention to the pattern 
of bolding, not to the meanings of the words that he was seeing.  He knew the 
bolded words were the ones that he had typed, but that was not part of his 
experience at the moment; at the moment he was paying attention to the visual 
characteristics of the bolding/nonbolding.  He was also experiencing what he 
called “gratification” because he knew the bolded words were what he was 
looking for.  Rather than gratification being directly experienced, at the moment 
there was more a mental relief, an absence of the compulsion of needing to find 
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the song that had strongly existed earlier.  The seeing of the bold and unbolded 
words was most salient in his experience (an estimated 70:30).   
Sample 5.2.  DH was writing the words white dwarf on a piece of paper.  At the 
moment of the sample, he was paying visual attention to what he was writing.  It 
was as if the writing was automatically coming out of him and he was visually 
monitoring the appearance of words.  He was attending to how the words looked 
and not what the words represented or meant.  He was also innerly saying, “what 
is the sun?” in his own voice.  The written words were more salient in his 
experience (an estimated 80:20).   
Similar to the samples just described, one of DH’s samples involved the sensory 
awareness of a traffic signal.  In this sample, DH was not attending to the signal for its 
meaning.  Here is the example:   
Sample 3.4.  He had been driving over a bridge.  At the moment, he was noticing 
the brightness of a red stop light as it emerged from being occluded by the bridge.  
He was attending to the glowiness of the stop light.  He was also seeing the road 
around him but he was mostly attending to the glowiness of the stop light. 
 As mentioned above, sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring 
characteristic in DH’s inner experience.  The majority of his samples (8/11) were typical 
sensory awareness experiences; however, 3 of his 11 samples involved attending to the 
sensory qualities of words or symbols (sign in sample 3.4). 
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Inner Seeing 
 DH’s inner experience involved nine samples of inner seeing (38%).  Five of 
DH’s inner seeing samples involved a seeing of something he had already seen, although 
the inner seeing transformed the original in some way.  Here are examples: 
Sample 2.4.  DH was on the couch with his eyes shut thinking about a movie he 
had watched a week ago.  At the moment, he was innerly seeing two girls 
(characters from the movie) standing in a kitchen.  He was seeing this as if he was 
standing in the kitchen with them, he recognized himself as being in the scene.  
The girls were standing close together facing DH (though he could not see any 
aspect of himself).  The seeing was a still image and in color.  This was an 
accurate recreation of a scene from the actual movie, with the exception of DH’s 
presence.  He was also thinking how sad without words, images, or any other 
symbolic representation.   
Sample 3.6.  DH had been studying.  At the moment, he was innerly seeing two 
arrows.  He was seeing a red arrow point up to the left and a blue arrow point 
down to the right.  The arrows were both bent outwards in the center similar to the 
recycling logo (except the recycling logo is gradually curved whereas the seen 
arrows were rather sharply bent).  He was seeing the arrows against a black 
background.  The heel of each of the arrows seemed to “fade” or disintegrate in 
both color and form.  There was some sense of the meaning of the arrows.  This 
was a seeing of what he had seen before, though the original arrows were straight 
up and down, not bent, and without fading or disintegrating. 
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Sample 4.4.  DH was looking in a magazine at an advertisement for a wristwatch.  
Before the moment of the sample, DH had been innerly saying “My dad has the 
same exact watch but nicer,” (referring to the fact that the advertised watch has a 
leather band whereas his father’s watch has a stainless steel band).  At the 
moment, he was seeing the wristwatch as he had seen it in the magazine, except 
that now his inner seeing had replaced the leather band, which was wrapped 
around a model’s wrist, with a stainless steel band similarly wrapped.  Thus he 
saw the magazine wristwatch advertisement (but what he saw had had the band 
replaced).  He was seeing the watch with a stainless steel band in the same 
position and orientation of the original leather band.  Simultaneously, the thought 
that his father’s watch was nicer was still in his experience; the meaning 
continued on in his experience (that is, half the meaning of the original sentence 
somehow continued on) but the words were no longer present. 
Sample 5.6.  DH had just finished having a conversation with his sister, Jamie, in 
which she indicated if she had to die she would rather drown than be stabbed.  DH 
had disagreed with Jamie and was walking away from her.  At the moment, he 
was innerly saying, “You’re nuts.”  The words were innerly spoken in a mostly 
irritated and also comical way (60:40).  DH was not feeling irritated at the 
moment; that is as far as he knew if it had not been for the characteristics of his 
voice, there would have been no indication of irritation at all.  Simultaneously, he 
was innerly seeing a scene from the movie Saving Private Ryan.  DH was innerly 
seeing a man in a green suit laying on top of another man, trying to stab him with 
a knife.  The man on the bottom was struggling against his attacker with his 
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hands.  The seeing was in motion.  The only colors DH was seeing was the green 
uniforms and the pale white faces of the men.  The whiteness of the faces was 
unrealistic and more pale in nature than what would be in real life.  It was as if the 
seeing were incompletely colored, not that he was focused on the incompleteness 
but that most of the scene was in black and white except for the green of the 
uniforms.  DH was seeing this from an angled perspective, he was seeing the rear 
left side of the man on bottom and right side of the man on top. 
One of his samples involved innerly seeing himself: 
Sample 3.5.  DH had been talking to his mom about taking a new class at the 
gym.  At the moment, he was innerly seeing a vivid and still picture of himself jiu 
jitsu fighting another male, Tommy.  DH was seeing himself with his back on the 
floor with Tommy up on his knees and on top of DH.  Tommy’s body was 
parallel to DH’s.  DH was wearing a yellow belt and white gi, and Tommy was 
wearing a blue gi.  DH was seeing this image from a viewpoint closer to his feet 
(in the image).  He was seeing the right side of his body and the left side of 
Tommy’s. 
 Here is a visual image that may have significance for understanding the visual 
experience of left-handed individuals:  
Sample 3.1.  DH had been irritated because he needed to use the bathroom and his 
sister, Olivia, was occupying it, brushing her teeth.  At the moment, he was 
thinking its taking her so long without words, images, or any symbolic 
representation.  He was also hearing Olivia brushing her teeth.  He was also 
innerly seeing Olivia’s reflection in the mirror brushing her teeth.  This was an 
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illustration of what he was hearing.  He was seeing Olivia as if she were bent over 
and her face near the mirror.  He was seeing Olivia with pimples, greasy hair, and 
a grey shirt brushing her teeth.  He was seeing more of the right side of her face.  
He was only seeing Olivia’s reflection, however (not her face and body that were 
being reflected).  The thought was more salient in his experience (an estimated 
60:40).   
In this experience, he innerly saw Olivia’s reflection, not Olivia herself.  Although it is 
unknown why he would do that, it is worth noting that seeing the reflection reverses 
Olivia’s seen handedness. 
Unsymbolized Thinking 
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in seven of DH’s samples (29%).  Six of his 
unsymbolized thinking samples were straightforward.  Two examples have already been 
described in detail in Inner Seeing section above.  In sample 2.4, DH was thinking how 
sad without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.  In sample 3.1, DH had 
been waiting for his sister to finish brushing her teeth so that he could use the bathroom.  
At the moment, the thought its taking her so long was present without words, images, or 
any symbolic representation.  Here are other examples: 
Sample 2.1.  DH was watching TV.  He was paying attention to the appearance of 
a woman’s hair on the screen (“it had a weird design on it”).  He was also 
thinking that her hair was odd.  This was a thought process that did not involve 
words, or comparisons, or any other symbolic representation.  At the moment of 
the sample, he was both seeing the oddness of the woman’s hair and thinking that 
her hair is odd.    
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Sample 2.5.  DH was feeling the edge of his ipod headphones, tracing them to 
find the end.  At the moment of the sample, he was wondering where is the end of 
it, this thought was present without words, images, or any other symbolic 
representation.  He was also feeling the wires though the thought was more salient 
in his experience (an estimated 70:30).   
Sample 5.1.  He had been looking for a can of soda and eliminating places of 
where it could be.  At the moment of the sample, DH was wondering where his 
soda could be.  This was a thought process that did not involve images, words, or 
any symbolic representation.  The soda itself or the places it could be were not in 
his experience at the moment.  He had a pill in his mouth and was experiencing a 
light weight on the middle of his tongue.  He was also physically looking for the 
soda; however, this was not in his experience at the moment. 
 One of DH’s examples involved a lingering thought.  In sample 4.4, described in 
detail in Inner Seeing section above, DH had innerly said “My dad has the same exact 
watch but nicer” prior to the sample.  At the moment of the sample, the words were no 
longer present; however, the idea was still in DH’s experience.   
Inner Speech 
 Inner speech occurred in 7 DH’s 24 samples (29%).  All of DH’s inner speech 
samples consisted of his own voice.  Here is an example: 
Sample 5.3.  DH had been looking at a five-point star he had drawn in his notes 
earlier indicating that the section in his notes was important.  At the moment, DH 
was seeing the five-point star.  He was also saying, “H e Flare” (as in helium 
flare).  Before the moment of the sample, he had been repeating the words “H e 
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Flare.”  At the moment of the moment of the sample, he was saying one unit of 
the “H e Flare” repetitions.  He was attending more to the sound of the words.  
What the words refer to was not in his experience at the moment.  That is, the star 
had indicated that this was important, and he was repetitively saying the words 
over and over.  But he was not thinking about or attending to what the words 
meant.  It was as if the repetition of the word sounds was all that was ongoing. 
In this sample, DH was attending to the sound of the innerly spoken words and not the 
meanings. 
Three of DH’s inner speakings involved an emotional or emphatic tone.  One 
example has already been discussed in detail in Inner Seeing section above.  In sample 
5.6, DH was innerly saying, “You’re nuts” in an irritated, comical way.  Here is another 
example: 
Sample 3.2.  He had been doing homework simulations on the computer.  He had 
been trying to make a rat press a lever by shocking him.  At the moment, he was 
innerly saying, “Why aren’t you!?!?”  DH was saying this in a powerful, almost 
yelling, tone which represented his frustration though he was not experiencing 
frustration at the moment.  This inner speech conveyed DH’s wondering about 
why the rat was not moving to the right.  DH was also noticing the rat was facing 
the wrong direction on the screen, the rat was facing the left and the lever was to 
the right.  DH was frustrated, and his inner speech conveyed frustration, but he 
did not experience frustration at the moment. 
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In two samples, DH was innerly speaking; however, he did not seem to be the 
agent of his inner speaking.  Here is an example: 
Sample 4.3.  DH had been writing his experience in sample 4.2 in his notebook.   
At the moment, he was innerly seeing the same image as he was seeing in sample 
4.2.  Most of his attention was focusing on himself having the image, a cognitive 
process or an examination of the extent to which he had been experiencing the 
image at the moment of sample 4.2.  At the moment, he was innerly saying “50 
vision,” meaning that 50% of his attention had been aimed at the image.  The 
inner speaking was happening automatically.  That is, he had little or no 
experience of the creation of the speaking, although he had experience of the 
speaking itself.  .    
Not Semantic Words 
 In four of DH’s samples (17%), words were present but he was not attending to 
the words for their meaning.  These examples have already been described above.  In 
sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was seeing an 
array of bold and unbolded words on the computer screen.  DH was not attending to the 
words for their meaning, rather he was attending to them for their visual characteristics.  
In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was noticing 
the brightness of a red stop light and was not paying attention to the meaning of the stop 
light.  In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was 
writing the words white dwarf.  DH was attending to the visual characteristics of the 
words and not the meaning of the words.  In sample 5.3, described in detail in Inner 
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Speech section above, DH was innerly saying “He Flare.”  He was attending more to the 
sound of the words than their meaning.     
Multiple Experience 
 Four of DH’s samples involved multiple experience (17%).  In these samples, DH 
was experiencing separate and unrelated stimuli simultaneously.  For example, in sample 
5.1 described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, DH had been thinking 
about where his soda could be.  Simultaneously and unrelated to the thought, DH was 
also feeling a pill on his tongue.   
Emotion 
 In three of DH’s samples, there was an ongoing emotion (13%) but DH was not 
directly experience the feeling.  These examples have already been described above.  In 
sample 2.4, described in detail in Inner Seeing sample above, DH was thinking how sad; 
however, he was not experiencing sadness at the moment.  In sample 3.2, described in 
detail in Inner Speech section above, DH was innerly saying “Why aren’t you!?!?” in a 
powerful tone representing his frustration, though he was not experiencing frustration at 
the moment.  In sample 5.6, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, DH was 
innerly saying “You’re nuts” in an irritated and comical way though he was not feeling 
irritated at the moment.   
Feeling 
 DH’s inner experience rarely involved feeling, only one of his samples involved 
the direct experience of an emotion (4%): 
Sample 4.2.  DH had been watching the World Series baseball game.  At the 
moment, he was innerly seeing the pitcher from the chest up, seeing the right side 
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of the pitcher’s torso and face.  Mostly DH was seeing the pitcher’s eyes, they 
were bright blue and watery (as if he was going to cry).  This inner seeing was an 
accurate re-seeing of what had appeared perhaps five minutes earlier on TV, 
except that the inner seeing was a still screen shot (as if it were one frame from 
the original viewing).  DH was also innerly saying, “that sucks.”  This was in his 
own voice and said with a drawn-out empathic tone.  DH was also feeling 
empathy for the pitcher.  This was mostly experienced mentally and (perhaps) 
partially experienced as a pulling-downward in his face. 
Three other samples might be marginally considered feelings by a broad 
definition of that term.  In sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section 
above, DH was experiencing gratification or mental relief, an absence of a compulsion he 
had been experiencing prior to the beep.  Whether one should call the lack of something 
that had previously been ongoing an experience is questionable; if so, then sample 3.3 
might be called a feeling.  Here is another example: 
Sample 4.1.  DH was driving home.  He had just picked up food and was singing 
his own “private remix” of a Blink 182 song.  That is, he was adding and 
changing words to the song.  At the moment, he was singing, “I can’t wait ‘til I 
get home.”  He was singing the song from Blink 182’s perspective.  DH was 
singing the song as if transported into the Blink 182 persona.  He was also 
experiencing anticipation to get home.  This was a mental anticipation or 
“compulsion” to get home, DH would not feel peace until he ate.  That is, it was 
as if the need/want to eat imposed itself actively on DH; that is, the urge to eat 
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was a being-done-to experience, not an active experience.  The singing was more 
salient in his experience (an estimated 70:30).   
If mental anticipation or “compulsion” to get home is considered an emotion, then sample 
4.1 is a feeling.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 4.5.  He had read something funny on Facebook.  At the moment, he was 
having a reaction to a statement, a reaction that the statement was ridiculous, 
which, if put into words, would be something like Nah! or No way! or Yeah, right!  
This was a mental, automatic reaction to the statement that seemed to come to 
him, rather than being created by him.  That is, DH understood this reaction as 
being much more similar to the I have to eat compulsion of sample 4.1 
aforementioned than to the my father’s watch is nicer thinking of sample 4.4 
(described in detail in Inner Seeing section above), and he understood the 
similarity to 4.1 as that the reaction was experienced as being done to him rather 
than his creating the reaction.  DH was also smiling, though that was not in his 
experience at the moment. 
If noticing ridiculousness can be considered an emotion, then sample 4.5 can be 
considered a feeling. 
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
Doing of.  
In three of his samples, DH was engaged in the completion of an activity (13%).  
In sample 2.6, described in detail Sensory Awareness section above, DH was feeling the 
strings of his guitar to make sure his hand was in the right position.  In sample 4.1, 
described in detail in Feeling section above, DH was singing a song from the perspective 
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of the band who sings the song.  In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness 
section above, DH was visually monitoring the appearance of the words he was writing.   
 Happening of.  
 In two of his samples, DH had little or no experience of the creation of an 
activity—that is, the activity was just happening (8%).  In sample 4.3, described in detail 
in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, DH was innerly saying “50 vision”; however, 
he had little or no experience of the creation of the inner speaking.  In sample 5.2, 
described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was writing the words white 
dwarf.  He was attending to the visual presentation of the words and not the writing—that 
is, the writing was automatically happening.      
 Anticipation.   
 One of DH’s samples involved an anticipatory state (4%).  In sample 4.1, 
described in detail in Feeling section above, DH was experiencing a mental anticipation 
to get home.   
 Inner hearing.  
 One of DH’s samples involved inner hearing (4%).  In this sample, DH was 
innerly hearing a song: 
Sample 4.6.  DH had been looking at a picture of Mario Brothers’ characters on 
his computer screen with a solicitation to add a caption to the picture.  At the 
moment, he was innerly hearing the Jaws theme song, which was seeming to him 
as being a good caption.  He was also seeing the picture on the screen.  The inner 
hearing was most salient in his experience (an estimated 60:40).   
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Noteworthy Characteristics 
Words.  
DH had seven inner speakings, which are quite similar to the inner speakings of 
right-handed people.  In one sample, DH had an inner speaking that was outside of his 
experience—that is, the inner speaking was just happening.  DH did experience inner 
hearing in one sample.  In this sample, he was innerly hearing a song (the theme song to 
Jaws).  Three of DH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of 
words.  In these samples, words were present; however, DH was attending to them for 
their auditory of visual characteristics and not for their meaning. 
Discussion 
 Overall DH seemed to be a motivated DES participant.  He was interested in the 
process of exploring inner experience as well as his inner experience.  DH frequently 
experienced sensory awareness, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, and inner speech.  
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CHAPTER 9 
“NT” 
NT was a 28-year-old Biracial (Caucasian/Asian) male who sampled with us in 
January and February 2011.  NT received a laterality quotient of -68 on the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating he is left-handed.  He received a 
GSI raw score of 0.19 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 50) on the Symptom 
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), 
suggesting the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.  
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
NT sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 23 of NT’s samples counts his 
inner experience characteristics.  The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory 
awareness, occurring in 16 samples (70%); not semantic words, occurring in 10 samples 
(43%); multiple experience, occurring in 10 samples (43%); doing of, occurring in 8 
samples (35%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 3 samples (13%); emotion, 
occurring in 2 samples (9%); anticipation, occurring in 2 samples (9%); inner seeing, 
occurring in 2 samples (9%); feeling, occurring in 1 sample (4%); and noteworthy 
characteristics.   
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness occurred in 16 of NT’s samples (70%), which suggests that 
sensory awareness is highly characteristic of NT’s inner experience.  Here are typical 
examples of sensory awareness: 
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Sample 3.1.  NT was sitting in the passenger seat of a car while his girlfriend was 
driving.  At the moment, he was seeing a dull silver color (which happened to be a 
sign), a white color (which happened to be the post the sign was connected to), 
and black etchings (he was experiencing the etchiness of it, not the etchings 
themselves) within the metal square (which happened to be letters).  NT was not 
attending to the signness, postness, wordness, or letterness.  All that was in his 
experience was the silverness, whiteness, and blackness of the etchings.  This was 
a weak experience in that NT was passively or idly involved in the apprehension 
of the colors, and they did not grab him as energetically as sample 3.4 below. 
Sample 3.4.  NT was looking at a pastry.  At the moment, he was seeing white, 
brown, yellow, which happened to be a pastry of several pastries, but he was not 
aware of the pastryness at the moment.  And he was seeing dark circles that 
happened to be chocolate chips on one of the pastries, but he was not aware of the 
chocolate-chipness at the moment.  All that was in his experience was the 
whiteness, brownness, yellowness, and dark circleness. 
Here is a less typical example: 
Sample 2.2.  NT was flipping through a book.  As he flipped, his eyes came to 
rest on a diagram with cross-hatchings.  At the moment, the many cross-hatchings 
were central in NT’s experience.  He was not attending to them as part of the 
diagram or for their meaning, but he was attending to them for their visual 
aspect—in fact, he did not know what the diagram was about.  He was also seeing 
the pages that surrounded the diagram, seeing an array of opened pages as he 
flipped them.  In retrospect, he said that the pages looked sort of like the petals of 
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a flower (although the flowerness was not in his experience at the moment).  
Thus, it was as if he was experiencing cross-hatchings with something around 
them (paper). 
This sample is an unusual sensory awareness in that NT was also aware of the area 
surrounding the focus of his attention (the opened pages surrounding the cross-hatchings) 
despite their being irrelevant to the cross-hatchings.  Here is another unusual example: 
Sample 3.6.  NT was in class and his professor was talking about the down-
regulation of drugs.  At the moment, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle 
that was his representation of the down-regulation of a cell.  The outer ring was 
pink and the inner circle was white.  NT was also seeing “suckers,” by which he 
meant things that looked like the suction cups on an octopus tentacle, popping 
into the outer ring.  NT was seeing only a slice of the cell.  NT was attending to 
the colorness and shapeness of the cell more than the suckerness of it.  NT was 
writing notes and experienced a low level recognition of the act of writing, and no 
experience whatever of the words he was writing.  There was nothing else in his 
experience, including no experience of the instructor, who was speaking (even 
though he was processing her meaning as evidenced by the taking of notes and the 
creation of a parallel inner seeing).   
In this sample, NT was attending to the sensory stimuli (the colorness and shapeness) of 
an innerly seen image.   
 Five of NT’s sensory awareness samples featured the sensory awareness of words.  
Two of these samples involved the sensory awareness of a written word.  Here is an 
example: 
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Sample 4.3.  NT had been idly looking at a phrase handwritten in his notepad.  At 
the moment, his eyes were directed at the word “collecting.”  Something about the 
word “collecting” had drawn NT’s attention.  The word was mentally present in 
his head, however, the meaning of the word or the words that came before it were 
not in NT’s experience.  It was as if his experience consisted of word, word, 
word, collecting (beep).  He was not apprehending the meaning of the word. 
In this sample, the word “collecting” was present in NT’s experience, however, he was 
not attending to the meaning of the word, rather he was drawn to the word for other 
reasons, though that was not in his experience at the moment.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 5.1.  NT had been reading a text book.  He had looked away to see who 
was talking, and now had returned his gaze to the textbook.  At the moment, his 
eyes were directed at the textbook and he was seeing fuzzy black shapes against a 
white background.  The fuzzy black shapes were letters in the text book, however, 
he was not recognizing them as letters. 
In this sample, although NT had been reading and was currently seeing the words on the 
page, he was not recognizing the letters he was seeing as words, rather he was attending 
to the letters for their sensory qualities (their appearance against the whiteness of the 
page).  NT’s other sensory awareness of words samples involved attending to the 
auditory characteristics rather than the meaning of spoken words.  Here are examples: 
Sample 3.5.  NT was in class attending to a classmate named Ellen.  NT was 
listening to Ellen talk about drinking and driving and seeing her arm movements.  
The object of NT’s experience seemed to be Ellen as a person, not merely her talk 
or her arm movements.  That is, NT heard Ellen talk from the perspective of 
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recognizing that that is how Ellen always talks; and he was seeing her gesticulate 
from the perspective of recognizing that Ellen always gesticulates like that. 
Sample 4.6.  NT was in class and attending to his professor, Dr. Simon.  NT was 
taking in the way Dr. Simon was speaking, somehow recognizing the Simon-ness 
of her talking.  NT was also experiencing anticipation or some sense of where the 
discussion was heading.  The actual topic was not in his experience, just the 
expectation of the topic. 
Not Semantic Words 
NT had a unique presentation of words in his inner experience.  In fact, words 
were present very little in his experience and, when they were, NT did not experience the 
words for their meaning regardless of their presentation.  Ten of NT’s samples of inner 
experience involved this phenomenon (43%).  In these samples, words were somehow 
present, either written, heard, read, or thought; however, the words themselves or the 
meaning of the words were not in NT’s experience.   
Three examples of not semantic words have already been described in detail in 
Sensory Awareness section above.  For example, in sample 3.1, NT was attending to the 
sensory aspect of a sign.  A sign is designed, constructed, and installed specifically to 
convey words—everything about a sign is aimed at Read these words.  Even though his 
eyes were aimed at the sign, the words did not penetrate NT’s experience.  Similarly, in 
sample 2.2, NT was attending to the sensory characteristics of a diagram in a book.  A 
book is designed, constructed, and printed specifically to convey words—the main thrust 
of a book is aimed at Read these words.  But even though his eyes were aimed at the 
book, the words did not penetrate his experience.  This example is slightly weaker 
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because books do contain pictures rather than merely words.  But even those pictures are 
designed for semantic purposes, and he sees them for their sensory purposes.  In sample 
3.6, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle, a representation of the down-regulation 
of drugs his professor was talking about at the moment.  However, NT was not attending 
to the double ring circle for its representation or meaning, he was attending to the sensory 
characteristics.  Even though the innerly seen image was a representation of what he was 
hearing his professor talk about (down-regulation of drugs), the down-regulation of drugs 
was not in his experience.  Rather, NT was only attending to the sensory aspects of the 
image.    
Here is an example of reading: 
Sample 5.5.  NT had been reading an article about the quality of life outcomes in 
children with Autism.  NT had just read the phrase “academic achievement.”  At 
the moment, the notion of academic achievement and how NT could place the 
concept of academic achievement into a paper he will be writing was present in 
his awareness.  This was a thought present without any form of symbolic 
representation.  NT was unable to determine whether the words “academic 
achievement” were present in his experience or whether it was just the concept.  
NT’s eyes were still directed at the words in the article (and probably continued to 
track along as if he were reading); however, he was not comprehending the 
reading.  Furthermore, someone (perhaps the professor—he was in class) was 
talking, but he was not hearing this at all.   
Although NT was reading, he was not aware of the words or the meaning of the words he 
was reading.   
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Here is another example:  
Sample 2.3.  NT had been deciding between the phrases “it appears” or 
“sometimes” to use in the e-mail he was writing.  At the moment, he was waiting 
for the cognition to happen, at which time the chosen word would come out of his 
fingers.  There was nothing in his experience—he was waiting for the choice to be 
made so that he could continue typing.   
In this sample, NT was trying to decide on choice of words.  The words themselves, 
however, were not in his experience at the moment.   
Multiple Experience 
 Ten of NT’s inner experience samples feature multiple experiences (43%).  The 
most frequently occurring combination of multiple experience in NT’s samples included 
sensory awareness with other sensory awareness (three times).  Here is an example: 
Sample 4.4.  NT was at Starbucks chewing a pastry.  At the moment, he was 
experiencing the sweetness and chewyness of the pastry.  He was also looking at 
jars of brown caramel.  In his experience was the brownness in the jars.  He was 
not attending to the bottleness or caramelness of the bottles—in fact, he did not 
see the shapes of the individual jars.  NT was also thinking about the vivid 
sensory awarenesses in the inner experience of schizophrenics [referring to a 
conversation he had had earlier].  This was a thought without any symbolic 
representation.  
In this sample, NT was experiencing multiple and separate experiences, including the 
sweetness and chewyness of a pastry (sensory awareness), the brownness of the jars 
(sensory awareness), and thinking about the sensory awarenesses in the inner experience 
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of schizophrenics (unsymbolized thinking that happens to be about sensory awareness).  
Here is another example of multiple experience: 
Sample 5.2.  NT was looking at a display of brown pastries.  In his experience, he 
was seeing “golden pockets” or splashes of goldness (approximately 10-20).  NT 
was seeing the golden-brown color of the pastries.  He was not interested in the 
pastryness or the shape of the bagels, scones, muffins, croissants, etc. he was 
looking at, all that was in his experience was their golden-brownness.  All the 
splashes of color seemed the same.  Simultaneously, NT was also idly thinking of 
a cheese bagel.  This thought was presented without words, images, or any other 
symbolic representation. 
Other combinations of multiple experience include sensory awareness and 
doing of (twice); sensory awareness, doing of, and emotion (twice); sensory awareness 
and unsymbolized thinking (twice); sensory awareness and emotion (once); inner seeing 
and doing of (once); and not semantic and doing of (once). 
Doing Of 
 Eight samples in NT’s inner experience involved intentional doing (35%).  In 
these samples, NT was actively involved in the doing of some action.  The action was not 
automatically happening.  NT was experientially invested and directing the activity.  Here 
are examples:   
Sample 5.3.  NT had been typing on the computer, sent a document to be printed, 
and was walking towards the printer.  At the moment, he was experiencing the 
movement towards, (and that towardsness was towards the printer but the aim of 
the towardsness, the printer, was not in his experience at the moment).  NT was 
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not experiencing the movement as a bodily sensation, however the movement was 
present mentally.  NT was also experiencing a sense of drive and forwardness.  
This was experienced as both a mental and bodily purpose.  This was separate but 
related to the experience of movement towards something.  NT was also seeing a 
purpleness and (less intently) silverness (which happened to be a stapler but that 
was not in his experience).  
Sample 3.3.  NT and his girlfriend had just finished laughing.  At the moment, NT 
was looking down and seeing a jumble of light crooked angles against a dark 
background.  The angles happened to be steps but the stepness was not in NT’s 
experience at the moment.  NT was also experiencing an uplifiting or light feeling 
that was left over from the previous laughter.  NT also had some experience of 
being in motion—that is, he was not simply moving.   
Sample 2.6.  NT was in his car with the door open about to get out.  At the 
moment, he was prepared to slap the door frame with his right hand.  [His car 
typically gives him an electrostatic shock when getting out, so he has acquired the 
behavior of slapping the car so that the shock doesn’t sting or surprise him.] 
One of NT’s doing of samples involved the act of writing.  This example has 
already been discussed in detail in Sensory Awareness section above.  In sample 3.6, NT 
was taking notes; however, he was only slightly aware of the act of writing but not at all 
aware of the words he was writing or the words his professor was saying. 
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 There were three samples that perhaps should be counted as being unsymbolized 
thinking (13%).  One sample of Unsymbolized Thinking has already been described in 
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detail in Not Semantic Words section above.  In sample 5.5, NT had been reading and the 
notion of academic achievement was present in his experience without symbolic 
representation.  In this sample, there was some kind of “notion” present to him about how 
academic achievement might fit into his paper.  This notion did not involve words or 
other symbols, and from that perspective might be said to be unsymbolized.  However, 
the unsymbolized thinking concept typically involves a more specific, differentiated 
thought.   
The other two samples that might be considered unsymbolized thinking were 
similarly nonspecific.  Sample 5.2 (described in detail in the Multiple Experience section) 
involved “idly thinking about a bagel” without any form of symbolic representation in his 
inner experience.  However, typical unsymbolized thinking is more specific (what about 
the bagel was being thought?).  Similarly, at sample 4.4 (described in detail in the 
Multiple Experience section) NT was thinking about the vivid sensory awarenesses in the 
inner experience of schizophrenics, but there was no about-what in that thinking. 
Thus, all three of these perhaps-unsymbolized-thinking seemed more like not-
well-differentiated thinking than the more usual unsymbolized thinking of other DES 
participants, which is typically as differentiated as, for example, inner speech.  
Additionally, two or maybe three of these samples also involved multiple experience 
including an unsymbolized thought and a sensory awareness (in sample 4.4), while, 
simultaneously, attending to the sensory aspects of jars of brown caramel (the 
brownness); in sample 5.2, NT was thinking of a cheese bagel while, simultaneously, 
attending to the sensory aspects of a display of pastries (the golden brown color).  It is 
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concluded that to the extent that NT experience unsymbolized thinking, it was off of the 
center of the target. 
Emotion 
NT’s samples had very little direct experience of a feeling (the direct experience 
of emotion).  There were two samples that, depending on how one understands things, 
might be said to involve emotion (9%).  Here are the samples: 
 Sample 4.5.  NT was walking along a cross-walk.  Before the sample, NT had 
been thinking of a Bipolar participant, Suzy, in his research study who had 
completed the research battery in 8 hours even though most people typically 
complete the battery in 4/5 hours.  NT had been thinking about how Suzy’s friend 
will also participate in his study and how she is probably expecting to complete 
the battery in 8 hours as well.  NT was also thinking that his research project 
involves such long batteries.  At the moment, NT experienced a lingering negative 
valence from the previous thought regarding the 8 hour research project battery.  
He was also attending to the stripey whiteness of the cross-walk.  He was drawn 
to the whiteness of the lines.  He was also attending to the cross-walkness of the 
white stripes, indicating that it is a cross-walk.  The negative valence, stripey 
whiteness, and cross-walkness were all equal in his experience.  NT was also 
experiencing a motion of forwardness, however, this was less so in his 
experience. 
The “negative valence” in this example might be considered a feeling, but it has none of 
the specificity that is often associated with DES reports of feeling. 
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The second of NT’s samples that might be said to include emotion was sample 
3.3, discussed in Doing Of section above, NT was experiencing an uplifting or light 
feeling that had been left over from his laughing with his girlfriend prior to the moment 
of the sample.  However, it was not clear whether at the moment of this sample this was a 
bodily uplifted/lightness (in which case DES would consider it a sensory awareness).  
That is, the laughing might, a bit before the sample, have involved feeling, but the 
experience of the feeling was now gone, and what remained was a bodily lightness. 
Anticipation 
Two of NT’s samples involved an anticipatory state (9%).  In these samples, NT 
was experiencing an anticipation of something about to happen.  One example, sample 
4.6, has already been described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above.  NT was 
hearing his professor speaking and anticipating something to come; however, whatever 
that something was not in his experience at the moment of the sample.  Here is the other 
example:  
Sample 4.1.  NT had been leaving a message on Amy’s, his girlfriend, voicemail.  
Before the moment of the sample, NT had said the word “maybe.”  At the 
moment, NT was experiencing a mental sensation of something about to happen.  
It was as if his mind paused, waiting for the thoughts backed up in his mind to 
move forward, and he was somehow experiencing the imminence of the 
continuation of the sentence.  He was also slightly experiencing the dark ground 
in front of him, that is, the groundness was in his experience in an undifferentiated 
way. 
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In this sample, NT was anticipating the rest of the sentence; however, whatever the rest 
of the sentence was not in his awareness at the moment of the sample.   
Inner Seeing 
Inner seeing occurred twice in NT’s inner experience (9%).  One of NT’s inner 
seeing samples (sample 3.6 described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above) 
involved the inner seeing of something that was related to external stimuli.  In this 
sample, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle that was a representation of what his 
professor was talking about at the moment (down-regulation).  
NT’s other inner seeing sample was relevant to or a representation of an ongoing 
thought he was having.  Additionally, this inner seeing sample was a mental recreation of 
something that NT had actually seen in the physical world.  Here is the example: 
Sample 2.5.  NT had been wondering if he will still be in shape in seven years 
when he turns 35.  NT had then thought of his friend, Mike, who was 35 and in 
shape.  He had thought about the last time he saw Mike at a bar eating a pizza and 
had wondered how he could eat a pizza and still be skinny.  At the moment, NT 
was innerly seeing a whole, round pizza sitting on a dark bar with a brown 
wooden counter.  He was also seeing the elevated portion of what was a stage.  
The bar was wide with wide angles.  There was nothing else and no one in the 
bar.  This was a recreation of something that had happened.  NT was innerly 
seeing this as he had seen it when it really happened except that the innerly seen 
scene was simplified—it had no people at the bar, no people on the stage, and he 
did not have a sense of being there at the moment—that is, his experience was of 
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seeing a scene, not of being in the scene.  The seeing was in color; however, NT 
was not particularly attending to the colors.    
Feeling 
NT did not have any clear examples of feeling.  In one sample, NT was 
experience pressure (4%).  Here is the example: 
Sample 2.4.  NT had been playing the game Star Craft 2 on the computer.  At the 
moment, he was experiencing the yellowness of the enemy base and the greenness 
of some circles (a mass unit that he recognized to be his army).  He was drawn to 
the yellowness of the screen.  This was the most central aspect of his experience.  
He was also experiencing something like pressure—wanting to kill before he was 
killed in the game, but this pressure was difficult to describe.  He was also hearing 
the sounds of the game.  The hearing was the least salient aspect of his 
experience. 
The “pressure” in this sample might, in an extremely loose understanding of “feeling,” be 
considered a feeling.  Thus, NT had no clear-cut feelings (see Emotion section above), 
and one sample that might be considered to be feeling if that term is given a broad or 
loose definition. 
Discussion 
 Overall, NT’s samples of inner experience suggest that he experiences sensory 
awareness much of the time; also frequent were not semantic word experiences, multiple 
experience, and doing of.  Words were present only rarely in NT’s inner experience, and 
his overall experience with words was unusual.  NT did not have any samples of inner 
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speech, typically the most frequent form of words in experience.  NT had two samples of 
emotions; both involved the lingering of a previously triggered feeling.   
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CHAPTER 10 
“MM” 
MM was an 18-year-old Ethiopian female who sampled with us throughout 
October 2010.  She received a laterality quotient of -67 on the EHI (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) 
indicating that she is left-handed.  MM received a Symptom Checklist-90-R GSI (SCL-
90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973) raw score of 1.53, which 
converts to a T-score compared to adolescent nonpatients of 61, suggesting the lack of 
clinically significant psychological distress.  MM’s GSI score was higher than any of our 
other subjects, necessitating the use of the adolescent nonpatient norms. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
MM sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples.  
Because Sampling Day 1 is considered training for participants, samples from this day 
are omitted.  Additionally, because MM was sleeping during two of her samples on 
Sampling Day 4 (samples 4.1 and 4.2) and chose to skip one (sample 4.5), those samples 
are omitted as well.  Thus 20 of MM’s samples will be considered as reflecting her inner 
experience characteristics.  The following aspects of her inner experience will be 
discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 12 samples (60%); unsymbolized thinking, 
occurring in 7 samples (35%); not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples (25%); doing 
of, occurring in 3 samples (15%); emotion, occurring in 3 samples (15%); infrequently 
occurring characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.  
Sensory Awareness 
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in MM’s 
inner experience, occurring in 12 of her 20 samples (60%).  Here are examples: 
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Sample 2.2.  MM had been looking at her index finger to see whether or not it is 
clean.  At the moment of the sample, she was seeing that her fingernail is slanted.  
She was also experiencing a thoughtful recognition of the slantedness of the nail.  
The thought hmm, slanted was present in her experience without words or images.  
This is a parallel, but separate, thought present in her experience.  All that is in 
MM’s experience at the moment of the sample is seeing the slantedness of the 
fingernail and recognizing that the fingernail is slanted.   
Sample 5.6.  MM’s Psychology instructor had been talking about a research 
finding in which 76% of college males consented to bring a female back to their 
room to have sex if asked.  At the moment of the sample, MM was paying 
attention to the laughter in the room.  She was noticing the whole class laughing 
(including herself).  She was not, in her experience, differentiating between her 
own laughter and the rest of the class’s laughter, rather she was experiencing the 
class laughter as one.  She was also seeing the back of the head of a male student 
sitting in front of her.   
Four of MM’s samples involved the sensory awareness of words or numbers.  
Here is an example: 
Sample 3.2.  MM had been studying for her Psychology course and because of an 
interruption and short conversation with her roommate, she had lost track of 
where she was in the book.  At the moment of the sample, MM’s searching for a 
particular word (she could not remember the word during the interview but there 
was a specific word involved) was in her experience.  MM was seeing all the 
words on the page.  She was not seeing the sentences or meaning of the words, in 
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her experience she was just seeing a bunch of disconnected words which were not 
noticed for their meaning or for their contextual significance, but instead were just 
a display of words.  MM was searching for the particular word where she had left 
off (and when she found it she would resume reading).  She was not searching for 
the meaning of the word or for the general content or topic where she had left off, 
she was just looking for the word. 
In this sample, MM was seeing words on a page but not attending to their meaning.  
Instead, MM was attending to the display or appearance of the words.  Here is another 
example: 
Sample 3.1.  MM had been studying for her Psychology course.  At the moment, 
she was writing the word pseudo-forgetting.  In her experience, she was 
“watching the flow” of pseudo-forgetting, that is—she was engaged in the way 
pseudo-forgetting was unfolding and being revealed on the page.  This was a 
visual watching of pseudo-forgetting appearing on the page.  This experience was 
not in any way about the meaning of pseudo-forgetting, or even the wordness of 
pseudo-forgetting; it is about the way this visual thing pseudo-forgetting (which 
happens to be a word) unfolds itself on the page. 
In this sample, MM was seeing the words unfold on the page.  She was not attending to 
the words for their meaning, rather she was attending to the visual characteristics of the 
words.  Additionally, MM was experiencing herself as more of an observer of the 
creation of the words rather than being the creator.  Here is another example of the 
sensory awareness of words/numbers: 
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Sample 5.4.  MM was walking through the dorms hallways slowly, on her way to 
class.  At the moment of the sample, MM was seeing a sign with numbers on a 
door to her left.  MM was drawn to the yellowness of the numbers and not the 
meaning of the numbers.  All that was in her experience was the yellowness of the 
numbers. 
In this sample, MM was attending to the yellowness of the numbers rather than the 
numerical value or meaning of the numbers.   
One of her samples involved the spreading of pain:  
Sample 4.6.  MM had just finished taking a shower.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was experiencing stomach pain.  This felt as if a needle was poking 
her in the stomach.  She experienced the pain as oscillating.  She was feeling the 
pain in her stomach but the discomfort spreading throughout the trunk of her body 
but not in her extremities.   
In this sample, the sensory awareness was experienced as spreading throughout the trunk 
of her body. 
In one of her samples, MM was experiencing sensory awareness in a unique way: 
Sample 4.4.  MM was clicking buttons on her phone with her right thumb.  At the 
moment of the sample, her phone was vibrating.  MM was experiencing the 
feeling of the vibration on her right thumb.  She was also hearing the vibration 
through her thumb.  It was as if she could hear the vibration through her thumb, 
she was not hearing the vibration through her ears.  Apparently MM was 
repeatedly clicking the buttons so that she could feel/hear the vibration.  MM was 
also hearing a reggae song her friend, Barbara, was playing.  MM also heard her 
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roommate Katie saying, “Dude, I just learned ChapStick shouldn’t go in the 
laundry.”  The hearing and feeling of the vibration was the most salient in her 
experience (an estimated 60/20/20).   
MM was experiencing the vibration as being heard through the sensation of the vibration 
on her thumb.   
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in MM’s 
experience.  The majority of her samples were typical sensory awareness examples.  Four 
of her samples involved the sensory awareness of words or numbers. 
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Unsymbolized thinking was the next most frequently occurring characteristic in 
MM’s inner experience, occurring in seven of her samples (35%).  Here is an example: 
Sample 5.5.  MM’s Psychology course instructor had been talking about how men 
think about sex more frequently than women, but women suppress their thoughts 
about sex because it is not socially acceptable.  MM had read about this the night 
before in her psychology book.  At the moment of the sample, MM was listening 
to the instructor and realized she had heard this before.  This was a thought 
without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.   
Four of her unsymbolized thinking samples involved a thought about a stimulus. 
Here are examples:  
Sample 2.1.  MM’s lights were off and she was trying to find her RebelCard.  She 
had been trying to distinguish between her RebelCard and Marlok card through 
their textures.  She expected the RebelCard would be more smooth and the 
Marlok card would be more rough.  At the moment of the sample, she was feeling 
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the two cards at the same time with her left hand.  She was feeling the smoothness 
of both cards on her fingers.  MM was also experiencing a thought process related 
to but separate from the feeling of the cards.  MM was thinking something along 
the lines of What the hell, is this the Marlok card or the RebelCard?  This notion 
was present in MM’s experience without words, images, or any symbolic 
representation.   
Sample 2.5.  MM had just completed entering a text message and was watching 
her phone to see if it sent.  At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the blue 
dots moving on the screen indicating the text message is sending.  MM was also 
thinking don’t say message failed!!  This was an intense thought present without 
words, images, or any symbolic representation. 
Sample 5.2.  MM had been getting ready to go to class and wanted to change her 
clothes in the bathroom but the bathroom was occupied.  MM had grabbed her 
clothes and was trying to find another place to change in privacy (so her 
roommate and friend would not see her).  At the moment of the sample, MM was 
holding her clothes and looking towards her right at an area she could change.  In 
her experience, she was seeing the area where she might go and deciding if that is 
a good place to change.  This was a thought that did not involve words, images, or 
any other symbolic representation. 
Unsymbolized thinking was the second most frequently occurring phenomenon in 
MM’s inner experience, occurring in 7 of her 20 samples.  Four of these samples 
involved some thought about an external stimulus.   
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Not Semantic Words 
 In 5 of MM’s 20 samples (25%), words were present; however, MM was not 
attending to the words for their meaning.  Three examples have already been described in 
detail in Sensory Awareness section above.  In sample 3.1, MM was writing the word 
pseudo-forgetting and rather than attending to the semantic meaning of the word, she was 
“watching the flow” or unfolding of the word on the page.  In sample 3.2, MM was 
seeing a display of words on a page.  She was not, however, attending to their meanings.  
In sample 5.4, MM was attending to the yellowness of the numbers on a sign.  The value 
or meaning of the numbers were not in her experience.  Here is another example: 
Sample 3.3.  MM was changing clothes in the bathroom and a song was playing 
on the stereo in a room on the other side of the bathroom.  At the moment of the  
sample, MM was trying to remember what song it was.  She was hearing the 
melody of the song.  The song had words but the words were not in MM’s 
experience (as if she had actively stripped the words away leaving only the 
melody, which is how she remembers songs).  All she was attending to was the 
melody.  MM was searching her memory for the melody of that particular song, 
as if many known melodies were “stored in her memory banks” and she would 
eventually discover the one that matched the actually heard melody.  This was not 
a one-by-one search, but rather somehow a waiting for the memory to produce a 
melody that matched the melody currently being heard. 
In this sample, MM was hearing the melody of a song.  Although the heard song did, in 
fact, have words to it, MM was only attending to the melody of the song.  Here is the 
other example: 
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Sample 2.3.  MM was typing a colon and parenthesis (to make a smiley face) on 
her phone.  This was an automatic, bodily action with little experience. 
In this sample, the meaning of the combination of the colon and parenthesis was not in 
MM’s experience.    
In these samples, words were present in various ways; however, in MM’s 
experience, the words were ignored or stripped of their meaning. 
Doing Of 
 In 3 of her 20 samples (15%), MM was involved in effortfully completing an 
activity.  Here is an example: 
Sample 2.4.  MM had been studying in the study room and three people entered 
the room.  The male had started to talk about animals and MM was trying not to 
eavesdrop.  At the moment, MM was instructing herself not to listen to him or pay 
attention to his words.  MM was actively involved in the ignoring of what he was 
saying.  The experience was of actively screening out the conversation, not of (for 
example) trying to pay attention to something else.   
In this sample, MM was concentrating on the blocking out of the conversation happening 
in her company.  Rather than focusing her attention elsewhere (i.e., her study material), 
MM was actively involved in the blocking out of the conversation.  Here are other 
examples of actively doing: 
Sample 2.6.  MM had her head down in her biology book and was trying to take a 
five minute nap.  In her experience, she was actively involved in the task of 
falling asleep.  She was effortfully trying to fall asleep. 
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Similar to sample 2.4, MM was actively involved in the trying to accomplish some task 
or activity.  Here is another example: 
Sample 2.7.  MM was eating spaghetti in her bed and attempting to keep the 
spaghetti on her fork inside the plate.  At the moment of the sample, she was 
seeing a piece of spaghetti dangling from her fork (she was only seeing the 
dangling spaghetti and not the fork).  She was also trying to keep the spaghetti 
inside her plate.  This was a concentrated effort of keeping the spaghetti in the 
plate.  
Emotion 
 MM did not experience feelings in any of her samples.  However, in three of her 
samples (15%), there was some marginal presence of emotion.  In these samples, there 
was the presence of an emotion; however, MM was not directly experiencing the emotion 
at the moment.  In sample 5.6, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, 
MM was laughing.  However, she was not experience a feeling at the moment.  In two of 
these samples, MM was talking out loud about emotion, but not directly feeling the 
emotion at the moment.  Here is an example: 
Sample 5.1.  MM had been talking to her friend, Hannah, about how MM tends to 
be closed off when she is angry.  At the moment of the sample, MM was talking 
to Hannah; however, this was happening automatically and out of MM’s 
experience.  All that was in MM’s experience was somehow expressing to her 
friend that she is closed off.  Words are coming out, and what Hannah is doing is 
coming in; however, all that is in MM’s awareness is conveying to Hannah that 
MM is closed-off.  MM does not feel closed-off at the moment.   
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In this sample, MM was telling her friend about how she gets closed-off when she is 
angry.  However, MM was not feeling closed-off or angry at the moment.  Here is the 
other example: 
Sample 5.3.  MM had just changed her clothes and was looking in the mirror.  She 
was seeing her bra through her shirt.  At the moment of the sample, the thought 
that it would be embarrassing if other people saw her bra was present in her 
experience.  MM was not thinking of particular people, rather she was thinking 
that she would be embarrassed if people in general saw.  MM was not feeling 
embarrassed at the moment, it was the likelihood of embarrassment that was 
present to her.  This thought was present without words, images, or any symbolic 
representation (an instance of unsymbolized thinking).  MM was also saying, 
“this is so embarrassing” out loud with the intention of her roommate hearing.  
The words were reflecting MM’s thought process in that she was not telling her 
roommate that she was embarrassed, rather she was indicating to her roommate 
that she would be embarrassed if people saw her like her roommate was seeing 
her.  The talking was happening automatically—that is, MM did not feel as if she 
was driving the words, they words were just happening.   
In this sample, MM was both thinking and telling her roommate that she would be 
embarrassed if people saw her bra; however, MM was not feeling embarrassed at the 
moment.  MM did not have any other involvement or direct experience of feelings in her 
samples.   
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Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
Anticipation.  
Two of MM’s inner experience samples involved anticipation of finding 
something (10%).  In sample 3.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section 
above, MM was searching for a word on a page.  In sample 3.3, described in detail in Not 
Semantic section above, MM was searching her memory for the melody of a particular 
song. 
Multiple experience.  
In two of MM’s samples, multiple and separate phenomenon were occurring 
simultaneously (10%).  In sample 4.4, described in Sensory Awareness section above, 
MM was feeling/hearing the vibration of her phone and, unrelated to the vibration of the 
phone, hearing a song and hearing her roommate talking.  In sample 5.6, also described in 
detail in Sensory Awareness section above, MM was attending to the laughter in the 
classroom.  She was also seeing the head of a male student sitting in front of her.   
Inner hearing.  
MM experienced inner hearing in one of her samples (5%).  In this sample, MM 
was innerly hearing the voice of someone else: 
Sample 4.3.  In bed but awake, MM had been thinking about her roommate, 
Katie, telling MM about how Katie’s mom gets upset when Katie spends time at 
her aunt’s house because Katie’s mom thinks they are starting a new family.  At 
the moment of the sample, MM was innerly hearing Katie say the words “I don’t 
like Vegas” the way Katie’s mom had said them.  The innerly heard words were 
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of Katie mimicking her mother.  This was an inner rehearing of something that 
had happened before. 
In this sample, MM was innerly hearing something she had heard before, something that 
someone else had already said.  The inner hearing of someone else’s voice is an unusual 
phenomenon.   
Just doing.  
One of MM’s inner experience samples involved just doing (5%).  In this sample, 
MM was not actively engaged in any aspect of her inner or outer environment, rather she 
was automatically completing an activity, outside of her awareness.  In sample 2.3, 
described in detail in Not Semantic Words section above, MM was typing a colon and 
parenthesis (to make a smiley face) on her phone.  There was nothing in her experience, 
not the typing, not the smiley face, not the person on the receiving end of the message.  
Nothing. 
Noteworthy Characteristics 
Dreams.  
Two of MM’s samples occurred while dreaming (samples 4.1 and 4.2).  These 
samples were not counted as part of her inner experience.   
Discussion 
 Overall MM seemed to be a motivated DES participant.  She was interested in the 
process of exploring inner experience as well as her own inner experience.  MM’s inner 
experience is mostly characterized by sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and not 
semantic words.  MM did not have any samples of feelings or inner speech.     
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CHAPTER 11 
“MO” 
MO was an 18-year-old Hispanic female who sampled with us throughout 
October 2010.  MO received a laterality quotient of -53 on the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is left-handed.  She received a GSI raw 
score of 0.37 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 55) on the Symptom Checklist-90-R 
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the absence 
of clinically significant psychological difficulties. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
MO sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 30 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, and because MO chose to skip 
discussion of one sample (on Sampling Day 2), 23 of MO’s samples will be considered 
when counting her inner experience characteristics.  Sensory awareness, occurring 
somewhere between 17 and 19 samples (74% and 83%), dominated her experience.  No 
other feature of her experience came close to the sensory awareness degree of salience: 
unsymbolized thinking occurred in 3 or 4 samples (13% or 17%); inner speech occurred 
in 2 samples (9%); inner hearing occurred in 2 samples (9%); inner seeing occurred in 2 
samples (9%); feeling occurred in 2 samples (9%); and not semantic words occurred in 2 
samples (9%).   
Sensory Awareness 
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in MO’s inner 
experience and occurred substantially more than the other characteristics (the next 
frequently occurring characteristic occurred four times); 17 of her 23 inner experience 
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samples involved clear sensory awareness characteristics.  In two of her samples, it was 
difficult to definitively determine whether or not a sensory awareness existed.  Thus the 
count of her sensory awareness samples ranges from 17 to 19 (74% to 83%).  The 
frequency of her sensory awareness samples, on average, occurred 78% of the time 
(18/23).  
MO’s sensory awarenesses were remarkably specific and differentiated.  Here is 
an example: 
Sample 2.6.  MO’s bare feet were touching the floor.  At the moment of the 
sample, MO was experiencing constant coldness on the bottom surface of both 
feet.  She was experiencing more coldness on her toes.  That is, there was a range 
of coldness.  She was not experiencing the floor as being cold.  All that was in her 
experience was the coldness of her feet.   
In this sample, rather than experiencing the floor as being cold, MO was specifically 
experiencing the bottom surface of her feet (not her whole foot) and her toes as being 
cold.  Here is another example: 
Sample 4.4.  MO was noticing that that the upper part of her back (in between her 
shoulders) and the bottom surface of her feet (but not her toes) were warm.  The 
warmth in her back seemed to be deeper than the warmth in her feet.  There was 
nothing else in her experience.   
In this sample, MO was experiencing a sensation in the specific areas of her upper back 
and bottom surface of her feet.  Additionally, there was specificity to the degree of 
warmth—that is, MO was able to differentiate between the degree of warmth on her back, 
which seemed to be deeper, than the warmth in her feet. 
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In 12 of MO’s sensory awareness samples, including samples 2.6 and 4.4 just 
described, MO’s experience was exclusively sensory awareness (in some cases multiple 
sensory modalities).  Here are other examples:  
Sample 4.5.  MO was tired.  At the moment, she was experiencing pressure on the 
back of her eyes and eyelids.  The direction of the pressure seemed to be pushing 
from the bottom of the back of her eyes up towards her eyelids. 
Sample 5.5.  MO had just bitten into a piece of ice.  At the moment of the sample, 
she was feeling the coldness on the left surface and left side of her tongue.  She 
also may have been feeling the texture of the ice.  The coldness was most salient 
in her experience (an estimated 90:10 compared to the texture). 
As previously mentioned, in some of her samples (four), MO attended to multiple 
sensory modalities.  For example, in sample 4.6, she was both hearing and feeling: 
Sample 4.6.  She was hearing the sound of her air conditioning and feeling cold.  
She was also noticing that the sound of the air conditioning is associated with the 
coldness.  This was a thought present without words, images, or any symbolic 
representation. 
Here are other examples: 
Sample 2.3.  MO was biting her lip.  In her experience was both the action of the 
biting and the pressure on her lip as a result of the biting.  She was also tasting 
metallic (which she later knew to be blood).   
Sample 5.3.  She was drinking pink lemonade through a straw.  In her experience, 
she was tasting the flavor and feeling the coldness of the pink lemonade in her 
mouth.  The tasting and cold feeling seemed to be part of the same experience.  
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She was attending to the sensory qualities of the pink lemonade and not the pink 
lemonade itself.  She was also feeling the straw on the left side of her mouth, 
though this was less salient in experience (an estimated 80:20).   
 On one occasion, MO had an imaginary sensory awareness.  It seems as though 
sensory awareness is such a salient part of MO’s inner experience that it does not only 
occur as she surveys the external world, MO also attends to sensory stimuli she has 
created.  Here is the sample: 
Sample 3.5.  MO had been craving a salad with wontons.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was innerly hearing the crunching of a salad and wontons.  The 
crunching sound was as if she were eating a salad herself.  She was also tasting a 
salad.  It was as if she were tasting the scent of the salad and not the salad 
directly.  The tasting seemed to be in her mouth, though she recognized she did 
not actually have the taste of the salad in her mouth. 
In this sample, MO had been craving a salad.  At the moment of the sample, she was 
experiencing the sensory characteristics associated with eating a salad (e.g., hearing of 
the crunching and tasting) as if it were actually happening.   
In four of her samples, MO was experiencing a growing or spreading of sensory 
awareness.  All four samples involved pain.  In these samples, MO was experiencing the 
spreading of the pain at the moment—that is, there was an awareness of the spreading at 
the moment of the sample.  Here are the examples: 
Sample 2.5.  MO had gotten a paper cut.  At the moment of the sample, she was 
experiencing pain on the tip of her left index finger as a result of the paper cut.  
She was experiencing the pain across the tip of her finger (from side to side).  The 
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pain was differentiated such that it was less painful to the sides of the actual cut 
and more painful on the cut itself.   
Sample 4.2.  MO had been trying to figure out where her headache was localized.  
At the moment of the sample, she was noticing the pain pushing out in her 
temples.  The notion oh, its in my temples was also present.  This was a thought 
without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.   
Sample 4.3.  Her lips were chapped from the weather and she had been eating 
Lays potato chips.  At the moment, she was feeling a surge of pain on the left part 
of her bottom lip.  This pain was not instantaneous like a light switching on and 
off, it was more of a gradual pain happening quickly.  
Sample 5.6.  MO had cut her left index finger over the weekend.  Before the 
sample, she had hit her left index finger against something.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was experiencing pain spreading throughout the entire cut, both 
surface and depth, but the pain had not yet completely filled the cut yet.  There 
was nothing else in her experience. 
In these samples, MO was experiencing movement or spreading of her sensory awareness 
experiences.   
Here are two examples where it was difficult for us to be confident whether MO 
was experiencing a specific thematic sensory awareness: 
Sample 2.1.  She had been staring at her iced tea bottle.  At the moment, she was 
thirsty.  She also may have been thinking that she was thirsty, but we were highly 
skeptical.  If it existed, it was a mental phenomenon, a knowing that she is thirsty 
that was present without words, images, or any symbolic representation. 
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In this sample, it is unclear if MO’s experience of being thirsty involved a sensory 
awareness.  It was difficult to determine if MO was experiencing the sensory aspects of 
being thirsty and, if so, were they experienced as a function of being thirsty or simply for 
the sensory qualities or both.  Here is the other example:  
Sample 5.2.  She was hungry.  At the moment, she was innerly saying “What 
should I eat?” quickly.  MO was also hearing her stomach growling.  This was 
more an auditory thing (90%) though she may have also felt the growling (10%). 
In this sample, it is unclear whether the hearing of her stomach growling is attended for 
its sensory qualities or for its meaning of being hungry. 
Sensory awareness dominated MO’s inner experience, occurring at a much 
higher frequency than the other characteristics.  All of her sensory awareness samples 
were specific and differentiated.  In the majority of her samples (12), sensory awareness 
was the only phenomenon. 
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Unsymbolized thinking, thinking without the presence of any words, images, or 
any other symbolic representation, occurred in 3 or 4 of MO’s 23 samples (13 or 17%).  
All of MO’s samples of unsymbolized thinking were related to or noticing a sensory 
awareness.  One example, sample 4.2, has already been described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above.  In this sample, MO was noting the location of her headache.  
Here is another example: 
Sample 5.1.  MO was hearing a sound to the left of her from outside the room she 
was in.  At the moment, she was hearing the sound and was wondering what it 
was.  The wondering of what it was was more salient in her experience than the 
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sound itself.  She later recognized it to be a lawnmower but that was not in her 
experience at the moment.  
It was difficult determining if one sample included an unsymbolized thought.  
Sample 2.1, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, may or may not 
have included an unsymbolized thinking.  MO was thirsty and whether or not there was 
an additional and separate thought about being thirsty is unclear.   
Inner Speech 
MO’s inner experience involved inner speech in two of her samples (9%).  Both 
of MO’s inner speech samples were in her own voice.  Additionally, both samples 
involved a question MO was asking herself.  In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, MO was innerly saying, “What should I eat?”  Here is the 
other example:   
Sample 4.1.  MO was innerly saying, “Hmm, I wonder when this is going to 
beep? 
In this sample, similar to sample 4.1, MO was innerly asking herself a question.   
 MO’s inner speakings were similar in nature to her outer speakings.  For example, 
in one of her samples, MO was speaking aloud to herself.  The speaking aloud to 
herself had the same features as inner speaking except that the words were actually being 
produced: 
Sample 3.2.  The beeper had not sounded for a while and MO was wondering if 
the beeper was working.  At the moment, MO was saying, “is this thing 
working?” out loud to herself.  MO was also experiencing confusion and humor.  
The confusion and humor were both related to the words she was saying.  The 
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confusion was experienced as an asking of self the question.  The humor was 
experienced as a smiling while asking the question.  This was a bodily humor 
experienced in MO’s mouth and cheeks.   
Inner Hearing 
 Inner hearing occurred twice in MO’s inner experience samples (9%).  One of 
MO’s inner hearing samples involved the repetition of the same innerly heard phrase:   
Sample 3.6.  She had been watching a video on anorexia in her Psychology 
course.  Before the moment of the sample, MO had been innerly seeing Joanna, a 
character in the video she was watching about anorexia, standing against a white 
background.  MO had also been innerly saying the words could you imagine not 
eating.  The words MO was innerly speaking, could you imagine not eating, 
appeared in the innerly seen image as she was saying them.  The words appeared 
written with an arch above Joanne. At the moment, MO was innerly seeing an 
image with the words “Could you imagine not eating?” written in black lettering.  
The words were written in an arch (upside down u).  She was also innerly seeing 
Joanne standing underneath the words, in the middle of the arch.  She was seeing 
Joanne’s whole body directed to the left.  The image was seen in black, white, and 
grey colors on a white background.  MO was also innerly hearing her voice 
repeating the words could you imagine not eating.  She differentiated the innerly 
heard words at the moment from the innerly spoken words before the sample.  
The inner seeing was most salient in her experience (70:30).   
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In this sample, MO was innerly hearing her voice repeat the words could you imagine not 
eating.  This sample was not counted as inner speech because the innerly spoken words 
occurred before the moment of the sample. 
MO’s other sample which was counted as inner hearing consisted of an imaginary 
event that included inner hearing.  In sample 3.5, described in detail in Sensory 
Awareness section above, MO was innerly hearing herself eating a salad which was a 
creation of her imagination—that is, she was not really eating a salad.  She was innerly 
hearing a crunching sound as if she were eating the salad wontons, though she was not 
actually chewing anything.  In both samples, the inner hearings were MO’s production—
that is, her innerly heard voice and her innerly heard chewing.  
Inner Seeing 
 Inner seeing occurred in two of MO’s samples (9%).  One of her inner seeing 
samples involved a transition from one innerly seen image to another: 
Sample 3.1.  Her friend, Tracy, had been next to MO reading a magazine article 
on Kenny Chesney.  MO had been innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s face.  At the 
moment, MO’s experience was in transition from innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s 
face to innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s whole body.  It was as if MO’s 
experience was incorporating Kenny Chesney’s body into it.  In her experience, 
MO was focused on Kenny Chesney’s face, but she was also aware of the 
presence of the rest of his body (though she was not attending to it).  MO was 
seeing Kenny Chesney in color with a green background.  This was a still image.   
MO’s other inner seeing sample involved innerly seeing words.  In sample 3.6, 
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described in detail in Inner Hearing section above, MO was innerly seeing an image with 
the words “Could you imagine not eating?” written in black lettering in the shape of an 
arch.   
Feeling 
MO had very little affect in her inner experience samples.  In fact, only two of her 
samples involved some form of affect or emotion.  It was difficult determining if these 
samples were experienced feelings.  Depending on how they are counted, MO’s 
experience of feelings ranged from 0% to 9%.  Either way, she had very little experience 
of emotion.  In sample 3.2, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, MO was 
experiencing confusion and humor, both related to the words she was saying aloud to 
herself (“is this thing working?”).  The confusion was experienced in the question and the 
humor was experienced as smiling.  Although confusion and humor were somehow 
present, it is difficult to determine whether this confusion/humor should be considered a 
feeling.   
MO’s other feeling sample involved a mental feeling that had been leftover from 
a previous moment: 
Sample 3.3.  MO had been wearing new jeans and her legs were tingling.  At the 
moment, MO was experiencing a tingling sensation from the knee to the hip areas 
of both legs.  She was experiencing the sensation only on the top surface of her 
legs (from one side seam to the other).  This sensation was a tingly, prickly 
sensation as if she had “sequins” in her legs.  At the moment, the sensation was 
only experienced on the top layer of her skin.  Before the moment of the sample, 
she had been irritated about the tingling sensation.  At the moment, she knew 
 160 
herself to still be irritated, however, to a much lesser degree.  This was a mental 
irritation.  The tingling sensation was more salient in her experience than the 
irritation.   
It was clear that the tingling sensation was still present; it was clear that she had felt 
irritated prior to the sample; it was clear that the sensation was still irritating; but whether 
this irritation was actually felt at the moment of the sample was unclear. 
 Thus none of MO’s moments included a substantial experiential apprehension of 
emotion.  Whether humor or confusion (Sample 3.2) should be called an emotion is 
questionable, and extent to which the irritation of Sample 3.3 was present is also 
questionable.  That is, none of MO’s samples included as a more-or-less dominant aspect 
any of the experiences that are generally taken to be feelings: anxiety, anger, sadness, and 
so on. 
Not Semantic Words 
 In two of her samples, a symbol was present in MO’s experience; however, the 
meaning or function of that symbol was not directly in her experience (9%).  Here is the 
first example: 
Sample 3.4.  MO had been taking a test.  She was unsure of the details of her 
inner experience at the moment of this sample because she could not turn away 
from her test to note her experience.  To her best recollection, MO had been 
seeing an x written by her instructor on the exam sheet.  At the moment of the 
sample, MO was both seeing the x and noting the ugliness of the x.  That is, she 
was noticing the appearance of the x and not its function. 
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 In the other example, sample 3.6, discussed in detail in Inner Hearing section 
above, MO was innerly seeing the words “Could you imagine not eating?”  In this 
example, the meaning of the words was in MO’s experience.  However, the words were 
innerly seen as written in an arch and the archedness of the words was at least as 
important as the words themselves.  That is, even when the meaning of the words are 
present in her experience, MO also attends to or, in this case, creates some sensory 
quality to the words (e.g., presented in an arch). 
Discussion 
 MO seemed to be a motivated participant.  She expressed interest in DES and 
appeared to have gained clarity and self-awareness from the process.  MO seems to 
attend to the sensory aspects or mere presence of stimuli without additional 
characteristics in her experience.  Sensory awareness is her most frequently occurring 
inner experience characteristic.   
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CHAPTER 12 
“KA” 
KA was a 21-year-old Biracial (Middle Eastern/Caucasian/Black) female who 
sampled with us in December 2010.  KA received a laterality quotient of -53 on the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is left-handed.  
She received a GSI raw score of 0.71 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 61) on the 
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 
1973), suggesting the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
KA sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants and KA chose to skip two 
samples, 21 of KA’s samples counts her inner experience characteristics.  The following 
characteristics will be discussed: inner seeing, occurring in 13 samples (62%); inner 
hearing, occurring in 7 samples (33%); not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples 
(24%); multiple experience, occurring in 4 samples (19%); inner speech, occurring in 3 
samples (14%); doing of, occurring in 3 samples (14%); sensory awareness, occurring in 
2 samples (10%); emotion, occurring in 2 samples (10%); infrequently occurring 
characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.   
Inner Seeing 
 Inner seeing was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in KA’s inner 
experience, occurring in 13 of KA’s 21 samples (62%).  Five characteristics emerged in 
KA’s inner seeing samples: 1) KA’s seeings “populated themselves”—that is, assembled 
slowly; 2) KA saw a light coming from the left; 3) KA saw herself; 4) KA saw people 
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other than herself; and 5) KA’s seeing was related to something ongoing in her external, 
physical world.   
 Five of KA’s seeings involved the coming together or self assembly of the innerly 
seen image.  In these samples, KA’s innerly seen images did not appear whole and all at 
once.  Instead, these images populated or came together at the moment of the sample.  
Here is an example: 
Sample 2.2.  KA was talking to her boyfriend, Sam, on the phone.  Sam had said 
he wanted to teach art.  At the moment, KA was innerly seeing Sam as an art 
instructor.  She was seeing this from her own perspective, as if she was in the 
classroom.  Sam was standing, facing his left so KA was seeing the right side of 
his face and body.  Sam was moving his arms.  There were other students in the 
classroom to both sides of Sam so that he was in the center.  KA had an art board 
in front of her with a paper taped on it so that she was only seeing Sam’s thigh, 
buttock, and upper body.  KA was also seeing sunlight coming through from the 
left.  The seeing was detailed and in color (the tile was beige, the walls were 
white, Sam’s hair was black).  KA understood this to be a memory.  It took KA a 
few seconds to create the image, it did not appear at once.  She was also still 
hearing and attending to what Sam was saying but the image was most salient in 
her experience.   
In this sample, the image was not wholly in KA’s experience at once.  Rather the image 
took KA time to create.  .   
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Six of KA’s inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing light coming from the 
left, including sample 2.2 just described.  In these samples, KA was paying particular 
attention to the light that was illuminating her seeing.  Here is another example: 
Sample 4.3.  KA was finishing writing about sample 4.2 when the beep for 
sample 4.3 sounded.  In her experience she was innerly seeing her friend Ramona 
and three other girls.  It was as if KA was present in the scene and seeing the 
other girls.  KA was seeing the girls standing in a half circle at her middle school.  
Ramona was positioned in exactly the same stance as she was in sample 4.2.  
There was one girl, Tina, standing behind Ramona and two girls, Sarah and 
Joanne, standing next to Ramona.  Ramona and Tina were facing the same 
direction towards Sarah and Joanne.  Sarah and Joanne were both facing Ramona 
and Tina.  KA’s perspective was from beside Sarah and Joanne.  KA was seeing 
the girls from the hips up.  Ramona was seen the most vividly though she was less 
clear than she was in sample 4.2.  Ramona was wearing a black tank top and black 
bottoms.  KA was also seeing concrete on the ground and a couple of trees.  KA 
saw the sunlight coming from the upper left of the scene.  The writing was not in 
KA’s experience at the moment of the sample. 
In this sample, KA saw the sunlight coming from the upper left of the scene. 
Two of KA’s inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing herself.  Here are 
examples:  
Sample 3.2.  This sample occurred shortly after sample 3.1 while KA was writing 
down her experience from sample 3.1 in her notebook.  At the moment of this 
sample, KA was innerly seeing herself sitting and writing.  She was seeing herself 
 165 
from the back such that she was seeing her back and the back of her head and hair 
from the waist up.  KA was seeing herself sitting on a bed though she was only 
seeing the top of the bed.  Her body was hunched over and she was writing.  KA 
was also seeing the TV in front of her.  KA was wearing blue plaid pajamas but 
she was not paying particular attention to the blueness or plaidness.  She was 
seeing this image slightly to the left.  The seeing was dark but there was 
illumination from the TV screen.  All that KA was seen clearly was herself and 
the TV, though she could not tell what was on the TV screen.  There were other 
items in the room but she could not identify what they were.  KA referred to this 
as a frozen image; whether that meant a still image or a moving image where 
there was no motion was difficult to determine. 
Sample 3.4.  KA was innerly saying “I’m going to sleep” in her own voice.  She 
was also innerly seeing an image of herself sleeping.  KA was seeing herself from 
the waist up with her head lying on a white pillow.  Her hands were clasped 
together, prayer style, on the pillow and her head was on her hands with her eyes 
closed.  KA was seeing her head to the right and her body to the left.  She was 
seeing herself diagonally such that her body was angled towards her.  KA was not 
seeing a bed but her body was level.  She was not seeing a lamp; however, there 
was light coming from the left corner.  KA was not seeing anything beyond 
herself and the pillow.  The bed and the room were not her own or anyone else’s 
that she knows of.  This image was called “frozen” as in sample 3.2. 
In these samples, light was coming from the left as well.    
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Seven of KA’s inner seeing samples involved seeing people other than herself.  
Here is an example:   
Sample 3.6.  KA was driving.  She had seen a billboard that had a picture of a DJ 
and said “I’m a scam artist.”  She had been innerly hearing “Scam artist, I don’t 
get it” in her own voice referring to the billboard.  At the moment, KA was 
experiencing the tail end of that inner hearing.  KA was also hearing a song and 
innerly seeing the head of her ex-boyfriend.  It was as if the notion of the scam 
artist was leaving her experience and the song and ex-boyfriend were taking over.  
The song and the inner seeing were somehow directly related.  KA was seeing the 
head of her ex-boyfriend diagonally such that his head was directed slightly to his 
right (KA’s left).  KA was unable to see the details of his face clearly as if his 
face was covered by a cloudy or foggy glass.  KA was able to see his shiny black 
and spiked hair clearly.  The inner image of KA’s ex-boyfriend’s head “populated 
itself,” came together slowly in her experience, that is the pieces of this seeing 
were flying into place.  Despite happening slowly in KA’s experience, KA was 
under the impression that if they could be clocked in the external world the 
coming together of the pieces happened rapidly so that, at the moment of the 
sample, KA was already seeing his whole head.  KA was under the impression 
that the population was done in the sense that the unclearly seen face of the ex-
boyfriend would remain unclear. 
In addition to being an inner seeing of a person other than herself, this sample also had 
two other interesting characteristics: 1) the innerly seen image was unclear and 2) the 
inner image came together slowly, that is the image did not appear all together at once in 
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KA’s experience, rather, as her seeing took place, she saw the pieces of the image come 
together or elaborate themselves.   
In five of her samples, KA was seeing an image related to something ongoing in 
the physical world at the moment.  Here is an example: 
Sample 4.4.  KA had been intensely looking at a dream catcher directly in front of 
her.  KA was innerly seeing a dream catcher her boyfriend had drawn.  The 
innerly seen dream catcher initially appeared automatically; however, it quickly 
became a produced version.  KA was struggling to create the seeing of her 
boyfriend’s dream catcher.  This was a mental phenomenon, a trying to figure out 
what she could do to create the seeing.  As the struggle was occurring, the innerly 
seen dream catcher was morphing into different versions.  KA was innerly seeing 
a dream catcher; however, the specific details were undefined.  At the moment of 
the sample, KA was at the tail end of her focusing on the real dream catcher and 
the automatic version of the innerly seeing dream catcher had just turned into the 
produced version.   
In this sample, KA’s innerly seen image (a dream catcher drawn by her boyfriend) was 
related to her seeing of an actual dream catcher in her environment. 
 One of KA’s inner seeing samples involved the inner seeing of a word.  Here is 
the example: 
Sample 2.1.  KA had been filling out the McNair Scholarship Application.  At the 
moment, she was shuffling the McNair Application papers.  KA was attending to 
the shuffling and making sure the papers were in the correct order.  KA was also 
innerly seeing the word “McNair.”  KA was seeing the word in Times New 
 168 
Roman font against a black background.  KA knew the background to be 
rectangular; however, she was not seeing the borders of the rectangle.  The letters 
were white and had a black border with a red shadow.  KA was attending to the 
shuffling of the papers more (an estimated ration of 90:10).  
One of KA’s inner seeing samples involved an inner seeing indicating a 
sensation she was experiencing on her physical body.  Here is the example: 
Sample 2.6.  KA was experiencing a pain sensation on the lower, right part of her 
back.  She was also innerly hearing “My back is strained.”  This was in her own 
voice.  Simultaneous to the innerly heard words, KA saw a flash of a black 
background with a reddish-orangeish slanted blob going across the background 
indicating the area where her back is strained.  The innerly seen image occurred 
very quickly and ceased when the innerly heard words were completed.   
The innerly seen flash was related to the sensation KA was experiencing in her back. 
 One of her inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing a picture.  Here is the 
example: 
Sample 4.2.  KA had been writing something about her friend, Ramona, from 
middle school.  At the moment, KA was innerly seeing an image of Ramona, a 
boy named Sam, and herself.  It was as if KA was looking at a picture of herself 
with Ramona and Sam.  KA was seeing Ramona to the left, Sam in the middle, 
and KA to the right, seen in profile looking at the left.  The seen KA was cut off 
(she said it was cut off like at the edge of the visual field) such that all that was 
seen was her hair and part of her nose.  Ramona was standing with her body 
directed forward and her face turned to the left.  Ramona was the most vividly 
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seen, followed by KA, and Sam last.  KA was seeing them from the knees up.  
KA did not innerly hear anything, though it appeared they were talking.  Sam was 
sitting on the hood of a car behind them and KA was leaning on it.  The writing 
was not in KA’s experience at the moment of the sample.  The scene was 
illuminated by light coming from the upper left; this light was part of KA’s 
experience at the moment.  The light seemed to come from a lamp post light, but 
the lamp post itself was not seen.   
Although the innerly seen image was like a picture, this sample involved three other inner 
seeing characteristics described above, including light coming from the left, a seeing of 
herself, and a seeing of others. 
Inner Hearing 
 Seven of KA’s samples involved inner hearing (33%).  All of KA’s inner hearing 
samples consisted of her own voice.  One example has already been discussed in Inner 
Seeing section above.  In sample 2.6, KA was innerly hearing “My back is strained” in 
her own voice.  Here is another example:  
Sample 3.1.  KA had been watching a scene from the show Family Guy, in which 
Peter, a character, was trying to scare a bird out of his beard by playing loud 
music.  In her experience, she was innerly hearing “Could a bird really get scared 
and leave?” in her own voice.  KA was also attending to the show on the TV.  KA 
was laughing; however, as best we could ascertain that was not in her experience 
at the moment. 
In this example, KA’s innerly heard words involved a question or trying to understand 
something that was ongoing in the external, physical world.  This occurred three other 
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times in KA’s inner hearing samples.  In sample 3.6, discussed in detail in Inner Seeing 
section above, KA was innerly hearing “Scam artist, I don’t get it” referring to a billboard 
she had seen.  Here is another example: 
Sample 3.5.  KA had been reading an article about vegans who cheat on their diet 
by eating eggs, etc. At the moment, she was innerly hearing the phrases: 1) 
“Vegan conferences? Where are those?”; 2) “How can you tell one’s cheated?”; 
and 3) “Do they know you know?”  KA was innerly hearing the phrases in her 
own voice.  The phrases were happening one after the other.  In KA’s experience, 
the phrases were heard in a normal, natural pace.  However, she was under the 
impression that if they could be clocked in the external world they were 
happening so fast it seemed they all happened at the moment of the sample.   
In this sample, KA was innerly hearing several phrases which she experienced as 
happening one after the other.  In sample 2.4, KA heard the same phrase repeated three 
times but with different inflections each time: 
Sample 2.4.  KA had seen the words “DE contact form” on the computer screen.  
KA was having a visual experience of “DE contact form” at the moment.  
However, she was unsure if she was seeing the words on the screen, innerly 
seeing the words, or innerly seeing the words AND seeing them on the screen at 
the moment.  KA was also innerly hearing DE contact form.  The words were in 
her own voice.  The words were repeated three times with a different inflection 
each time.  The second time, the words were formed as a question.  KA’s sense 
was that the words were coming from the left side of her head. 
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This sample of inner hearing is also unique for KA in that KA was experiencing the 
words coming from the left side of her head.  
 One of KA’s samples involved simultaneously innerly hearing her innerly spoken 
words: 
Sample 5.1.  KA had been sticking pictures in a frame.  At the moment, she was 
concentrating on the position of the picture.  She was mentally making sure the 
picture was straight on the glass.  At the same time, KA was both innerly 
speaking the words and simultaneously innerly hearing herself say “it hasn’t 
beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going to take forever.”  KA referred to 
herself as “hearing herself say” even though she confidently said she experienced 
herself as saying the words as if into a tape recorder.  We worked hard at 
understanding what this meant, eventually agreeing with some confidence that 
KA simultaneously experienced something like two KA’s, or two points of view, 
one speaking and the other hearing herself speak.  On those samples where KA 
said she was just innerly hearing, she had the hearing KA but not the speaking 
KA.  KA said that when she speaks out loud (as to us in the interview room) she 
is experiencing only the speaking and not hearing herself speak.     
KA had difficulty conveying her experience at the moment of the sample.  Although she 
initially reported she was “speaking into a tape recorder,” KA consistently described this 
inner dialogue as “hearing myself say.”  When asked “is the experience primarily one of 
hearing or primarily one of speaking?” she said “in this experience it’s primarily of 
speaking”; however, she continued on to say “it’s almost like there’s two different 
mes…two separate mind entities.  The one that’s speaking and the one that’s 
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hearing…I’m hearing it as I’m saying it.”  Thus the investigators concluded, along with 
KA, that this sample is both an example of inner speech and inner hearing.   
Not Semantic Words 
 In five of KA’s samples (24%), words were somehow present; however, the 
words themselves or meaning of the words were not in her experience.  For example, in 
sample 3.2 described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was trying to formulate 
words to write.  In this sample, words did not come naturally to KA rather she had to put 
forth effort.  In sample 2.1, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was 
innerly seeing the word “McNair.”  The meaning of the word or what the word represents 
was not in her experience, however.  In samples 4.2 and 4.3, described in detail in Inner 
Seeing section above, KA was writing; however, the writing was not in her experience at 
the moment.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 4.6.  KA had been writing in her journal.  At the moment of the sample, 
she was innerly seeing an image of herself in black space.  There was nothing 
behind her, to the sides of her, or beneath her.  The innerly seen KA was facing 
her left side.  She was wearing a white banner with black writing that read, “I’m 
the best.”  The innerly seen KA had her hands on her hips.  There was no light 
source; however, the image was lit.  There was nothing else in her experience. 
Similar to samples 4.2 and 4.2, KA was writing in sample 4.6; however, the writing was 
not in her experience at the moment.   
Multiple Experience 
Four of KA’s inner experience samples involved multiple experiences (19%).  In 
all samples, KA was attending to various, unrelated phenomena.  Here is an example:   
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Sample 5.3.  KA had been looking at an advertisement for boots on the internet 
and was seeing a picture of brown leather boots.  The words next to the picture 
said “style sophisticate.”  At the moment, there were four separate experiences 
happening quickly and sequentially in KA’s inner experience.  First, KA was 
innerly hearing the words “style sophisticate?” in her own voice.  KA was innerly 
seeing her friend Gina, seen from the waist up (KA was seeing Gina’s left side).  
KA was seeing Gina’s black hair and face though Gina’s face was not fully 
articulated; that is KA was not seeing the details of Gina’s face.  Gina was 
wearing a white top.  There was a light background as if Gina was shopping or 
something of the sort.  The details of the background were not articulated.  KA 
was seeing this image at eye level.  Third, KA innerly saw Gina’s boots and legs, 
from the knees down.  KA was seeing Gina’s legs in profile as well, apparently in 
the same position as the upper seeing.  Gina’s left foot was off the ground as if 
she were walking.  KA was mostly attending to the brown, knee high boots Gina 
was wearing.  There was a black background.  This image was positioned lower 
than the upper body image in KA’s experience—that is, KA looked more or less 
straight ahead at the upper portion of Gina, but looked somewhat down at the foot 
portion of Gina.  The upper Gina and the lower Gina had the same body position, 
as if KA had shifted her gaze from the upper part of the body to the lower part, 
but that was not how KA experienced it.  Instead, there was first a seeing of the 
upper part, then a seeing of the lower part.  Furthermore, the backgrounds of the 
upper seeing (light) and lower seeing (dark) were not the same.  KA herself found 
this mixture of the same/different to be rather curious or remarkable.  Fourth, KA 
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innerly saw KA in a Steve Madden shoe store.  The seen KA was seen standing to 
the left and facing to the right, trying on brown boots (the same brown boots Gina 
was wearing the previous innerly seen image, which were also the same boots 
seen in the internet advertisement).  KA was seeing the profile of KA; she was 
seeing the right side of her body.  The seen KA was wearing jeans, a black jacket 
and boots, and her right leg was off the ground as if she was posing.  The real KA 
was also innerly hearing the imaginary KA say, “I don’t like these.”  In real KA’s 
experience, she was only innerly hearing the words.  The innerly heard words 
were more salient than the inner seeing of imaginary KA.   
In this sample, KA was attending to multiple and separate experiences simultaneously.  
She was innerly hearing the words “style sophisticate?” in her own voice, innerly seeing 
her friend, innerly seeing her friend’s boots and legs, innerly seeing herself (KA) in a 
Steve Madden shoe store, and innerly hearing her imaginary self say, “I don’t like these.”   
Inner Speech 
KA’s inner experience involved inner speech in three of her samples (14%).  All 
of KA’s inner speech samples were in her own voice.  One sample has already been 
described in the Inner Seeing section above.  In sample 3.4, KA was innerly saying “I’m 
going to sleep” in her own voice while she was innerly seeing an image of herself 
sleeping.  Another example, sample 5.1, has already been described in detail in Inner 
Hearing section above.  In this sample KA was simultaneously innerly saying and innerly 
hearing the phrase “it hasn’t beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going to take 
forever.”  Here is KA’s other sample of inner speech: 
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Sample 3.3.  KA had been looking at her boyfriend, Kyle.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was innerly saying “I love him so much.”  KA was saying this in her 
own voice.  She was also experiencing a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in 
the middle of her stomach, inside her body.   
KA consistently said that the “I love him so much” was understood as being said, rather 
than heard as in sample 3.1.  However, she also consistently referred to this expression as 
“I heard myself say” (or maybe it was “I heard myself to say”).  The investigators pressed 
her on the distinction between hearing and saying, and she was confident and believable 
that 3.3 was more said than heard and 3.1 was more heard than said.  RTH was not sure 
that that distinction is the same as, for example, his own. 
Doing Of 
 Three of KA’s inner experience samples (14%) involved the effortful, directed 
completion of an activity.  These examples have already been discussed above.  In 
sample 2.1, described in detail in Inner Seeing section, KA was attending to the shuffling 
of papers and making sure the papers were in the correct order.  In sample 4.4, described 
in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was trying to create an innerly seen image of 
a dream catcher her boyfriend had drawn.  This was the only sample of inner seeing in 
which an attempt to create an inner image occurred.  In sample 5.1, described in detail in 
Inner Hearing section, KA was concentrating on positioning a picture straight in a frame.   
In this example, KA was trying to create an innerly seen image.   
Sensory Awareness 
 KA’s inner experience consisted of two sensory awareness samples (10%).  Both 
examples have already been described in detail above.  In sample 2.6, described in Inner 
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Seeing section above, KA was experiencing a pain sensation on the lower, right part of 
her back.  In sample 3.3, described in Inner Speech section above, KA was experiencing 
a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in the middle of her stomach.  The investigators 
worked hard but unsuccessfully at trying to discern whether this was a feeling (love) that 
manifested itself in part by the butterflies; or whether the love was a fact of KA at the 
time, but not of KA’s experience; and the experience was of butterflies, which on 
retrospection was understood to be related to love.  Her characterization of this seemed to 
be more consistent with the latter interpretation, that love was ongoing but not directly or 
clearly in experience.   
Emotion 
 Emotions occurred infrequently in KA’s inner experience.  In two of her samples, 
there was the presence of an emotion; however, KA was not directly experiencing the 
emotion at the moment (10%).  In sample 3.1, described in detail in Inner Hearing section 
above, KA was watching a scene from the show Family Guy and laughing.  Despite her 
laughter at the moment, KA was not directly experiencing an emotion.  In KA’s other 
sample of emotion, sample 3.3 discussed in Inner Speech and Sensory Awareness 
sections above, KA was not feeling love; however, she was innerly saying “I love him so 
much” and experiencing a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in the middle of her 
stomach.  In KA’s experience, love was ongoing but not directly in her experience.   
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
Feeling.  
KA only had one sample of feeling (5%).  Here is the example: 
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Sample 5.5.  KA was setting the alarm and opening the door to her house.  This 
was happening automatically.  She was also experiencing a mental stress.   
This sample involved a mental feeling—that is, KA did not describe any aspects of the 
feeling other than that it was a mental experience 
Just doing.  
In one of KA’s inner experience samples (5%), she was simply engaged in the 
automaticity of an activity, there was nothing else in her experience: 
Sample 4.4.  KA was watching TV and was absorbed in the television show she 
was watching.  There was nothing else in her experience. 
Nothing.  
In one of KA’s samples (5%), there was nothing in her experience.  Unlike the 
Just Doing section above, in this sample KA was neither absorbed in any activity nor 
attending to any stimuli: 
 Sample 2.5.  KA had nothing in her experience.   
Noteworthy Characteristics 
Leftness.  
Seven of KA’s inner seeing samples involved a leftness attribute (33%).  For 
example, in three of her inner seeing samples, a light source was coming from the left.  In 
three of her inner seeing samples, KA was innerly seeing herself where the innerly seen 
KA was facing the left.  In sample 2.4, described in detail in Inner Hearing section above, 
KA was innerly hearing “DE contact form” and had a sense that the words were coming 
from the left side of her head. 
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Words.  
KA had substantially more inner hearing samples than inner speaking (33% 
compared to 14%).  Additionally, in one of KA’s samples, she experienced words both 
innerly heard and innerly spoken (sample 5.3 described in Inner Hearing section in 
detail).  KA’s inner experience included samples in which she used inner speech to aid in 
her understanding of external stimuli, these samples were described in detail in Inner 
Speech section.  Outside of her innerly heard or spoken words, KA did not have any other 
experience of words. 
Discussion 
 Overall, KA seemed to be a motivated DES participant.  She was interested in the 
process of exploring inner experience as well as her own inner experience.  KA’s inner 
experience is mostly characterized by inner seeing and inner hearing.  KA only had one 
sample of feeling.      
 179 
CHAPTER 13 
“JS” 
JS was a 19-year-old Caucasian female who sampled with us in September and 
October 2010.  JS received a laterality quotient of -50 on the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971), indicating she is left-handed.  She received a GSI raw 
score of 0.511 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 58) on the Symptom Checklist-90-
R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting the absence 
of clinically significant psychological difficulties. 
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
 JS sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total 30 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 24 of JS’s samples count 
towards her inner experience characteristics.  The following characteristics will be 
discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 5 samples (21%); inner seeing, occurring in 5 
samples (21%); words present, occurring in 4 samples (17%); not semantic words, 
occurring in 3 samples (13%); happening of, occurring in 3 samples (13%); anticipation, 
occurring in 2 samples (8%); listening with comprehension, occurring in 2 samples (8%); 
and infrequently occurring characteristics.  
Sensory Awareness 
 No feature of JS’s inner experience occurred at a high frequency.  Sensory 
awareness and inner seeing were the most frequently occurring characteristics in JS’s 
inner experience, each occurring in five of her samples (21%).  Four of her samples were 
typical examples of sensory awareness.  Here are the examples:  
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Sample 2.4.  JS was looking at a picture on her phone her boss had sent her of JS 
and four others wearing colorful Hawaiian lei necklaces made of flowers.  At the 
moment of the sample, she was just focused on the orange, yellow, green, and 
blue colors of the flowers on one person’s lei in the picture (the person standing 
closest to the picture taker). 
Sample 4.2.  JS was having a conversation with her friend, Tammy, as they were 
waiting at the CVS pharmacy drive-thru.  JS was sitting in the passenger seat and 
Tammy was in the driver’s seat.  At the moment of the sample, JS was 
experiencing the car shaking as a result of her friend moving her leg.  JS was 
feeling the whole car shaking (not her body shaking in the car).  She was hearing 
Tammy talk and registering what she was saying, but that was not in her 
experience at the moment of the sample. Her eyes were aimed at Tammy’s leg but 
that was not in her experience at the moment of the sample.  All that was in her 
experience was the shaking of the car. 
Sample 4.4.  JS was watching a scene of the movie The Last Song in which the 
two main characters were talking on the beach.  She was mostly attending to the 
movie’s music.  She was drawn to the sound of the music and not the significance 
of the music.  JS was also attending to the dialogue of the movie although this 
was much less in her experience than the music. 
Sample 5.3.  JS had been watching a TV show and the screen zoomed in on two 
female characters hugging.  At the moment of the sample, JS was noticing the 
light brownness of one of the characters’ eye color.  JS was focused on the 
brownness of the eyes and not the eyes themselves.   
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One of her samples involved the sensory awareness of an innerly seen image: 
Sample 2.2.  JS was reading about the Mechanics in Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
cosmology.  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing her dad’s auto 
mechanic shop, seeing the garage with the orange garage door almost, but not 
complete, open, seeing a man working on a car inside the garage.  The seeing was 
in color although, the colors were dull.  Despite the dullness of the colors, 
something about the orangeness of the garage door stood out to her.  The innerly 
seen image was blurry, not in focus.  She was seeing the garage straight ahead, as 
if she was really there.  The seeing was in motion but nothing was moving at the 
moment of the sample.  Note that the inner seeing illustrated the word 
“mechanics” which had a different meaning from Plato’s use that she was reading 
in her notes, as if the seeing was connected to the word itself, not to the meaning 
of the word in context.   
In this sample, JS was innerly seeing her father’s auto mechanic shop and was drawn to 
the orangeness of the garage door. 
Inner Seeing 
 JS experienced inner seeing in five of her samples (21%).  Four of her five innerly 
seen images were seen as blurry and in dull colors.  One example, sample 2.2, has already 
been described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above.  In this sample, JS was 
innerly seeing her father’s auto mechanic shop in dull colors.  Additionally, the innerly 
seen image was blurry.  Here is another example: 
Sample 2.6.  JS had been looking at an older picture of herself and her friend, Jim, 
who moved to New Hampshire.  At the moment of the sample, she was 
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wondering how Jim is doing in New Hampshire with regard to his employment.  
She was also innerly seeing a narrow, empty highway going straight ahead, which 
she took to be an illustration of New Hampshire, although she had never been in 
New Hampshire.  She was seeing grass closer to the road and trees in the distance.  
The seeing was blurry and in color; however, the colors were dull, similar to all 
the other inner seeings on this day (samples 2.1 and 2.2).  The seeing was still like 
a snapshot in the sense that she did not have a sense of herself being there. 
JS’s innerly seen images also had variability in the degree of dullness in the 
colors.  In sample 5.6, the colors were so dull it was almost like a black and white seeing: 
Sample 5.6.  JS had been talking to her friend, John, who works at the Vans store.  
At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the Vans store.  She was 
seeing the whole store and parts of the surrounding stores.  She was seeing the 
store as if she were standing in front of it.  The inner seeing was blurry, but the 
Vans store was less blurry than the other stores.  She was seeing the store in dull 
colors, almost as if it were a black and white image with some dull colors.  The 
seeing was a moving image.   
Two of her inner seeing samples involved the seeing of motion.  In sample 2.2, 
described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, JS was innerly seeing her 
father’s auto mechanic shop.  The seeing was in motion; however, nothing was moving at 
the moment of the sample.  The other example is sample 5.6, just described. 
One of her inner seeing samples was seen from an aerial perspective: 
Sample 2.1.  JS had been reading what her friend wrote on Facebook regarding 
leaving the mall.  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the Guess 
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store in the mall.  She was seeing the Guess store from an aerial perspective (one 
which she had never taken, and which is impossible in reality to take).  The seeing 
was blurry, not in focus.  Although the seeing was in color, the colors were dull 
and less vibrant than in reality.  She also had some sense that she was going to the 
mall on Sunday. 
Similar to the examples described above, this sample was also innerly seen as blurry and 
in dull colors.   
 One of her inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing a word: 
Sample 2.3.  JS had been searching through her notes for something about the 
Greek polis.  She had come to a sentence with the word “polis” in it before the 
sample.  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the word “polis” as 
if it stood out from the other words, and was saying “polis” in inner speech.  This 
speech was somehow extended in time in a way that external speech cannot be.  It 
was as if she had said “polis” a few seconds ago and was still saying it, not in any 
drawn out way (not “pooolllliiiiis”) and not repetitive (not “polis polis polis”), 
and not an echo.  She was innerly saying polis, which seemed to have the same 
vocal characteristics of external speech, and yet was extended in time.   
Words Present 
 Four of JS’s inner experience samples involved the presence of words (17%) that 
did not have any perceptual characteristics.  In these samples, specific words or letters 
were present in her experience; however, the actual words were not seen or spoken or 
heard or read—the words were simply there.  Here are examples:  
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Sample 4.1.  JS had just finished reading a text message her friend, Patricia, had 
sent her asking, “Who said that, Danny?”  At the moment of the sample, JS was 
thinking the words “Ha ha, how did you know” which was what she was about to 
type in response to the text.  The words came sequentially; that is, they were 
present one after the other in JS’s experience.  However, they were not 
experienced as innerly heard or said and did not have any other voice 
characteristics.  They were also not experienced as innerly seen.  Thus these exact 
words were experienced as being produced without any of the characteristics 
typically associated with word production, hearing, or seeing. 
Sample 5.4.  JS had been talking on the phone and just said bye.  At the moment 
of the sample, the word bye was still present in her experience without any 
perceptual representation.  That is, bye was somehow present, but it was not 
spoken, heard, or seen.   
In one of these samples, a name was present: 
Sample 5.2.  JS was scrolling through her touch screen cellular phone, searching 
for her friend’s name, Rita, in her contact list.  At the moment of the sample, the 
name Rita was present in her experience without being articulated.  JS was aware 
of the name Rita and was looking for it but had not yet found it.  JS was also 
seeing the names in her phone as she scrolled through them.  The physical act of 
scrolling was not in her experience.   
Not Semantic Words 
 In three of her samples, JS was not experiencing the meaning of the words present 
in her experience at the moment (13%).  In sample 2.3, described in detail in the Inner 
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Seeing section above, JS was both innerly seeing and innerly saying the word “polis.”  
However, the meaning of the word “polis” was not in her experience at the moment.  The 
seeing and saying of the word continued in her experience after the semantic value of the 
word had passed.  Sample 2.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, 
seems related to the non-semantic topic.  In that sample, JS was reading about Aristotle’s 
“mechanics,” meaning the science of physics, but at the same time innerly seeing her 
father’s automobile mechanic shop.  Thus the relationship between the inner seeing and 
the outer context was through a clang association, rather than a semantic association. 
Here is the other example: 
Sample 5.5.  JS was watching a baseball game on TV that was between innings 
and had heard the announcer say the word Minnesota.  At the moment of the 
sample, she continued to hear the announcer’s articulation of the word Minnesota 
even though it was no longer being said and no longer had any specific meaning.  
She was also seeing the pitcher on the screen warming up on the pitcher’s mound.   
Happening Of 
 In some of the other participants, the investigators noticed a characteristic 
described as the “happening of” experience: action that is occurring without a sense of 
being produced or created.  There were three samples (13%) where JS did not experience 
herself as being the agent of her actions.  Here is an example: 
Sample 3.4.  JS was walking down the aisle in the grocery store when her mom 
had asked her if she could get rice.  At the moment of the sample, JS was saying 
“brown?”  This questioning word seemed to be rolling out unbidden; it was not as 
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if JS had the sense of wondering what kind of rice to buy, not as if there was an 
inner seeing of rice packages, and so on. 
In this sample, JS’s saying “brown?”  The questioning word seemed to be rolling out.  
Here is another example: 
Sample 3.2.  JS and her mom were driving to the store; mom was driving.  JS had 
just finished telling her mom she wanted to wait for her in the car.  At the moment 
of the sample, she was looking at her mom as she was driving.  She was idly 
seeing her mom but not paying particular attention to any feature of her mom.  
Sample 4.6.  JS had been conversing with her friend, Barbara.  Barbara had said 
something funny and both Barbara and JS had started laughing.  JS’s laugh was 
somewhat amplified because she always found the manner of Barbara’s laugh 
annoying, so that seemed to contribute to an increase in JS’s own laughter, even 
though none of that was directly in her experience.  At the moment of the sample, 
JS was simply laughing.  There was nothing else in her experience, not the 
content of their conversation nor Barbara’s annoying laugh. 
Anticipation  
Two of JS’s samples (8%) involved anticipating finding something.  In sample 
5.2, described in detail in Words Present section above, JS was searching for her friend’s 
name, Rita, in her contact list on her touch screen phone.  Here is the other example: 
Sample 4.3.  JS was preparing to continue watching the movie, The Last Song, 
that she had seen before until a certain point (she had not seen the end).  At the 
moment of the sample, she was fast forwarding the movie to find the part she had 
not seen.  In her experience, JS was somehow processing the duration of the fast 
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forward (she was intermittently stopping the DVD to see whether she had already 
seen that part).  JS was also seeing her friend, Tammy, standing to the right of her 
folding clothes.  JS was more focused on the folding of the clothes than any 
particular aspect of Tammy.  JS’s report of seeing Tammy during the expositional 
interview involved gesturing with her left hand to her left side as if she had seen 
Tammy folding clothes to her left at the moment of the sample. 
In this sample, JS was searching for the part of the movie she had not seen.   
Listening With Comprehension 
 In two of her inner experience samples (8%), JS was listening with 
comprehension.  In these samples, JS was comprehending the words spoken to her.  Here 
are the samples: 
Sample 3.1.  JS had been getting ready to go to the grocery store with her mom.  
At the moment of the sample, she was hearing her mom say, “should we leave 
him in or out?” regarding their dog.  JS was listening and absorbing what her 
mom was saying.  There was nothing else in her experience. 
Sample 3.3.  JS was at the grocery store with her mom.  JS was walking ahead of 
her mom.  At the moment of the sample, JS was hearing her mom say to her, 
“slow down!” in an angry tone.  JS was listening and absorbing what her mom 
was saying.  There was nothing else in her experience.  
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics 
 JS had six characteristics that each occurred once (4%) in her inner experience. 
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Focus on words (rather than sentences).  
In one of her samples, JS was focused on a word rather than a sentence.  In 
sample 2.3, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, JS was innerly seeing the 
word “polis” (part of a sentence).  JS was not attending to the rest of the sentence.  
“Polis” was the only word in her experience at the moment.       
Emotion.  
JS did not experience any feelings in any of her samples.  However, during one 
sample, there may have been an ongoing emotion.  In sample 4.6, described in detail in 
Happening Of section above, JS was laughing in an amplified way at something funny 
her friend had said; however, she was not directly experiencing a feeling (e.g., happy, 
humorous, annoyed) at the moment.    
Doing of.  
In one of her samples, JS was planfully involved in the completion of an activity.  
Here is the example: 
Sample 5.1.  JS was text messaging her friend and, at the moment of the sample, 
was texting the word class.  Before the sample, JS had thought the letter c and 
then pushed the key c in her phone, followed by thinking the letter l and then 
pushing the key l in her phone, followed by thinking the letter a and then pushing 
the key a in her phone.  In her experience, JS was thinking the letter ss.  The 
letters ss were present in her experience as a unit.  She was not innerly saying ss, 
innerly hearing ss, or innerly seeing ss.  JS was confident that in this experience 
there was an explicit thinking followed by a texting of each letter; think-text-
think-text-think-text. 
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Inner Speech.  
JS experienced inner speech in one sample.  In sample 2.3, described in detail in 
Inner Seeing section above, JS was innerly saying the word “polis.”  In her experience, 
the innerly spoken word seemed to be extended in time in a way that external speech is 
incapable of, and had no meaning whatsoever.  
Reading with comprehension.  
In one of JS’s samples, she was reading with comprehension.  Here is the 
example: 
Sample 4.5.  JS was reading the text message, “Are you home yet?” her mom had 
just sent her.  In her experience, she was simultaneously looking at the text 
message and recognizing the meaning. 
Unsymbolized thinking.  
Unsymbolized thinking occurred once in JS’s inner experience samples.  Here is 
the example: 
Sample 3.5.  JS was outside with her mom while her mom was cooking burgers 
on the grill.  At the moment of the sample, JS was hearing her mom say “flip it” 
with regard to the burgers.  JS was thinking, without words or images or other 
symbols, that she needed to go get the spatula and then flip the burgers.  Even 
though this thought described a sequence of actions, the thought itself was not 
sequential—the notion of getting the spatula and then flipping was all present at 
the same time.  JS was not sure whether there was also an inner seeing at the 
moment of the sample.  It seems likely that this is a presupposition: that she 
always thinks in images. 
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Discussion 
Overall, JS’s samples of inner experience suggest that she is experiencing sensory 
awareness and inner seeing much of the time.  Words were present only rarely in her 
inner experience, and, when they were present, her overall experience with them was 
unusual.  JS had one sample of inner speech, one of the most frequent forms of words in 
experience.  JS did not have any samples that included feelings.   
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CHAPTER 14 
“TS” 
TS was a 35-year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us in May and June 
2011.  TS received a laterality quotient of -45 on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating that he is moderately left-handed.  He received a GSI 
raw score of 0.316 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 55) on the Symptom 
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting 
the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.  
Characteristics of Inner Experience 
TS sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 28 samples.  Because 
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for participants, samples from this day were 
omitted and 24 of TS’s samples were considered as reflecting his inner experience 
characteristics.  The following characteristics of his inner experience will be discussed: 
sensory awareness, occurring in 17 samples (71%); multiple experience, occurring in 16 
samples (67%); feeling, occurring in 11 samples (46%); inner seeing, occurring in 3 
samples (13%); doing of, occurring in 3 samples (13%); anticipation, occurring in 3 
samples (13%); emotion; occurring in 2 samples (8%); not semantic words, occurring in 
2 samples (8%); and unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 1 sample (4%).    
Sensory Awareness 
 Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in TS’s inner 
experience, occurring in 17 of TS’s samples (71%).  Here is an example: 
Sample 5.4.  TS was sitting on his couch eating a sandwich.  At the moment of the 
sample, he was seeing his living room though he was not paying attention to any 
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particular aspect of the living room.  He was feeling the sandwich in his left hand; 
this was a pressure against his hand, not the feeling of the roughness or softness of 
the bread.  He was also feeling pressure in his cheeks, roof of mouth, and weight 
on his tongue from a bite of sandwich in his mouth.  He was also tasting the 
saltiness and sweetness of the corned beef on pumpernickel of the sandwich.   
In this sample, TS was experiencing multiple sensory awareness aspects all related to the 
act of eating his sandwich.  In fact, all that was in his awareness was the sensory aspects 
of this activity.  Including sample 5.4, TS had four samples in which sensory awareness 
was the only phenomenon present in his inner experience—that is, TS was not paying 
attention to anything other than the sensory aspects of his inner or outer environment.   
Here is another example: 
Sample 2.2.  TS was in the bathroom getting ready for the day.  He had been 
positioning a contact lens onto the middle finger of his left hand with his right 
hand in preparation for inserting it into his eye.  At the moment of the sample, he 
was feeling the contact lens on his left middle finger.  He was also seeing the 
contact lens; simultaneously, he was also seeing the mirror, sink, and other items 
on the bathroom counter.  These other items were as individually distinctly seen 
as was the contect lens; they were not merely part of the background of the 
contact lens activity.  Thus, even though he was performing a very localized task 
(positioning the contact lens), he was also simultaneously seeing as part of his 
direct experience much that was irrelevant to the task.   
Five of TS’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of 
words.  Here is an example: 
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Sample 2.1.  TS was on the social networking site Facebook on his computer.  He 
was clicking on the link profile with the intention of removing an unflattering 
picture of himself.  At the moment, he was trying to complete the aforementioned 
task.  There was an active, conscious trying to get it done in his experience.  That 
is, he was not idly or automatically accomplishing the task.  He was also seeing 
the word profile on the computer screen, the rest of the computer, and the desk 
surrounding.  The word profile was the center of his visual experience though he 
was not attending to the word for its meaning; that is, profile is seen as a visual 
object rather than a semantic word.  He was also seeing all the irrelevant-to-the-
task stuff on the computer screen.  He was also feeling the mouse in his right 
hand.  He was interested in the feeling of the mouse in his hand rather than 
manipulating the mouse. 
In this sample, TS was not interested in the word profile for its meaning.   
One of TS’s sensory awareness samples involved the seeing of nothing.  In this 
sample, TS was having a visual experience; however, the experience was of seeing 
blackness which happened to be an absence of light or nothing.  Here is the sample: 
Sample 4.2.  TS had just lain down on the couch and closed his eyes.  At the 
moment, he was seeing a fuzzy blackness that uniformly filled his visual field, 
like a black screen; however, he described the blackness as like an absence of 
light.  He experienced himself to be seeing something (the blackness) though 
there was nothing to be seen.  That is, he experienced himself to be seeing but not 
seeing anything.  He was also experiencing a mental relief/relaxation/good 
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feeling.  This mental relief/relaxation/good feeling was ongoing in his direct 
experience but not felt bodily.   
In this sample, TS experienced a sensory awareness even when there was “nothing to be 
seen.”   
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in TS’s inner 
experience.  In such situations, it is reasonable to ask whether TS simply uses a language 
that sounds like sensory awareness rather than sensory awareness being a frequent 
phenomenon.  The investigators note that during the expositional interviews, he 
confidently distinguished between experiences that did and did not include sensory 
awareness.  Here is an example that does not contain sensory awareness: 
Sample 3.5.  TS was sitting at his desk with his eyes directed at his desk, though 
he was not seeing the desk at the moment.  He had been thinking about how he 
does not plan on telling his parents about his upcoming motorcycle trip until he 
returns from the trip.  He had been (and perhaps still was) wondering what he will 
tell his parents when he returns from the trip—wondering how he will say it—but 
it seems that this wondering, while perhaps cognitively ongoing, was not 
experienced at the moment.  At the moment, he was experiencing a rising sense of 
obligation, a mental experience that could not be further described.  He also may 
have been experiencing an awareness of the ongoing thought process regarding 
how and what he will tell his parents, but he was not experiencing the thought 
itself. 
In this sample, TS’s eyes were aimed at the desk, but he was not seeing the desk at the 
moment.     
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Multiple Experience 
Sixteen of TS’s samples involved multiple experiences (67%).  In these samples, 
TS was attending to a welter of environmental stimuli (inner and outer) despite the 
relevancy to the target of his experience at the moment.  Here is an example:  
Sample 3.1.  TS was brushing his teeth.  At the moment, he was tasting the minty 
flavor of the toothpaste; feeling the bristles of the toothbrush in his mouth; feeling 
the hard plastic of the toothbrush in his mouth; and feeling the hard plastic of the 
toothbrush in his left hand.  The act of brushing his teeth was not in his 
experience.  He was also seeing the bathroom mirror, his reflection in the mirror, 
counter, and surrounding wall.  He was attending to the visual seeing at a low 
level.  He was not paying attention to any particular aspect of the bathroom.  All 
the sensory aspects of this—both the physical sensations and the visual—were 
understood to be somehow unified; one thing with several aspects.  
In this sample, similar to other samples of TS’s inner experience, TS was not interested in 
any one aspect of brushing his teeth.  Rather, he was interested in multiple sensations that 
were coming at him equally more or less.  Similarly, TS was attending to multiple visual 
stimuli, granted at a low level in this particular example, rather than focusing on one 
relevant visual stimulus.  This is consistent across TS’s inner experience.  The same can 
be said of TS’s feeling samples, discussed below.  Rather than directly experiencing one 
salient feeling, a variety of emotions, both positive and negative, come at TS.  After 
weighing all of them, he is able to say whether the overall experience was negative or 
positive, depending on the weight of each.  It is as if TS experiences the ingredients that 
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make up his inner and outer environments and present themselves to him rather than 
seeking out a stimulus to focus on and experience.   
Six of TS’ multiple experience samples include one or more sensory awareness 
along with a feeling.  The other combinations of multiple experiences occurred with 
lower frequency.  Here is an example of sensory awareness/feeling: 
 Sample 4.4.  TS was sitting on the couch, changing the channels.  At the moment, 
he was feeling the controller sitting on his right hand and feeling his right thumb 
resting on the up-channel button.  At the same time, he was seeing the TV 
program, an episode of South Park.  TS was not directly attending to the South 
Park scene, but rather he was attending to the visual aspects of the South Park 
display.  He was also, but somewhat less distinctly, seeing the rest of the TV 
screen, the TV cabinet, and the adjacent parts of the living room.  He was 
enjoying the South Park episode, which he had been watching for perhaps a 
minute as he channel surfed, and he was experiencing in some way this enjoyment 
even though he was particularly attending to the visual aspect of South Park 
rather than its story line or content.  He was also experiencing a mental 
indecisiveness and curiosity--he was curious about what else was on TV.  The 
investigators questioned him carefully about the degree to which the off-center 
visual characteristics (TV cabinet, living room, etc.) were present, and as 
carefully as could be ascertained, he was indeed directly experiencing these 
things.  It was not merely that they were present and could be looked at in 
response to the beep.   
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In this example, TS was feeling the controller (sensory awareness), feeling his right 
thumb resting on a button (sensory awareness), seeing the visual presentation of the TV 
(sensory awareness), and experiencing a mental indecisiveness or curiosity (feeling).  He 
was attending to separate experiences (the feeling of the controller and his thumb, the 
visual presentation of the show, and a mental indecisiveness/curiosity) simultaneously.   
Feeling 
 Eleven of TS’s samples (46%) involved his experience of feeling.  None of TS’s 
samples of feeling involved a physical representation of the feeling.  Six of his samples 
involved mentally experiencing the feeling.  Here is an example: 
Sample 5.5.  TS was sitting on the couch. He was debating on whether or not he 
should apply for another job or call it a night, but this cognitive debate was not in 
his experience.  At the moment, he was seeing his living room.  He was also 
experiencing a mental state of tension and indecisiveness.  [It was his sense that 
this tension/indecisiveness arose from his cognitive debate, but that is an 
inference.] 
Including sample 5.5, just described, there were five samples where TS was 
experiencing some kind of mental tension or pressure.  Here are other examples: 
Sample 3.3.  TS was sitting at his desk, looking out the window.  He was 
experiencing a sense of indecisiveness or tension, a mental pressure about having 
to make a decision.  The indecisiveness/tension/pressure was regarding whether 
or not he should wait until his next oil change to check his brakes, but this content 
(the brakes) was not directly in his experience at the moment.  [It was as if the 
brake-decision process was taking place somewhere in TS outside of his 
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awareness, leaving in its wake, so to speak, the indecisiveness/tension/pressure 
which was directly experienced.]   He was also seeing (directly in his experience) 
the window, shades, and surrounding wall in his bedroom.   
Sample 3.6.  TS was sitting at his desk.  At the moment of the sample, he was 
seeing the words St. Francis U written in red ink on a notepad.  TS was seeing the 
words both for their sensory qualities (red ink against a white background) and as 
a reminder of wanting to apply to schools.  TS was also seeing the rest of the 
notepad, the desk, and rest of the bedroom at the same time.  He was also 
experiencing a mental pressure of needing to complete certain tasks today.   
Sample 5.2.  TS was driving on South Eastern towards a grocery store, 
Albertsons.  He saw through his windshield the street, cars ahead, and stores.  He 
simultaneously saw the instruments and window inside the cabin of his vehicle.  
He was not focused on any particular aspect of the seeing; in particular, he was 
not seeing the street or the cars with any more focus or attention than the objects 
inside the car.  He was also hearing the humming of his jeep.  He was also feeling 
the pressure of the steering wheel against his hand; this was a felt pressure on his 
hand, not a sensation of the steering wheel itself.  He was experiencing a mental 
sense of tension and impatience. 
Similar to TS’s other feeling samples discussed below, it is not clear whether tension and 
pressure should be called feelings.  Certainly they are not typical of the feelings that other 
DES participants experience. 
There were four samples where TS seemed to be undergoing a simultaneous 
collection of unintegrated positive and negative states that were perhaps slightly 
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differentiated, but which do no cohere or coalesce into a feeling or a feeling that DES 
finds in other subjects.  Here are examples: 
Sample 2.5.  TS was sitting at his desk.  At the moment, he was innerly seeing a 
photograph of his girlfriend, Carla.  That is, he was not innerly seeing Carla— he 
was seeing a photograph of Carla.  He was seeing Carla’s head from the neck up.  
Carla’s head was slightly tilted to her right such that he was seeing the left side of 
her face.  He was seeing this in color.  He was seeing the neckline of her yellow 
shirt, blue sky, and a little bit of clouds.  The innerly seen Carla-photograph was, 
as far as he could tell, an accurate representation of the real photograph.  He was 
also experiencing an undifferentiated multitude of positive and negative mental 
emotions including uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision regarding 
the relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of security.  The valence of this 
experiencing was, on balance, positive, but the individual ingredients were both 
positive and negative.  He did not experience any of the feelings separately or 
distinctly, but rather felt an undifferentiated valenced something that could be said 
to include uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision regarding the 
relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of security.   
Sample 4.5.  TS was sitting at his desk submitting a job application to the 
University of Limerick in Ireland.  At the moment of the sample, he was focused 
on the word Limerick as it was displayed on the screen.  However, this focus was 
not on the word “Limerick” but on the visual display “Limerick.”  That is, he was 
not seeing a word; he was seeing a visual display.  He was also seeing the rest of 
the webpage, computer, desk, and rest of his room to a lesser degree.  He was 
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experiencing a host of positive and negative sensations related to the potential of 
living and working in Ireland, which he described as including apprehension and 
excitement.  Overall, the sensation was more excitement and apprehension thus 
the general sensation was more positive. 
Sample 5.3.  TS was sitting at his desk looking at the computer screen.  At the 
moment of the sample, he was focused on the biesieda part of the e-mail address 
michael.biesieda@unlv.edu.  He was still seeing the rest of the e-mail address, the 
computer screen, desk, and part of his bedroom; however, biesieda was central in 
his visual experience.  He was not attending to biesieda as a word or name or 
email address; rather he was attending to its visual presentation.  To a lesser 
degree, he was attending to the blackness of the letters against the white 
background.  He was also experiencing a sense of happiness, relief, uncertainty, 
and the urge to get answers to questions, all one “ball” of experience with those 
aspects.  Some of these aspects were positive, some negative; the overall sense 
was more positive than negative.   
There does not seem to be a clear answer to the question of whether these experiences 
should be called emotional.  The samples contain bits of things that might be called 
emotion or feeling (uncertainty, attraction, etc.), but even those are not unequivocally an 
emotion: should uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision be called emotions?  
And even if they are called emotions, they are not coherent emotions or even several 
coherent emotions, much less coherent feelings—his experiences are more like the 
ingredients of emotion/feeling rather than the emotion or feeling itself.  And even if it is 
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accepted that they are feelings, they are only a minor aspect of his experience, typically 
the third or less salient aspect. 
There were three samples where TS was experiencing some kind of uncertainty, 
interest, or anticipation.  Here are the samples: 
Sample 2.6.  TS was sitting at his desk, applying for jobs.  At the moment of the 
sample, TS was apprehending where he will be living and what he will be doing.  
This was not a cognitive process, however.  TS was experiencing a sense of 
uncertainty, opportunity, and anticipation.  This seemed to be a mush of emotions 
that were, taken together, more positive than negative.   
Sample 3.2.  TS was lying on his bed, reading a book.  At the moment, he was 
seeing the word Kolya, the name of a male character in the book.  He was also 
seeing the words surrounding Kolya, the rest of the book, and his room.  The 
word Kolya was clear.  The visual seeing became progressively less clear the 
further removed from Kolya.  He was not attending to the word Kolya in context, 
and, at the moment, he was unaware of the rest of the sentence, paragraph, etc.  
He was also wondering what Kolya was going to do next.  This sensation 
involved an interest and curiosity surrounding what will happen next with the 
character.  This was a state of curiosity and interest rather than a cognitive 
thought process.  
Sample 4.4.  TS was sitting on the couch, changing the channels.  At the moment, 
he was feeling the controller sitting on his right hand and feeling his right thumb 
resting on the up-channel button.  At the same time, he was seeing the TV 
program, an episode of South Park.  TS was not directly attending to the South 
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Park scene, but rather he was attending to the visual aspects of the South Park 
display.  He was also, but somewhat less distinctly, seeing the rest of the TV 
screen, the TV cabinet, and the adjacent parts of the living room.  He was 
enjoying the South Park episode, which he had been watching for perhaps a 
minute as he channel surfed, and he was experiencing in some way this enjoyment 
even though he was particularly attending to the visual aspect of South Park 
rather than its story line or content.  He was also experiencing a mental 
indecisiveness and curiosity--he was curious about what else was on TV.  The 
investigators questioned him carefully about the degree to which the off-center 
visual characteristics (TV cabinet, living room etc.) were present, and as carefully 
as could be ascertained, he was indeed directly experiencing these things.  It was 
not merely that they were present and could be looked at in response to the beep.  
Here again, it is not clear whether we should call uncertainty, interest, or anticipation 
feelings or emotions.  Certainly they are not typical of the feelings that other DES 
participants experience.   
There were two samples where TS was experiencing happiness or a good feeling.  
One of those was just described: at sample 4.4 he was enjoying the South Park episode.  
In sample 4.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section, TS was seeing 
blackness.  He was also experiencing a mental relief/relaxation/good feeling.   
Inner Seeing 
 TS’s inner experience featured inner seeing in three of his samples (13%).  One 
example, in sample 2.5, has already been described in Emotion section above.  In this 
example, TS was innerly seeing a photograph of his girlfriend Carla.  He was seeing 
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Carla’s head from the neck up.  In the innerly seen photograph, Carla’s head was tilted 
and TS was seeing the left side of her face.  It is worth emphasizing that TS was not 
seeing Carla; he was seeing a photograph of Carla.  Here is another example: 
Sample 3.4.  TS was sitting at his desk with a pair of jeans draped over his legs.  
He had been thinking of how to sew the hole in the crotch of these jeans.  At the 
moment, he was seeing the physical jeans, his legs, the chair he was sitting on, 
and the carpet.  At the same time, he was seeing an imaginary needle in his left 
hand and green thread dangling from the thread.  He was also seeing a few 
imaginary strands of green thread sewn into his real blue jeans as if he were 
halfway done sewing them.  The strands were seen as messy and uneven.  He was 
unable to differentiate whether there was an explicit, additional thought process 
regarding how to sew the jeans or if the imaginary needle and thread represented 
such thought process.   
In this sample, TS was projecting an innerly seen or imaginary image onto the physical 
world.  His seeing involved a mixture of seeing the external world and inner seeing 
combined together into one coherent seeing.  Although TS has a small percentage of 
inner seeing in his experience, when he does experience inner seeing, it is as if he blends 
his inner images with his outer world.    
Doing Of 
 In three samples of TS’s inner experience (13%), TS was experientially involved 
in the deliberating and directing of the mental processes or physical actions.  This 
phenomenon is called “doing of.”  One example has already been discussed in Sensory 
Awareness section above.  In sample 2.2, TS was concentrating on the task of putting a 
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contact lens in his eye.  He was consciously adjusting the lens with his right hand.  Here 
is another example:   
Sample 5.1.  TS was walking towards his mailbox, outside in his apartment 
complex, to get his mail.  At the moment, he was seeing the street, mailboxes 
ahead, apartment buildings, Sunset Road, and the airport; he saw all these 
simultaneously in his direct experience.  He was also experiencing motion or his 
movement through space.  He was feeling directed pressure on the bottom of his 
feet as part of the motion, feeling the contribution of his feet to his motion.   That 
is, he was not merely moving through space; he was directly experiencing that 
movement. 
Anticipation 
Three of TS’s samples of involved an anticipatory state (13%).  One, sample 2.3, 
discussed in the Emotion section below, involved anticipating feeling carefree, but not 
actually experiencing the carefree-ness.  Here is another example: 
Sample 4.3.  TS was standing in his kitchen raising a shot glass of whiskey in his 
left hand.  In his experience, he was feeling the shot glass in his left hand, but he 
was not paying any particular attention to any of its aspects—not, for example, to 
the smoothness or hardness, or coldness of the shot glass.  He was also seeing the 
yellowish-brownish liquid inside the shot glass, which he knew to be whiskey.  
He was more attending to the yellowish-brownish of the liquid than to its 
whiskeyness.  He was also anticipating the sensory aspects of the about-to-take-
place drink: the sweet taste, the feel of the liquid, the burning sensation, etc.  
There seemed to be some evaluation of these sensations.  Some were positive 
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(taste, feel, etc.) and some were negative (burn).  The positive and negative 
anticipated sensations were bundled up together and the resulting anticipation 
was, “on balance,” more positive than negative. 
One of TS’s anticipation samples involved some kind of searching.  In this 
sample, TS was actively involved in looking for some specific thing.  This looking was 
more than a sensory awareness or perceptual experience of seeing the stimuli.  Here is the 
example:   
Sample 4.1.  TS was sitting on the couch reading a book.  At the moment, he was 
seeing the word aberration.  He was focused on that word but was also seeing the 
sentence of which it was a part, “What aberration?” including the quotation 
marks, question mark, and What were in his experience to a lesser degree.  He 
was also seeing the blackness of the print against the yellowish-white pages of the 
book, the rest of the book, and his legs, couch, and carpet.  The seeing decreased 
in focus the further away from aberration.  Equal or perhaps slightly more in his 
experience he was also “mentally scanning” or recalling what the definition of the 
word aberration is.  This involved a recalling of the dictionary-type definition of 
aberration as well as what that word meant in the present context (more on the 
definition).  This scanning was a mental search or waiting-for, not a visual 
process. 
This is the only occasion in which explicit words with meaning appeared in TS’s inner 
experience.  In this sample, TS was seeing the word aberration and mentally scanning for 
the definition.  When TS does, for whatever reason, call for the meaning of a word he 
seems to actively seek out and search for the definition. 
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Thus TS on occasion anticipated feeling, finding, or sensing something.   
Emotion  
In DES (and many others’) terminology, “emotion” refers to an ongoing process 
that might be called affective, and typically includes sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, and so 
on.  “Feeling” is the experience of emotion.  Emotional processes may well be occurring 
but are outside of direct experience; those are emotions but not feelings.   TS had two 
samples (8%) which might be said to involve emotion, depending on how the term 
“emotion” is defined, but none which might uncontroversially be said to include feeling 
(see Feeling section above).  Here is an example: 
Sample 2.3.  TS was innerly seeing a motorcycle as if he were sitting on it, seeing 
the gas tank, instruments, his forearms, hands, (straight) highway, and 
surrounding desert.  The intricacies of the motorcycle were seen clearly but not 
greatly detailed.  He was innerly seeing this in color (the motorcycle was grey).  
He was also anticipating feeling carefree and thrilled, but the carefree-ness and 
thrilled-ness were not experienced.  That is, he was directly experiencing 
anticipation, and the anticipation was of feeling carefree and thrilled, but he was 
not feeling carefree or thrilled.   
In this sample, TS was anticipating a feeling but he was not directly experiencing that 
feeling at that moment.   
TS’s other sample of emotion involved the recollection of a feeling though he was 
not directly experiencing the feeling at the moment: 
Sample 4.6.  TS was lying on the couch, watching the movie Star Wars on TV.  
He was seeing the space craft and desert on the TV screen.  He was also seeing 
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the rest of the TV and living room within his visual field.  He was also recalling 
having experienced a sense of excitement, being challenged, competition, 
winning, and frustration during a time he played the video game version of the 
movie.  He was not directly experiencing those sensations at the moment, he was 
recalling having experienced them.    
This sample is, in a sense, opposite from his anticipation of a feeling sample.  Rather than 
having his attention directed at the future, his attention is focused on the past.  In both 
samples, however, the notion of a feeling is present though TS is not directly 
experiencing a feeling.   
Not Semantic Words 
Words were present in five of TS’s inner experience samples.  In all five samples, 
TS was attending to the visual characteristics of the words.  In two of these samples (8%), 
TS was only attending to the visual presentation of the word and not attending to the 
word in context or for meaning.  One example has already been described in detail in 
Sensory Awareness section above.  In sample 2.1, TS was seeing the word profile on the 
computer screen.  TS was not attending to the word for its meaning.  Here is the other 
example: 
Sample 5.6.  TS was sitting on his couch with a map of Washington on his lap.  
He had been planning his upcoming trip and trying to decide on a path to take.  At 
the moment, the notion that surface streets have a long list of directional changes 
which aren’t easy to memorize and difficult to look up when on a motorcycle was 
present to him without words, images, or any other symbolic presentation.  He 
was also seeing the word Seattle on the map, the words and lines on the rest of the 
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map, his legs, couch, and carpet around him.  The word Seattle was central in his 
visual experience; however, he was not attending to the wordness of the word.  
Rather it was as if he was seeing a visual display which happened to involve 
semantic symbols.    
In these samples, it is as if TS is able to separate words from their meaning and attend to 
their visual display.  At any given moment, words in TS’s experience do not appear to 
hold communicative characteristics; they are viewed as objects rather than semantic 
carriers.  Meaning sometimes seemed to pass through TS without his paying much if any 
attention to it.   
Unsymbolized Thinking 
 Unsymbolized thinking occurred in one of TS’s samples (4%).  This example has 
already been described in detail in Not Semantic Words section above.  In sample 5.6, the 
notion that that surface streets have a long list of directional changes was present without 
words, images, or any other symbolic representation.  
Discussion 
 Overall, TS’s samples of inner experience suggest that he experiences sensory 
awareness (71%), multiple experience (67%), and feeling (46%) much of the time.  It is 
noteworthy to mention that, although TS experienced feeling much of the time, his 
samples of feeling are not typical samples that other DES participants experience.  Words 
occurred only rarely in TS’s inner experience, and his overall experience with words was 
unusual.  Meaning did not seem directly connected to words, that is meaning could be 
absent when words were present.  
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CHAPTER 15 
ACROSS-PARTICIPANTS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The previous 10 chapters were dedicated to describing the experience of the 10 
participants (AH, BP, CL, DH, NT, MM, MO, KA, JS, TS).  Each chapter provided an 
idiographic description of each participants’ inner experience.  In this chapter, the 
collection of samples across all participants will be considered and the characteristics, 
patterns, and tendencies that emerged will be discussed.   
 The present study was designed with three objectives in mind: 1) to explore the 
inner experience of left-handers; 2) compare the inner experience of the 10 left-handed 
participants to the inner experience of the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010); 
and 3) to compare the inner experience of left-handers to the inner experience of the 
general population.  The investigators were interested in the inner experience of left-
handers not because they themselves are left-handed (both of the two investigators 
happen to be  right-handed); however, given the research surrounding implications of 
left-handedness, the investigators were interested in possible inner experiential 
differences between left- and right-handers.  Results are divided into five sections.  The 
first section presents the participants’ frequently occurring characteristics.  The second 
section discusses other observations found across participants.  The third section reviews 
the present results compared to the literature.  The fourth section reviews the overall 
findings of the present study.  The last section of this chapter discusses the limitations of 
this study and directions for future research. 
 The across-participants results are based on a total of 217 samples of inner 
experience from 10 left-handed participants.  Their characteristics are shown in Table 2.  
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The table is arranged by participants’ scores on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory 
(EHI), a quantitative assessment of handedness administered to evaluate handedness 
laterality.  As evidenced by the participants’ EHI scores ranging from -100 (strongly left 
handed) to -45 (moderately left-handed), all of the participants were moderately to 
strongly left-handed.  As can be seen in Table 2, degree of laterality, at least within this 
fairly narrow range of laterality, does not seem to impact frequency of characteristics of 
inner experience in the 10 participants.  Therefore, the results discussed below apply to 
the left-handed participants as a group, not merely to the more extremely left-handed 
participants.  Nonetheless, the table is arranged by decreasing EHI scores.    
Table 2 
Frequently occurring or otherwise noteworthy characteristics of inner experience   
 Participant Comparisona 
Characteristic AH BP CL DH NT MM MO KA JS TS All 
 
Mizr. 
2010 
H&H  
2008 
EHI -100 -75 -75 -73 -68 -67 -53 -53 -50 -45 -66 -74.5  
Age 18 18 18 18 28 18 18 21 19 35 21.1 18.5  
Gender M F F M M F F F F M    
Number of  
samples 
20 
9% 
20 
9% 
18 
8% 
24 
11% 
23 
11% 
20 
9% 
23 
11% 
21 
9% 
24 
11% 
24 
11% 
217 
100% 
101 
100% 
 
Sensory  
Awarenessb 
14 
70% 
5 
25% 
7 
39% 
11 
46% 
16 
70% 
12 
60% 
18 
78% 
2 
10% 
5 
21% 
17 
71% 
107 
49% 
 
35% 
 
22% 
Multiple 
Experience 
6 
40% 
1 
5% 
1 
6% 
4 
17% 
10 
43% 
2 
10% 
0 
0% 
4 
19% 
0 
0% 
16 
67% 
44 
20% 
 
16% 
 
Inner Seeing 2 
10% 
0 
0% 
6 
33% 
9 
38% 
2 
9% 
0 
0% 
2 
9% 
13 
62% 
5 
21% 
3 
13% 
42 
19% 
 
24% 
 
34% 
Not Semantic 
Words 
3 
15% 
5 
25% 
1 
6% 
4 
17% 
10 
43% 
5 
25% 
2 
9% 
5 
24% 
3 
15% 
2 
8% 
40 
18% 
 
5%c 
 
Unsymbolized  
Thinking 
13 
65% 
3 
15% 
1 
6% 
7 
29% 
3 
13% 
7 
35% 
4 
17% 
0 
0% 
1 
4% 
1 
4% 
40 
18% 
 
20% 
 
22% 
Inner Speech 
 
4 
20% 
8 
40% 
2 
11% 
7 
29% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
9% 
3 
14% 
1 
4% 
0 
0% 
27 
12% 
 
9% 
 
26% 
Feeling 3 
15% 
0 
0% 
6 
33% 
1 
4% 
1 
4% 
0 
0% 
2 
9% 
1 
14% 
0 
0% 
11 
46% 
25 
12% 
 
4% 
 
26% 
Doing Of 
 
0 
0% 
1 
5% 
0 
0% 
3 
13% 
8 
35% 
3 
14% 
0 
0% 
3 
14% 
1 
4% 
3 
13% 
22 
10% 
 
8% 
 
Inner Hearing 3 
15% 
2 
10% 
1 
6% 
1 
4% 
0 
0% 
1 
5% 
2 
9% 
7 
33% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
17 
8% 
 
4% 
 
Emotion 
 
4 
20% 
0 
0% 
2 
11% 
3 
13% 
2 
9% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
5% 
1 
4% 
2 
8% 
15 
7% 
 
5%c 
 
Note. aFrequencies from Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). bMain 
characteristics from Heavey & Hurlburt (2008) are in bold face. cFrequencies of Not 
Semantic Words and Emotion were not reported in Mizrachi (2010), italicized 
frequencies presented in table were reconstructed from her data.   
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As shown in Table 2, each participant contributed approximately ten percent of 
the total number of samples: AH contributed 20 of these samples (9%), BP 20 (9%), CL 
18 (8%), DH 24 (11%), NT 23 (11%), MM 20 (9%), MO 23 (11%), KA 21 (9%), JS 24 
(11%), and TS 24 (11%).  Sampling began in September 2010 and was completed in June 
2011.   
Three participants completed sampling within one month of beginning 
participation (MM, KA, and MO) and seven participants completed sampling within two 
months (AH, CL, JS, NT, BP, DH, and TS).  Each participant participated in five 
sampling days, collecting an average of five (range: three to seven) samples on each of 
those days.  Within 24 hours of collecting samples, each participant participated in an 
expositional interview; thus there were five expositional interviews per participant.  Data 
from the first sampling day and its expositional interview was excluded from the 
idiographic analysis for each participant as well as from the collective pool of samples 
across all participants; therefore four sampling days and expositional interviews were 
included in the results and discussion.   
Frequently Occurring Characteristics 
The frequently occurring characteristics of the inner experience of the participants 
are presented in Table 2 in descending order.  The rightmost column of Table 2 shows for 
comparison the frequencies of the main five characteristics reported by Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008).  The main five characteristics reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) 
are shown in bold face in Table 2: sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner 
seeing, feeling, and inner speech.  Overall, the findings of the present study suggest that 
the characteristics of inner experience in left-handers are quantitatively and qualitatively 
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different from the characteristics of inner experience in the general population, as 
described by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).   
The results of the present study exploring the inner experience of left-handers are 
in agreement with the results of Mizrachi (2010), which also explored the inner-
experience of left-handers.  Both found sensory awareness in left-handers to occur nearly 
twice as much as the frequency reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) in the general 
population.  Similarly, the present study and Mizrachi (2010) both found about a 20% 
frequency of inner seeing in their left-handers, which is slightly more than half that 
reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  The present study and Mizrachi (2010) both 
found unsymbolized thinking occurring around a frequency of 20% in left-handers, as did 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  Inner speech occurred at a frequency of around 10% in 
both the present study and Mizrachi (2010), less than half of the frequency of inner 
speech reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  The frequency of feeling in both the 
present study and Mizrachi (2010) was less than half the frequency found in Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008).  Thus it is concluded that the inner experience of left-handers differs 
from the inner experience of the general population, as described by Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008).   
Sensory Awareness  
Sensory awareness is the experience of paying particular attention to some 
sensory aspect of the internal or external environment.  In such experiences, participants 
do not merely attend to an object or stimulus for its functional use, they directly focus 
experientially on some particular sensory quality of the object.  As shown in Table 2, 
sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic of inner experience 
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across participants in the present study (49%), and all 10 subjects experienced it at some 
point in their sampling.  Moreover, sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring 
characteristic in 8 of 10 participants’ inner experience (MO, TS, NT, AH, MM, DH, CL, 
JS).  Thus sensory awareness was the highest frequency experiential category both across 
participants and within most participants.  There was variability in sensory awareness 
frequency across participants, ranging from 10% to 78%.    
This result replicates the finding of Mizrachi’s (2010) study of left-handers: 
sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon there as well, where it 
occurred at a frequency of 22%.  Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring 
characteristic in 3 of her 6 participants’ inner experience (Mizrachi, 2010).  On the other 
hand, sensory awareness was the least frequent of the main five characteristics (tied with 
unsymbolized thinking) in Heavey and Hurlburt’s stratified random sample (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008).  Although sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring 
characteristic across participants, one participant, KA, reported only two sensory 
awareness samples in her inner experience.  Of the 10 participants, KA was the only 
participant who had substantially fewer sensory awareness samples than did the average 
participant in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  KA’s inner experience differed from the 
other nine participants in three other ways.  She was the only participant who did not 
have any samples of unsymbolized thinking, and she experienced both inner seeing and 
inner hearing more than did the other participants.  Of the female participants, KA 
experienced multiple experience substantially more than did the others.   
The majority of instances of sensory awareness described by participants were 
similar in nature and content to those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt’s general 
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population (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  However, three noteworthy patterns of sensory 
awareness emerged in participants’ inner experience samples: sensory awareness of 
words or letters; spreading of sensory awareness; and sensory awareness of an imaginary 
stimulus.   
Five participants (TS, BP, NT, DH, AH) had samples of the sensory awareness of 
words and/or letters (total of 20 out of 107 sensory awareness samples).  TS, BP, and NT 
all had five samples of sensory awareness of words.  DH had three samples, and AH had 
two.  In these samples, the participants were attending to the visual or auditory 
characteristics of seen or heard words rather than attending to the meaning of those 
words.  For example, in sample 5.1, NT was seeing fuzzy black shapes against a white 
background.  Those fuzzy shapes happened to be letters in a textbook; however, he was 
not recognizing them as letters at the moment.  This is an example of attending to the 
visual qualities of seen words.  In sample 4.1, BP’s grandmother was talking.  At the 
moment of the sample, BP was hearing the vocal/auditory characteristics of her 
grandmother’s voice; what the grandmother was saying (that she did not want Sarah 
Palin’s daughter to be on Dancing with the Stars any more) was not in her experience.  
As mentioned before, the participants were not attending to the functional quality or 
semantic meaning of the letters and words in these samples, they were instead 
experiencing their sensory quality.    
The sensory awareness of words was also found in Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed 
participants.  For example, one of Mizrachi’s (2010) participants, NH, was attending to 
the sensory aspect of the letter “F” in the word “Forever.”  Sensory awareness of words 
was not reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  It is Hurlburt’s impression (personal 
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communication, 2010) that sensory awarenesses of words are rare in the general 
population.  See also the Not Semantic Words section below.   
Three participants’ sensory awareness samples involved the experienced 
spreading of a sensory phenomenon (total of 11 samples).  Six of AH’s sensory 
awareness samples involved movement or spreading.  For example, in sample 4.5, AH 
was experiencing throbbing originating in the inner portion of his head and extending 
outwards towards his skull.  MO experienced spreading of sensory awareness in four of 
her samples, all four of which involved pain.  For example, in sample 4.2, MO was 
feeling a surge of pain on the left part of her bottom lip.  MM also experienced the 
spreading of pain in one of her samples.  For example, in sample 4.6, she was 
experiencing oscillating stomach pain and discomfort spreading throughout the trunk of 
her body.  In these samples, the participants’ were attending to some internal sensation 
that, at the moment, involved some type of movement.   
 The third characteristic that emerged in five participants’ sensory awareness 
samples was the sensory awareness of imaginary stimuli (CL, AH, JS, MO, NT) for a 
total of seven samples.  CL and AH both had two samples of sensory awareness of 
imaginary stimuli.  JS, MO, and NT all had one sample.  In these samples, the 
participants were attending to the sensory qualities of some imaginary stimulus.  Each 
sample involves an inner seeing, inner hearing, or imaginary tasting.  For example, in 
sample 2.3, CL was attending to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish wall color of an 
innerly seen classroom.  In sample 2.1, AH was innerly hearing an imaginary, “faded 
version” of a text message notification sound, and he was particularly attending to the 
faded sensory aspects of this sound.  In sample 3.5, MO was tasting a salad; however, she 
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was not actually eating a salad and did not have any part of a salad in her mouth at the 
moment.    
Thus the first general conclusion, the result of replication but with the caveat that 
the present findings are based on small samples, is that sensory awareness is a frequent 
phenomenon in left-handers, more frequent than in right-handers.  The instances of 
sensory awareness of words or significance for words suggest that left-handers may have 
an unusual way of dealing with letters or words in their experience.  The instances of 
spreading of sensory awareness suggest that sensory awareness in left-handers is specific 
and differentiated.  Lastly, sensory awareness of imaginary phenomenon may suggest 
that sensory awareness is so central in the inner experience of left-handers that it also 
occurs during imaginary experiences. This finding applies to most but not all left-
handers.   
Multiple Experience 
 Multiple experience consists of two or more separate, different, but simultaneous 
experiences.  Multiple experience occurred at a relatively high frequency across 
participants (20%), with eight participants experiencing samples of multiple experience.  
Mizrachi (2010) found a similar frequency of multiple experience in her left-handed 
participants (16%) (Mizrachi, 2010).  Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not provide a 
specific frequency for multiple experience except to say that no characteristic other than 
the main five had a frequency higher than 3%.  Thus it is tentatively concluded that left-
handed participants may have a higher frequency of multiple experience than do those in 
the general population. 
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As mentioned above, 8 of 10 participants had samples of multiple experience in 
their samples.  TS’s inner experience included the most frequent multiple experience 
samples.  Fourteen of his 16 multiple experience samples involved sensory awarenesses, 
five of which involved multiple sensory awarenesses.  For example, in sample 5.4, TS 
was feeling the pressure of a sandwich against his left hand.  He was also feeling pressure 
in his cheeks, roof of mouth, and weight on his tongue from a bite of sandwich in his 
mouth.  He was also tasting the saltiness and sweetness of the corned beef on 
pumpernickel of the sandwich.  The most frequently occurring combination of his 
multiple experience samples included one or more sensory awarenesses along with an 
emotion.  For example, in sample 4.5, TS was focused on the word Limerick as it 
displayed on his computer screen.  He was attending to the word’s visual characteristics 
and not the meaning of the word.  He was also experiencing a host of positive and 
negative sensations related to the potential of living and working in Ireland.  TS’s inner 
experience stood out from the other participants in that he also experienced substantially 
more feeling than the other participants (see Feeling and Emotion section below).  His 
feeling samples make up nearly half the total feeling samples in the study.  TS also 
experienced not semantic words with a lower frequency than the other participants.   
NT’s inner experience featured multiple experience in 10 of his samples.  Nine of 
his samples involved sensory awarenesses, three of which involved multiple sensory 
awarenesses.  For example, in sample 4.4, NT was chewing a pastry.  In his experience 
was the sweetness and chewyness of the pastry.  He was also simultaneously looking at 
jars of brown caramel and experiencing the brownness of the jars.  He was also thinking 
about the vivid sensory awarenesses in the inner experience of schizophrenics (a thought 
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without any symbolic representation).  Thus there were three separate strands of 
experience present simultaneously.   
AH also had a high frequency of multiple experience in his samples.  Four of his 
six multiple experience samples involved sensory awareness.  For example, in sample 
3.5, he was drawn to the gloomy, gray colors of the clouds.  He also smelled the rain.  He 
was also feeling relaxed and calm.  He may also have been thinking, I love this weather.  
The rest of the participants experienced multiple experience substantially less than TS, 
NT, and AH, with a frequency of 19% or less.     
The frequency of multiple experience in the present study and Mizrachi’s (2010) 
left-handed participants (20% and 16%, respectively) compared to the frequency of 3% 
or less in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) leads to the tentative conclusion that left-handers’ 
inner experience includes more multiple experience than the general population.  This 
finding applies to most but not all left-handers. 
Inner Seeing 
 Inner seeing is the experience of innerly seeing things that are not immediately 
present in the external environment.  As shown in Table 2, inner seeing was the third 
most frequently occurring characteristic of inner experience across participants (19%).   
Similar to the present findings, Mizrachi (2010) found an inner seeing frequency 
of 24% in her left-handed participants.  The frequency of inner seeing in the present study 
is roughly half the overall inner seeing frequency of 34% found in Heavey and Hurlburt’s 
participants (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  Furthermore, inner seeing was the most 
frequently occurring main characteristic in Heavey and Hurlburt’s participants (Heavey 
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& Hurlburt, 2008).  Thus inner seeing appears to occur less frequently in left-handers 
than the general population, as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).   
 In the present study, eight participants experienced inner seeing at some point in 
their sampling (KA, DH, CL, JS, TS, AH, MO, NT).  Some samples of inner seeing were 
similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  Some inner 
seeings were of things previously seen in actuality (similar to Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); 
some were of things not previously seen (similar to Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). 
The left-handed participants in this study did not experience inner seeing much of 
the time; however, one participant (KA) did experience inner seeing frequently.  KA’s 
inner seeing frequency of 62% is triple the average frequency of 19% found across left-
handed participants and double the inner seeing frequency of 34% found in Heavey and 
Hurlburt’s participants (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  Even though KA experienced many 
inner seeing samples, her samples were not straightforward.   
Two noteworthy and atypical characteristics emerged in KA’s inner seeing 
samples: 1) her seeings “populated themselves” or assembled slowly; and 2) she saw 
light coming from the left.  For example, in sample 3.6, KA was innerly seeing the head 
of her ex-boyfriend diagonally such that his head was directed slightly to his right (KA’s 
left).  She was unable to see the details of his face clearly as if his face was covered by a 
cloudy or foggy glass.  The inner image of KA’s ex-boyfriend’s head “populated itself,” 
came together slowly in her experience—that is, the image did not appear all together at 
once in KA’s experience.  Despite happening slowly in KA’s experience, KA was under 
the impression that if they could be clocked in the external world the coming together of 
the pieces happened so rapidly so that, at the moment of the sample, KA was already 
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seeing his whole head.  KA was also under the impression that the population was done 
and the unclearly seen face of the ex-boyfriend would remain unclear.  In sample 4.2, KA 
was innerly seeing an image of her friend Ramona, a boy named Sam, and herself.  The 
scene was illuminated by light coming from the upper left; the light was part of KA’s 
experience at the moment.  The light seemed to come from a lamp post light, but the 
lamp post itself was not seen.  As previously mentioned, KA’s inner experience also 
differed from the other participants’ in that she was the only participant who did not 
experience unsymbolized thinking.  Among the female participants, KA experienced 
multiple experience substantially more.   
As evidenced by the differences in frequencies between left-handers and the 
general population reported above, inner seeing occurs at a substantially lower frequency 
in left-handers.  And, when inner seeing does occur, it occurs differently from the inner 
seeing found in the general population.  For example, KA who experienced the highest 
frequency of inner seeing samples did not have typical and straightforward samples of 
inner seeing.  Rather her samples involved a slow assembling of the inner image.  The 
occurrence of not fully developed innerly seen images was also found in three other 
participants’ inner experience samples. 
Including KA, four participants’ (KA, JS, DH, MO) inner seeing samples 
involved an incomplete image, including a not fully developed innerly seen image or 
some type of coming together of the image.  In these samples, participants were not 
immediately seeing an image the way most people see it, the inner image was incomplete 
in some way.  Either the inner image had not completely formed in experience (KA, MO) 
or the colors of the inner image were somehow incomplete (JS, DH).  The images in 
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these samples took time to form.  As discussed above, four of KA’s inner seeing samples 
involved a slow assembling or coming together of the innerly seen image. 
Four of JS’s samples involved innerly seeing images in dull colors.  For example, 
in sample 2.1, she was innerly seeing the Guess store in the mall.  The seeing was in 
color; however, the colors were dull and less vibrant than in reality.  There was also range 
in the degree of dullness of color in JS’s samples.  For example, the image in sample 5.6 
(a Vans store) was so dull it was almost like a black and white seeing.  In these samples, 
the innerly seen images do not appear in full, vibrant colors.  Rather, it is as if extra time 
and energy is needed to build the colors—that is, it takes effort and time to build up her 
visual experience.   
Similar to JS’s dull images, DH had one inner seeing sample that was 
incompletely colored.  In sample 5.6, DH was innerly seeing a scene from the movie 
Saving Private Ryan in which a man in a green suit laying on top of another man trying to 
stab him with a knife.  The only colors DH was seeing were the green uniforms and the 
pale white faces of the men.  The whiteness of their faces was unrealistic and more pale 
in nature than what would be in real life.  It was as if the seeing was incompletely 
colored, not that he was focused on the incompleteness but that most of the scene was in 
black and white except for the green of the uniforms.   
MO had one inner seeing sample that involved a transition from one innerly seen 
image to another.  In sample 3.1, MO had been innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s face.  At 
the moment of the sample, MO’s experience was in transition from innerly seeing Kenny 
Chesney’s face to innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s whole body.  It was as if MO’s 
experience was incorporating Kenny Chesney’s body into it.   
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Two participants experienced inner seeing of words (MO and JS).  For example, 
in sample 3.6, MO was innerly seeing an image with the words “Could you imagine not 
eating?” written in black lettering in an arch.  In sample 2.3, JS had been searching 
through her notes for something about the Greek polis.  Before the sample, she had come 
to a sentence with the word “polis.”  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing 
the word “polis” as it stood out from the other words.   
Similar to the inner seeing frequency of 19% in the present study, Mizrachi 
(2010) found an overall inner seeing frequency of 24% in her left-handed participants.  
Mizrachi (2010) did not report a slow coming together or dullness in color of innerly seen 
images in her left-handed participants; however, she did report inner seeing involving 
words or parts of words in two of her participants.  It is Hurlburt’s impression (personal 
communication, 2010) that the inner seeing of words is rare in the general population.  
The frequency and quality of inner seeing in the present study along with 
Mizrachi’s (2010) suggest that inner seeing may be a somewhat less frequent 
characteristic in left-handers than in the general population.  The nonimmediate, slow 
coming together of images and the presence of words or symbols in the inner seeing of 
left-handed participants suggests left-handers may have an uncommon slow building of 
experience and unusual experience with words.   
Not Semantic Words  
In many samples (40 out of 217), words were present at the moment of the sample 
but were not attended to for their meaning.  This phenomenon, which the investigators 
called not semantic words, was the fourth most frequently occurring characteristic in the 
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participants (18%).  This category includes the sensory awareness of words that was 
discussed in the previous section. 
Mizrachi (2010) did not identify a not semantic words category in her study.  
However, she did provide high fidelity written descriptions of each of her participants’ 
samples of inner experience.  These descriptions from Mizrachi (2010) were reviewed 
and reconsidered to examine if the not-semantic-words phenomenon occurred there as 
well.  After review of the samples, a frequency of 5% of not semantic words was 
discovered across Mizrachi’s participants, as best can be reconstructed from the written 
descriptions (which may well be lower than the actual percentage that might have been 
identified from the interviews themselves).  Examples will be discussed below.  Heavey 
and Hurlburt (2008) did not mention instances of not semantic words, and the codebook 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2010) provided does not mention not semantic words (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2010).   
In the not semantic words samples, participants were attending to words; 
however, the words were not attended to for their semantic nature at the moment.  For 
example, in sample 3.1, NT was attending to the sensory qualities of a road sign (dull 
silver color, white color, and black etchings within a metal square).  Even though NT’s 
eyes were aimed at the sign, the words did not penetrate his experience.  He was not 
attending to the signness, postness, wordness, or letterness of the sign.  All that was in his 
experience was the silverness, whiteness, and blackness of the etchings (which happened 
to be letters).  In sample 5.4, BP was listening to her professor talk about the government 
being a hard job.  In her experience, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of the 
words he was saying.  She was not tracking the meaning of the words.  She had somehow 
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zeroed in on the words “hard job” but recognized them as objects of emphasis and not for 
content.  In these samples, and the rest of the not semantic words samples, the meanings 
of the words were not in the participants’ experience no matter their presentation (written, 
heard, read, or thought).   
As mentioned above, upon review of Mizrachi’s (2010) data, a frequency of not 
semantic words of 5% was discovered.  These samples were similar in nature to the not 
semantic words samples from the present study.  For example, one participant, KC, was 
seeing the written words “guitar hero” on her paper calendar.  She was attending to the 
visual presentation of the words and taking in some aspect of the shape of the words.  She 
was interested in the words for their sensory quality and not for their meaning or 
function.  In one sample, NH was reading an essay and was focused on the letter “F” in 
the word “Forever.”  He was paying particular attention to the letter “F” which appeared 
to be larger than the other letters.  Even though he was reading, the meaning was not in 
his experience at the moment (Mizrachi, 2010).   
Thus the next general conclusion, with the caveat that the present findings are 
based on small samples, is that not semantic words is a frequent phenomenon in left-
handers, more frequent than in the general population.  This finding applies to most but 
not all left-handers.   
Unsymbolized Thinking  
 Unsymbolized thinking, the experience of thinking without the presence of words, 
images, or any other experienced symbols, was the fifth most frequently occurring main 
characteristic across participants (18%).  Nine participants (AH, MM, DH, MO, BP, NT, 
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CL, JS, TS) experienced it.  Unsymbolized thinking was not the most frequently 
occurring characteristic in any participants’ inner experience.   
Similar to the present results, Mizrachi (2010) reported an overall unsymbolized 
thinking frequency of 20% in her left-handed participants (Mizrachi, 2010).  Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008) reported an overall unsymbolized thinking frequency of 22%.  
Unsymbolized thinking (along with sensory awareness) was the least frequently 
occurring of the main characteristics in Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey & 
Hurlburt, 2008).  The present findings suggest that left-handers experience unsymbolized 
thinking at a frequency relatively equivalent to the general population.    
The majority of the unsymbolized thinking samples in the participants were 
straightforward and similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants.  However, one 
participant experienced unusual unsymbolized thinking samples.  Although AH 
experienced unsymbolized thinking frequently and substantially more than the other 
participants, he did not have any clear and typical examples of unsymbolized thinking.  
His unsymbolized thinking samples were either secondary to something else (usually 
sensory awareness), included the presence of multiple possibilities, or involved some idea 
of what to do next.  For example, in sample 2.4, AH was looking for a pair of pants.  At 
the moment of the sample, he was wondering where could they possibly be?  This was a 
thought experienced without words or images.  There was a notion present of the places 
they could be (in his closet, in his mother’s house, in his father’s house, and so on); 
however, the specific places were not present in his experience at the moment.   
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One participant, KA, did not experience unsymbolized thinking.  As discussed in 
Inner Seeing section above, the majority of KA’s samples consisted of inner seeing 
(62%) which she experienced more than the other participants.   
 The frequency of unsymbolized thinking in the participants is similar to the 
frequencies reported in Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), suggesting left-
handers experience unsymbolized thinking at about the same rate as the general 
population.  Although the present findings are both quantitatively and qualitatively 
consistent with Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study, it is important to mention that, 
whereas in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) sample, sensory awareness and unsymbolized 
thinking were the least frequent characteristics among their main five, they both are 
among the most frequently occurring of the main characteristics in this study and 
Mizrachi’s (2010).     
Feeling and Emotion 
 Feeling and emotion are discussed in this section.  Emotion is a process whereas 
feeling is an experience.  For example, in 15 of the participants’ samples, emotions 
(affective processes) were ongoing, as noted by the immediately occurring retrospection; 
however, they were occurring outside of direct experience (7%).  Unlike emotion, 
“feeling” is direct affective experience.  Thus, samples that involved emotion without the 
direct affective experience were labeled “emotion,” whereas samples that involved the 
direct experience of emotion were labeled “feeling” and were not counted as emotion.  
Feeling occurred nearly twice as much as did emotion in the participants (12%).  
However, both feeling and emotion occurred infrequently.      
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Although the frequency of feeling is slightly higher in the present left-handed 
participants than Mizrachi’s (2010), the present findings are consistent with Mizrachi 
(2010) in that feeling occurred infrequently in both studies.  Mizrachi (2010) found a 4% 
frequency of feeling in her participants.  Mizrachi (2010) did not identify a separate 
category of Emotion; however, review of Mizrachi’s (2010) data shows that 3 of her 6 
left-handed participants described emotional samples similar to the emotion samples 
described in this study, as best can be reconstructed (5%).  These samples were not 
feelings as DES (and many others) use the term—that is, the participants were not 
actually experiencing an emotion at the moment.  There were, however, emotional 
aspects to the experience (Mizrachi, 2010). 
Unlike the low frequency of feeling found in the present study and Mizrachi’s 
(2010), Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) found a frequency of 26% of feeling in their 
participants.  The left-handed participants in the present study experienced feeling less 
than half of Heavey and Hurlburt’s participants (2010).  Additionally, Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of emotion.  Thus it is tentatively concluded that 
left-handers experience feeling substantially less than the general population and, in some 
cases, left-handers have a unique experience with emotion—that is, emotion may be 
ongoing without their direct experience of it.       
Seven participants (TS, CL, AH, MO, DH, KA, NT) had samples of feeling in 
their inner experience.  TS experienced feeling substantially more than the other 
participants.  His 11 feeling samples make up nearly half of the 25 total samples of 
feeling.  Seven of his samples involved a mental experience of the feeling.  For example, 
in sample 5.5, he was sitting on the couch and debating on whether or not he should 
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apply for another job.  At the moment, he was experiencing a mental state of tension and 
indecisiveness.  Four of his feeling samples involved the balancing of positive and 
negative feelings.  In these samples, he was experiencing a multitude of feelings which, 
on balance, were either positive or negative.  For example, in sample 2.5, he was innerly 
seeing a photograph of his girlfriend.  He was also experiencing an undifferentiated 
multitude of positive and negative mental emotions, including uncertainty, attraction, 
pressure to make a decision regarding the relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of 
security.  The valence of his experience was, on balance, positive but the ingredients 
were both positive and negative.  None of his samples involved a physical representation 
of the feeling.   
Although TS had a lot of feeling samples, his feeling samples were not 
straightforward.  It was difficult to determine whether or not his experience involved a 
true feeling.  Rather than experiencing a salient feeling, TS seemed to be influenced by a 
collection of unintegrated emotional states that were somehow differentiated.  In terms of 
outstanding characteristics, in addition to feeling, TS experienced multiple experience 
more than the other participants.   
Second to TS, CL also experienced feeling substantially more than the other 
participants.  Her feeling samples make up about one-quarter the total feeling samples 
across the participants (6 of 25 total feeling samples).  Four of her feeling samples were 
experienced mentally.  For example, in sample 2.1, CL was worried.  This was a 
powerful mental experience that was contained within the mental realm.  CL understood 
herself to be feeling and not thinking.  Her other two feeling samples involved a bodily 
experience of the feeling.  For example, in sample 2.4, she was experiencing relief 
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through the release of tension from her upper body, as if a weight had been lifted off of 
her shoulders.  Aside from her elevated frequency of feeling, CL’s inner experience did 
not exhibit other outstanding characteristics.   
The rest of the participants experienced feeling infrequently, 15% or less.  
Including TS and CL’s samples, four characteristics emerged in the 25 feeling samples.  
Fifteen of the samples were experienced mentally.  For example, in sample 5.5, KA was 
experiencing mental stress.  She was also setting the alarm and opening the door to her 
house, which was happening automatically.  Four of the feeling samples were 
experienced bodily.  For example, in sample 2.3, AH was feeling nervous which he 
experienced as multiple tingling sensations along and near his spine.  Four of the samples 
involved a multitude of feelings.  For example, in sample 4.2, TS was experiencing a 
mental relief/relaxation/good feeling.  One feeling sample was related to words spoken 
out loud.  In sample 3.2, MO was experiencing confusion and humor, both related to the 
words “is this thing working?” she was saying out loud to herself.  The confusion was 
experienced in the question and humor was experienced as smiling.   
As mentioned above, 15 participants’ samples involved emotions or ongoing 
affective processes that where occurring outside direct experience (7%).  Six of the 
emotion samples involved speaking with an emphatic tone.  Four of those six were AH’s 
emotion samples, where words were innerly present (either spoken or heard) with an 
emphatic tone.  Despite the emphatic tone, AH was not directly experiencing the emotion 
at the moment.  For example, in sample 3.1, he was innerly saying “He’s escaping!” with 
an emphatic tone, though he was not experiencing an emotion at the moment.  Two of 
DH’s samples also involved an emphatic tone.  In both samples, DH was innerly 
 230 
speaking.  For example, in sample 3.2, DH was innerly saying, “Why aren’t you!?!?” in a 
powerful, almost yelling, tone which represented frustration though he was not feeling 
frustrated at the moment.   
The remaining nine samples of emotion involved a variety of characteristics, 
including the following: thinking an emotion but not feeling it (e.g., in sample 3.2, DH 
was thinking how sad, though he was not feeling sad at the moment); conveying an 
emotion through words but not feeling it (e.g., in sample 3.3, KA was innerly saying “I 
love him so much” but she was not experiencing love or loving feelings at the moment); 
laughing with no experience of feeling; emotion suspended in time (e.g., in sample 4.1, 
CL had been overtaken by a wave of pure fear, at the moment she was in a suspended, 
frozen state); a lingering experience of emotion from a previous moment (e.g., in sample 
3.3, NT was experiencing a lingering negative valence from a thought he had previously); 
anticipating a feeling (e.g., in sample 2.3, TS  was anticipating feeling carefree and 
thrilled, but the carefree-ness and thrilled-ness were not in his experience); a recollection 
of a feeling (e.g., in sample 4.6, TS was recalling having experienced a sense of 
excitement, being challenged, competition, winning, and frustration though he was not 
experiencing those sensations at the moment). 
Both the left-handed participants in the present study and Mizrachi’s (2010) 
experienced feeling at a substantially lower frequency than that reported by Heavey and 
Hurlburt.  Even if the frequencies of feeling and emotion in the present study are counted 
together (25 + 15 = 40 of 217 samples, or 18%), the frequency is still less than the 26% 
frequency of feeling alone reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).   
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Samples of feeling in the present study were infrequent.  Furthermore, at times, 
left-handers may have ongoing affect that is not directly in their experience.  The low 
frequency of feeling in this study, the low frequency in Mizrachi’s (2010), along with the 
much higher frequency in the general population (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008), leads to a 
speculation that feeling is infrequent in the inner experience of left-handers.  It is 
emphasized that this speculation is based on very few participants and is need of 
additional investigation.  In a preliminary study such as this, there is no way of knowing 
whether emotion is merely an accidental or random occurrence or a robust characteristic 
of the inner experience of left-handed individuals.   
Inner Speech 
Inner speech was the sixth most frequently occurring characteristic of inner 
experience across participants, occurring in seven participants’ samples (BP, DH, AH, 
KA, CL, MO, JS).  Inner speech was the most frequently occurring characteristic in one 
participant, BP, who experienced it more than did any of the other participants.   
The inner speech frequency of 12% in this study is similar to Mizrachi’s (2010), 
who also found inner speech to occur at a relatively low frequency (9%) (Mizrachi, 
2010).  These inner speech frequencies are substantially lower than the frequency of 26% 
found in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study.  Thus, it is tentatively concluded that inner 
speech occurs substantially less in left-handers than the general population.   
Of the 10 participants, only two (BP, DH) experienced inner speech with a 
frequency of greater than the inner speech average reported by Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008).  All of BP’s inner speech samples were typical examples similar to those 
described by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  All samples were in her own voice and 
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involved some inner comment or question.  For example, in sample 2.4, BP was innerly 
saying, “I was focusing on the wrong triangle.”  BP’s inner experience did not differ 
substantially from the other participants aside from her inner speech frequency. 
Second to BP, DH also experienced inner speech frequently.  All of DH’s samples 
were in his own voice as well.  However, 2 of his 7 inner speech samples had an unusual 
characteristic.  In these samples, his inner speech was just happening.  For example, in 
sample 4.3, DH was innerly saying, “50 vision” (meaning that 50% of his attention had 
been aimed at the image); however, the inner speaking was happening automatically.  
That is, he had little or no experience of the creation of the speaking (even though the 
speaking itself was in his experience).  The remaining five participants experienced inner 
speech in four or less of their inner experience samples.   
There were four unique characteristics that emerged across the inner speech 
samples of our left-handed participants.  Four participants (AH, DH, KA, CL) had inner 
speech samples that involved an emotion or emphatic tone, for a total of nine samples.  
For example, in sample 5.6, DH was innerly saying, “You’re nuts” in an irritated, 
comical way.  Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) samples have emotion in their inner 
speakings as well; however, considering our left-handed participants experience feeling 
substantially less than Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants, it is remarkable that, 
despite the low frequency of feeling, left-handed participants have emotion in their inner 
speakings.   
Four participants’ inner speech samples involved some commentary on a bodily 
process (AH, KA, CL, MO).  All four participants had one sample of this phenomenon.  
In these samples, the participants were actively surveying and commenting on a bodily 
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process rather than automatically integrating the process as part of their experience.  For 
example, in sample 3.3, AH was saying “I’m hungry!” and feeling his lower abdomen 
grumbling, moving around, and tingling.  Rather than automatically processing the 
grumbling of his abdomen, AH commented on the process.  It is Hurlburt’s impression 
that it is unusual to have inner speech that comments on bodily processes (Hurlburt, 
personal communication, 2013).    
Two participants (BP, KA) each had one sample in which there was an inner 
speech and inner hearing simultaneously occurring.  For example, in sample 5.1, KA was 
simultaneously innerly saying and innerly hearing the phrase “it hasn’t beeped yet, of 
course on the last day its going to take forever.”  Unlike KA’s sample, BP’s inner 
speaking and inner hearing were not related.  She was innerly saying, “I know the beeper 
is about to go off” and innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song.   
Two participants (DH, JS) had inner speakings in which the meanings of the 
innerly said words were not in their experience at the moment.  In both samples, the 
innerly said word/s had unique characteristics.  In sample 5.3, DH was saying “H e Flare” 
(as in helium flare).  Before the sample, he had been repeating the words.  At the 
moment, he was saying one unit of the “H e Flare” repetitions.  He was attending more to 
the sound of the words.  In sample 2.3, JS was innerly seeing and innerly saying the word 
“polis.”  In her experience, the word had no meaning whatsoever.  This sample was also 
unique because the innerly spoken word seemed to be extended in time in a way that 
external speech is incapable of.    
Thus, the phenomenological characteristics of inner speech described by 
participants in the present study were in some instances similar to but in some instances 
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different from those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) in that the inner speech 
samples in the present study were experienced to be like outer speech except they were 
happening internally and were experienced as being in of the participants’ own voice.  
However, the content of the inner speech samples in the present study was quite narrow 
or restricted by comparison to everyday non-left-handed inner speech (Hurlburt, personal 
communication, 2010): mostly it was simple and directly related to the participants’ 
ongoing experiences.  For example, CL was innerly saying “I’m sneezing” in sample 3.1 
as she was sneezing; KA was saying “I’m going to sleep” in sample 3.4; and MO was 
innerly saying “What should I eat?” in sample 5.2 in response to his physical sensation of 
hunger.   
The prevalence of inner speech across left-handed participants in the present 
study, and the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010), suggests that left-handers 
experience inner speech less frequently than does the general population, and the 
complexity or floridness of the inner speech may be less in left-handers (Mizrachi, 2010).  
It should be recognized that some of the participants in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) 
sample may have been left handed— Heavey and Hurlburt did not collect that 
information.   
Doing Of 
 Doing of involves the concentrated, intentional doing of some action.  In these 
samples, participants were actively, specifically, focusedly involved in the doing of some 
action or activity.  That is, the action or activity that we call doing of were not 
experienced as automatically happening.  Doing of was the eighth most frequently 
occurring characteristic across our participants (10%).   
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Mizrachi (2010) described a similar phenomenon, in which she termed 
concentrated doing, in her left-handed participants with a frequency of 8%.  Doing 
of/concentrated doing are not well-established DES categories of inner experience and 
were not reported in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants.  However, this kind of 
experience of doing seems related to what Hurlburt (1993) called the doing of 
understanding which involves a deliberate and active experiential reaching out in an 
attempt to understand the meaning of information received (Hurlburt, 1993).   
 Seven participants in the present study (NT, MM, DH, KA, TS, BP, JS) 
experienced doing of.  Doing of was not the dominant experience in any participants’ 
inner experience but it occurred quite frequently in NT’s inner experience, who 
experienced it substantially more than the other participants.  For example, in sample 3.6, 
NT was writing notes and experienced a recognition of the act of writing.  He was not 
experiencing the words that he was writing, however.  NT also experienced not semantic 
words more than the other participants.  Doing of occurred rather infrequently in the rest 
of the participants, with a frequency of 15% or less. 
 Two characteristics emerged in the doing of samples.  The majority of the doing 
of samples involved some experiential bodily movement.  For example, in sample 3.1, 
BP was experiencing the act of typing.  She was aware of the act of typing with the 
intention of creating the words on the screen.  Five doing of samples involved words.  For 
example, in her only sample of doing of (sample 5.1), JS was text messaging her friend 
the word class.  Before the sample, she had thought the letter c and then pushed the key c 
in her phone, followed by the letter l, and then the letter a.  At the moment of the sample, 
JS was thinking the letters ss as a unit.  She was not innerly saying ss, innerly hearing ss, 
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or innerly seeing ss.  She was confident that in this experience there was an explicit 
thinking followed by a texting of each letter; think-text-think-text-think-text.   
Inner Hearing 
Inner hearing is an established DES characteristic.  Inner hearing involves 
attending to auditory characteristics occurring innerly.  Inner hearing was the ninth most 
frequently occurring characteristic in participants’ inner experience (8%).  Seven 
participants experience inner hearing (KA, AH, BP, MO, CL, DH, MM).  Inner hearing 
was not the dominant characteristic in any participants’ experience, though it occurred 
relatively frequently in KA’s experience.   
Similar to the present finding, inner hearing occurred at a frequency of 4% in 
Mizrachi (2010).  Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not specifically report the frequency of 
inner hearing in their participants other than reporting that no characteristic other than the 
main five had a frequency of higher than 3% (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).  Thus, it is 
tentatively concluded that left-handers experience inner hearing somewhat more than the 
general population.   
KA experienced inner hearing substantially more than did the other participants. 
Her seven samples make up almost half of the total 17 inner hearing samples.  All of 
KA’s inner hearing samples consisted of her own voice.  Four of her samples involved an 
attempt to understand the external world.  For example, in sample 3.6, she was innerly 
hearing “Scam artist, I don’t get it” referring to a billboard she had seen.  Two of KA’s 
samples involved multiple phrases.  One involved innerly hearing three different phrases: 
1) “Vegan conferences? Where are those?”; 2) “How can you tell one’s cheated?”; and 3) 
“Do they know you know?”  The innerly heard phrases were happening one after the 
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other.  In KA’s experience, they were happening in a normal, natural pace.  However, if 
they could be clocked in the external world, they were happening so fast it seemed like 
they all happened at the moment.  Her other sample involved repetition of the same 
phrase.  One sample involved innerly hearing her innerly spoken words.  In sample 5.1, 
she innerly heard herself saying “it hasn’t beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going 
to take forever.”  KA referred to the phenomenon as “hearing [herself] say.”  One of her 
samples involved some commentary on a bodily sensation.  In sample 2.6, she was 
innerly hearing “My back is strained” in her own voice.  KA’s inner experience differed 
from the other participants in that she also experienced inner seeing substantially more 
than the others and she was the only participant who did not experience unsymbolized 
thinking.   
Seven characteristics emerged across the inner hearing samples of participants, 
including the following: three were heard in the participants’ own voice; two samples 
involved innerly hearing a tune; two samples involved a rehearing of something that had 
been heard earlier; one sample involved a simultaneous inner hearing and inner speaking; 
one sample involved an emphatic tone; one sample involved repetition; and one sample 
involved innerly hearing the voice of someone else.    
Other Observations 
In addition to the most frequently occurring characteristics, additional 
observations about the inner experience of left-handed participants were made.  Like the 
observations above, all these observations should be considered tentative, exploratory.  
All require corroboration by additional phenomenological observation and/or validation 
by so-called objective procedures.  
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Anticipation 
Seven participants (CL, JS, MM, NT, TS, AH, MO) experienced anticipation, for 
a total of 15 samples (7%).  In these samples, the participants were anticipating 
something happening or anticipating finding something.   
Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed participants had samples involving anticipation to 
find something (Mizrachi labeled these “searching”) with a frequency of 10% (Mizrachi, 
2010).  Anticipation is not an established category of inner experience.  Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008) did not mention instances of anticipation (or searching), and the 
Codebook Heavey and Hurlburt (2010) provide does not mention anticipation (or 
searching) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2010).   
In six of the anticipation samples in the present study, the participants were 
anticipating finding something and experientially involved in searching.  In three of these 
samples, the participants were searching for words or definitions.  For example, in sample 
4.1, TS was “mentally scanning” or recalling the definition of aberration.  The rest of 
these samples involved internal or external searching.  For example, in sample 3.3, MM 
was searching her memory for the melody of a particular song (internal searching).  In 
sample 5.2, CL was experientially searching her closet for a particular pair of shoes 
(external searching). 
In four of the anticipation samples, the participants were anticipating some 
sensory stimulus (e.g., seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.).  For example, in sample 4.3, TS was 
anticipating the sensory aspects of whiskey (the taste, feel of the liquid, burning 
sensation, etc.).  He was not tasting the whiskey, feeling the liquid, or feeling the burning 
sensation of the whiskey at the moment. 
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 In two of the anticipation samples, the participants’ experience was paused, 
suspended, or frozen in time.  For example, in sample 4.1, a wave of fear had overtaken 
CL.  At the moment of the sample, she was frozen, waiting for something to happen.  The 
fear was suspended at the moment so that, at the exact moment of the sample, nothing is 
experienced.  In sample 4.1, NT had been leaving his girlfriend a voicemail message.  
Before the sample, he had said the word “maybe.”  At the moment, his mind was paused, 
waiting for the thoughts backed up in his mind to move forward.  He was experiencing a 
mental sensation of something about to happen.   
 Two samples involved anticipation of something to come.  In sample 4.6, NT was 
hearing his professor speaking and anticipating something to come.  In sample 2.2, AH 
was thinking about what he had to do next.  This involved some sense that he had a lot of 
homework to do.  One sample involved anticipating a feeling, but not experiencing the 
feeling at the moment.  In sample 2.3, TS was anticipating feeling carefree but he was not 
actually feeling carefree at the moment.   
The present study and Mizrachi (2010) both reported a frequency of anticipation 
around 10%.  Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not report samples of anticipation in their 
participants’ inner experience.   It is of course possible that anticipation is merely an 
occasionally occurring event that happened to be caught in flight by the random beep, 
with no particular significance for left-handed individuals. 
Happening Of 
Happening of occurred in four (JS, BP, DH, CL) of the participants’ inner 
experience samples, for a total of nine samples (4%).  In these samples, the participants 
had no creation investment in the experience—that is, the experience was just 
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happening—in situations where most people experience some sense of agency.  In six of 
the samples, words or some other form of communication was involved.  For example, in 
sample 3.3, she was thinking I started it this morning.  The words were presenting 
themselves to BP and, experientially, she was not creating them.  The rest of the samples 
involved a visual experience.  For example, in sample 2.2, BP was waiting for the 
solution of a math problem to visually appear.  She was not actively involved in creating 
the solution.   
Mizrachi (2010) reported the happening of phenomenon occurring in 4 or 5 of her 
participants’ 101 samples (4%).  For example, Mizrachi reported one participant (FM) 
experienced the Happening of Speaking, in which he was saying words out loud without 
those words being directly in his experience (Mizrachi, 2010).  Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008) did not report happening of in their participants.   
Words Present 
 Three participants (JS, BP, CL) had samples in which specific words or letters 
were present; however, the words and/or letters did not have any perceptual 
characteristics—that is, they were not innerly seen, heard, said, or read.  For example, in 
sample 3.3, the words I started it this morning were sequentially presenting themselves to 
BP; however the words were not innerly spoken, innerly heard, or innerly seen.  The 
investigators referred to this phenomenon as “words present.”  Words present was found 
in seven samples (3%).    
Although words present were relatively infrequent, JS experienced it more than 
the other participants.  Her four words present samples make up over half of the total 
words present samples (4 of 7).   
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Five of the words present samples were similar to the example provided above.  
Two of the words present samples were unique.  One sample involved specific visual 
characteristics.  In sample 5.3, the words pink elephant were present in CL’s experience 
with visual characteristics; however, despite their visual characteristics, the words were 
not innerly seen, innerly heard, or innerly said.  One sample involved a lingering word.  
In sample 5.4, JS had been talking on the phone and just said bye.  At the moment of the 
sample, the word (bye) was still present in her experience without any presentation. 
Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of 
words present in their samples (Mizrachi, 2010; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).   
Results Compared to the Literature 
 The present study found that the inner experience of left-handers is different from 
the inner experience of the general population.  This section will compare the results of 
this study to the relevant literature on left-handers’ experience.  More specifically, the 
experience of left-handers as discovered in this study compared to the literature on left-
handers’ experience will be discussed.   
Handedness effects have been explored in relation to divergent and convergent 
thinking.  In 1995, Coren explored divergent thinking as a function of handedness.  Coren 
(1995) described divergent thinking as involving the “consideration of several different 
directions, alternatives, or information sources” (Coren, 1995, p. 313).  Divergent 
thinking is hypothesized to enable the development or consideration of novel solutions 
and is often considered as a large factor of creativity, and is differentiated from 
convergent thinking, the use of existing knowledge and rules to come to a single 
conclusion (Coren, 1995).  After completion of four experiments (Alternate Uses and 
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Handedness; Object Synthesis and Handedness; Ideational Flexibility and Handedness; 
Convergent Thinking and Handedness), Coren reported a divergent thinking advantage in 
left-handed males by comparison to right-handed males.  Coren reported a linear 
relationship between degree of left-handedness and divergent thinking scores in males.  
He reported these results may explain the number of left-handed mathematicians, chess 
masters, architects, and artists.  He stated that, in addition to spatial ability, strong 
divergent thinking skills are likely a commonality among these activities.  He reported 
there were no significant findings between handedness and divergent thinking in females.  
In terms of convergent thinking, Coren reported a small advantage for right-handers.  
Thus he concluded that improved divergent thinking skills are associated with sinistrality, 
being left-handed, in males (Coren, 1995).   
Coren’s (1995) finding might be extrapolated as suggesting that left-handers, 
primarily males, tend to think in more unconventional ways and consider more 
possibilities when problem solving than do right-handers.  When compared to Heavey 
and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants, left-handed participants in the present study did 
exhibit such thinking styles.  For example, multiple experience was the third most 
frequently occurring characteristic in the present study (20%).  In these samples, two or 
more separate but simultaneous experiences were present.  Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) 
did not report such a high frequency of multiple experience in their participants’ inner 
experience.  The frequency of multiple experience in left-handed participants’ inner 
experience suggests atypical thinking styles and cognitive flexibility.  All four of the left-
handed male participants in the present study experienced multiple experience with a 
frequency of greater than 15%.  Only one female subject, KA, experienced it with a 
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frequency of 15% or higher.  Using Coren’s (1995) definition, the samples of multiple, 
simultaneous and separate experiences can be considered divergent thinking.  This 
notion, and the notions to follow, should be considered speculative and does not have 
corroborating evidence at this point.   
In 1998, McNamara, Clark, and Hartmann investigated the characteristics of 
dreams as a function of handedness.  Student volunteers from introductory psychology 
courses were asked to complete a questionnaire, including informed consent and the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, and write a description of a recent dream on a blank 
page.  Only 109 of the 420 students who completed the questionnaire described a recent 
dream.  The authors reported that, of the volunteers who completed the questionnaires, 
left-handers were more likely than right-handers to report a dream (79 of 359 right-
handers in total sample reported a dream, 22%; 30 of 61 left-handers in total sample 
reported a dream, 49%).  The authors found that the dream reports of left-handers 
included more high imagery nouns and more affective words than did the dreams of 
right-handers.  Additionally, the authors reported that more left-handers described their 
dreams as not accurately reflecting their everyday life.  That is, right-handers’ dreams 
reflected their everyday lives in a more realistic way.  The authors conclude that the 
dream reports of left-handers were more characteristic of right hemispheric related 
cognitive activity, including more high imagery nouns and more affective words than the 
dream reports of right-handers (McNamara, Clark, & Hartmann, 1998).   
McNamara et al.’s (1998) findings might be extrapolated as suggesting that the 
dreams of left-handers may involve more imagery and affective states than do the dreams 
of right-handers, and then further extrapolated as suggesting that the overall inner 
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experience of left-handers may involve more imagery and affective states than does the 
experience of right-handers.  Participants in this study experienced inner seeing at a 
frequency of 19%.  Similarly, Mizrachi (2010) reported her left-handed participants 
experienced inner seeing at a frequency of 24%.  However, that frequency was lower than 
the frequency of inner seeing (34%) Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) reported in the general 
population (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); thus the difference between left- and right-
handers imagery is in the opposite direction as might be speculated on the basis of 
McNamara et al.’s (1998) study.  Regarding emotion, the present study suggests a large 
difference between left-handers and the general population but in the opposite direction 
suggested by McNamara et al. (1998): participants in this study experienced feelings far 
less frequently (12%) than did Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) subjects (26%).  Similarly, 
Mizrachi (2010) reported a low frequency of feeling in her left-handed participants (4%).  
McNamara et al. (1998) reported that left-handers were more likely to report that the 
content of their dreams were not an accurate reflection of their daily life-experience than 
were right-handers (McNamara et al., 1998), so the extrapolations described above may 
not be valid.  It may be that left-handers are actually emotional but do not directly 
experience feelings in their inner experience—that is, they undergo affective states but 
have very little feeling in their inner experience.  Another explanation for the discrepancy 
between McNamara et al.’s (1998) finding and the findings of the present study relates to 
the theory of wish-fulfillment.  According to Freud, the dream represents a fulfilled wish 
or takes the place of some action in life (Freud, 1900).  It can be extrapolated from this 
that dreams may represent a phenomenon that is suppressed in waking life.  The results of 
the present study could then be interpreted as showing that left-handers, who might have 
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ongoing emotion but suppress the experience of it, experience that emotion in dreams 
instead.  An alternative explanation is that McNamara et al.’s participants did not 
carefully distinguish between the experience of emotion and emotional state.              
In 2013, Schredl, Beaton, Henley-Einion, and Blagrove examined the relationship 
between dream recall and handedness in adolescents and adults.  Unlike McNamara et al. 
(1998) the authors reported that right-handers and mixed-handers have a higher 
frequency of dream recall than do left-handers.  However, they reported that handedness 
effects were more prominent in adolescents and were not significant in adults (Schredl, 
Beaton, Henley-Einion, & Blagrove, 2013).  Considering the role of attention in memory, 
this result can be extrapolated to imply that left-handers may have less recall of dreams 
due to a lack of experiential involvement during dreams.  This result can be further 
extrapolated, in light of McNamara et al.’s (1998) findings to suggest that left-handers 
have less experiential involvement during high imagery and affective states than right-
handers.  That is, imagery and affect may be ongoing in left-handers (e.g., during 
dreams); however, they have less direct experience of them.  This extrapolation is 
consistent with the findings of the current study in which left-handed participants 
experienced inner seeing and feeling less than the general population.  Additionally, the 
presence of ongoing affective states (emotion) was found in participants’ samples without 
direct experiential involvement.  It is also noteworthy to mention that Schredl et al. 
(2013) reported the handedness effect in dream recall was not found to be significant in 
adults.  This may be extrapolated to imply that the handedness effects change over time.  
During the sampling phase, seven participants (AH, BP, CL, DH, MM, MO, JS) were 
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either 18 or 19 years-old, KA was 21, NT was 28, and TS was 35.  Thus, some of the 
present findings may be influenced by differences in age. 
Notably, the dream studies used verbal reports.  It may be that left-handers 
perform differently in that mode of responding.  Thus extrapolations made from the 
aforementioned dream studies may not be accurate due to the effects of verbal reports.  
For example, it may be that left-handers would more effectively report or recall dreams 
through a different mean such as drawing.   
In 2010, Beratis, Rabavilas, Papadimitriou, and Papageorgiou investigated the 
effects of handedness on the Stroop interference effect using the Stroop Color Word 
Task.  The Stroop effect has been suggested as providing evidence of verbal inhibition, 
which involves using an atypical response and suppressing an overlearned one (automatic 
reading) (Beratis, Rabavilas, Papadimitriou, & Papageorgiou, 2010).  The authors 
reported that selective attention is involved in the Stroop task—that is, attending to color 
versus orthography (Beratis et al., 2010).  The authors administered two tasks to the 
subjects, a neutral condition and an incongruent condition.  In the neutral condition, the 
subjects were asked to name the ink color of strings of Xs (neutral stimuli), quickly and 
accurately.  In the incongruent condition, the subjects were asked to name the ink color of 
incongruously named color words, quickly and accurately.  The difficulty posed in the 
incongruent condition is referred to as the Stroop interference effect (Beratis et al., 2010).  
With regard to high functioning individuals, the authors reported a greater Stroop 
interference effect in right-handers than left-handers.  Thus, left-handed individuals 
perform better on the Stroop task (Beratis et al., 2010).  It might be speculated that left-
handers have an advantage when completing the Stroop task because they have less 
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experienced connection to the semantic nature of words than do right-handers.  A lack of, 
or less strong, attachment to the semantic nature of worded phenomenon may decrease 
their interference effect.  Furthermore, participants in this study had a much stronger 
connection to colors in general (e.g., sensory awareness).  This may also favor left-
handers during the Stroop task in that they may have more interest in sensory aspects, 
like color, as opposed to the semantic nature of the stimulus.  All 10 participants in this 
study reported samples of not semantic words, for a total of 40 samples.  Twenty of these 
samples involved the sensory awareness of words and/or letters.  For example, in sample 
4.4, BP was looking at a list of songs on the computer screen as the songs were being 
downloaded.  BP was attending to the visual characteristics of the display—that is, she 
was absorbed in how the list looked.  Mizrachi (2010) also reported sensory awareness of 
words in 2 of her 6 subjects, for a total of three samples.  Considering Heavey and 
Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of sensory awareness of words/letters in their 
samples (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008), it may be tentatively concluded that the sensory 
awareness of words and/or letters is a characteristic of the left-handed experience.   
Inner Experience: Summary 
Main Five Characteristics 
 Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring of the five main 
characteristics in the present study, occurring at a frequency of 49%.  This finding is 
consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010) report of 35% sensory awareness in her left-handed 
participants.  Participants in this study experienced sensory awareness substantially more 
than the frequency of 22% in the general population as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008).  The majority of sensory awareness samples in this study were similar to those 
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reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008); however, three noteworthy patterns emerged, 
including the following: sensory awareness of words or letters; spreading of sensory 
awareness; and sensory awareness of an imaginary stimulus.  Thus, the present results 
suggest that sensory awareness may be more frequent in left-handers than in the general 
population.  This finding is consistent with Mizrachi (2010).   
 Inner seeing was the next most frequently occurring main characteristic in the 
present study, occurring at a frequency of 19%.  This is consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010) 
report of 24% inner seeing samples in her left-handed participants.  Left-handers 
experienced inner seeing less than the 34% in the general population reported by Heavey 
and Hurlburt (2008).  Most of the participants’ inner seeing samples in the present study 
were similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); however, 
there were two noteworthy characteristics, including experiencing the creating of imagery 
and inner seeing of words.  Thus it is concluded that inner seeing occurs less frequently 
in left-handers than the general population. 
 Unsymbolized thinking occurred at a frequency of 18% in the present study.  This 
is consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010) report of a frequency of 20% in her left-handed 
participants.  The rate of unsymbolized thinking in the present study was about the same 
as the 22% reported in the general population by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  The 
majority of the unsymbolized thinking samples in the present study were straightforward 
and similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants.  However, one participant (AH) 
experienced unusual unsymbolized thinking samples.  AH did not have any clear and 
typical examples of unsymbolized thinking.  His unsymbolized thinking samples were 
either secondary to something else (primarily sensory awareness), included the presence 
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of multiple possibilities, or involved some idea of what to do next.  Unsymbolized 
thinking appears to occur at a similar frequency between left-handers and the general 
population. 
Inner speech occurred at a frequency of 12% in the present study.  This is 
consistent with the frequency of 9% found in Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed participants.  
This is substantially lower than Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) finding of 26%.  In 
addition to inner speech, participants in this study experienced inner hearing.  Inner 
hearing is an established DES characteristic.  Inner hearing involves attending to the 
auditory characteristics occurring innerly.  Inner hearing occurred in 8% of the inner 
experience samples.  Even when taken together, inner speech and inner hearing constitute 
20% of the overall inner experience samples.  This figure is still lower than Heavey and 
Hurlburt’s (2008) finding of 26%. 
Feeling was the least frequently occurring of the main five characteristics found in 
the present study (12%).  This is comparable to Mizrachi’s (2010) infrequent occurrence 
of feeling in her left-handed participants (4%).  Participants in this study experienced 
feeling at a much lower frequency than the 26% reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).  
Participants expressed emotions through the tone of their speech, and understood that 
some of their thoughts are emotionally valenced, rather than actually experiencing an 
emotion.  In 15 samples, an ongoing, affective state was present; however, the 
participants were not directly experiencing the feeling at the moment.  Thus these 
ongoing, affective states, termed “emotion” by the investigators, occurred at a frequency 
of 7%.  Even when the emotion and feeling samples are combined, the combined 
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frequency of 18% is still less than the 26% of feeling reported by Heavey and Hurlburt 
(2008).   
Other Characteristics 
 In addition to the findings of the main five characteristics, other characteristics 
emerged across the left-handed participants in the present study.  Left-handed 
participants’ inner experience frequently included multiple experience (multiple, separate 
and simultaneous experiences) and not semantic worded experiences.  Participants also 
had a relatively high frequency of doing of (carefully and concentratedly engaged in a 
physical activity).  Other characteristics that emerged included anticipation and 
happening of. 
Words and Lack of Meaning in Experience 
 A pattern that emerged across participants was the low frequency of words 
present.  Additionally, when words were experienced, they had atypical presentations.  
For example, they were not explicitly attended to for their function or meaning.  In 40 of 
217 samples (18%), a unique presentation of words was present.  In these samples, words 
were somehow present; however, the participants were not attending to the meaning of 
the words in their experience.  This phenomenon, termed not semantic words, was the 
fourth most frequently occurring characteristic in the participants’ inner experience.  It 
occurred in all 10 subjects.   
Among the not semantic words samples was the sensory awareness of words.  In 
these samples it was as if the awareness of the subjects specifically ignored the meaning 
of the words in favor of their sensory aspects.  Five subjects (TS, BP, NT, DH, AH) 
reported samples of sensory awareness for words each for a total of 20 samples (9%).   
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With all the usual caveats regarding small sample size, it does appear that left-handed 
participants experience words in ways much different from the general population: less 
frequent overall, and instances where the meaning of words is stripped away from  
Slow Building of Experience 
A characteristic that emerged across left-handed participants’ inner experience 
samples included a slow building of experience.  That is, participants in the present study 
seemed to have a hard time manufacturing their inner experience.  Examples of this were 
seen in all of the main five characteristics: sensory awareness (e.g., spreading of 
sensation in body); inner seeing (e.g., inner image populating itself, dullness of colors, 
transition from one image to another); unsymbolized thinking (e.g., multiple options 
though the specific options not present in experience); inner speech (e.g., commenting on 
bodily experiences); emotion/feeling (e.g., empathic tone but no feeling, positive and 
negative valence simultaneously occurring).  In these samples, it is as if the ingredients of 
the experience are present; however, they are not integrated—that is, the phenomenon 
was not complete at the time of appearance.  Thus, these samples captured the 
participants in their attempt to integrate their experience.   
Discussion 
 The present study found that sensory awareness, multiple experience, inner 
seeing, not semantic words, and unsymbolized thinking are frequent characteristics of 
left-handers’ inner experience.  Inner speech and feeling (the experience of emotion) 
were found to be infrequent characteristic in the experience of left-handers.  Additionally, 
the present study suggests that left-handers experience words and meaning differently 
than the general population, supporting a right-hemispheric involvement regarding 
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linguistic ability.  The present study is preliminary and exploratory in nature and requires 
further investigation.   
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 The process of Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) yields inevitable study 
limitations.  One of the major limitations of the present study is the small sample size 
(N=10).  DES studies are time and labor intensive both for the participants and 
investigators.  Participants are asked to wear the beeper and collect beeps for period 
intervals of three hours on five separate occasions.  They are also asked to meet in the 
DES lab on the UNLV campus within 24 hours of each beep collection interview for a 1-
hour long expositional interview.  The sampling phase alone results in a dedication of 20 
hours from each participant.  The investigators are involved in coordinating the meetings, 
introducing the method, training the subject, conducting the expositional interviews, 
digitizing the interviews, writing narrative descriptions of each sample, coding the 
samples, writing idiographic narrative descriptions of the inner experience of each 
participant, and writing a narrative description of the characteristics that emerged across 
participants.  This time consuming and labor intensive process makes it difficult to collect 
data on larger sample sizes.  It is noteworthy to mention, however, that this study is a 
replication of an earlier study of six participants (Mizrachi, 2010).  Thus, there are 16 
left-handed participants across both studies.  The findings of the present study are similar 
to the findings in Mizrachi’s (2010) study.  
The nature of DES regarding small sample sizes contributes to the second 
limitation of this study.  Because of the small sample sizes, statistically significant 
conclusions cannot be drawn from the data.  In addition, data from the present study are 
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the samples of inner experience.  These samples cannot easily be collapsed into numbers 
and analyzed.  Frequency counts of characteristics that occurred within participants and 
across participants were taken; however, a larger sample of left-handers would be needed 
to conduct tests of statistical significance.  It may be possible that the characteristics of 
the participants that were attributed to left-handedness may be due, by chance, to some 
other common characteristic.   
The third limitation of the present study involves the possibility that the 
investigators inaccurately or incorrectly captured the participants’ experience.  One of the 
potential contributors involves presuppositions.  For example, it is possible that prior 
knowledge or belief systems interfered with the investigators’ apprehension of the 
participants’ experience.  The use of two investigators who probably do not share the 
same presuppositions is a way of limiting this likelihood.  The possibility of incorrectly 
apprehending the participants’ experience may also be due to the participants’ 
presuppositions.  It is possible that the participants presented their individual samples in a 
way that is consistent with their own belief systems about themselves.  In addition, even 
if the experiences were apprehended accurately, they may have been categorized 
idiosyncratically. 
The fourth limitation of the present study related to the fact that the investigators 
were not blind to the handedness of the participants.  As mentioned before, this study is a 
replication of a Master’s thesis (Mizrachi, 2010) and prior knowledge of the results of 
Mizrachi (2010) may have influenced the investigators’ apprehension of the participants’ 
inner experience.  However, the emergence of novel phenomena (e.g., not semantic 
words) in this study when compared to Mizrachi (2010) suggests that the investigators 
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were not narrowly apprehending the inner experience of the left-handed participants in 
this study based on the results of Mizrachi (2010).    
The fifth limitation of the present study relates to the fact that DES is an 
exploratory procedure.  The aim of this study was to explore the samples of inner 
experience of left-handers.  The rationale for this approach was that by applying DES to 
left-handers as a group characteristics of inner experience that were not previously 
discovered may emerge.  Prior to conducting this study, there was only one study 
exploring or describing the inner experience of left-handers (Mizrachi, 2010).  Because of 
the exploratory nature of the present study, no hypotheses were made at the outset. 
Two investigators, a student and her advisor (Hurlburt, the originator of DES), 
collected the data together and reviewed the data independently and together.  Despite 
this, the present study may have benefited from review from an additional rater.  Thus, 
the sixth limitation of this study is the lack of interrater reliability.  Although interrater 
reliability was not directly measured in this study, interrater reliability has been evaluated 
among DES investigators.  Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) reported that interrater reliability 
for 19-sample averages ranges from .92 to .98 (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002).    
The findings in the present suggest that more research on left-handers’ inner 
experience using DES would be worthwhile.  Research exploring the inner experience of 
left-handers while taking into consideration hemispheric specialization in the brain might 
shed light on how the left and right cerebral hemispheres contribute to inner experience.   
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APPENDIX A 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
ID:_________ 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Name...................................................................................................................  
 
2. Date of birth ........................................................................................................  
 
3. Sex (Male / Female)............................................................................................  
 
4. Address ...............................................................................................................  
 
.............................................................................................................................  
 
.............................................................................................................................  
 
5. Email address ......................................................................................................  
 
6. Home phone number...........................................................................................  
 
7. Cell phone number..............................................................................................  
 
8. Preferred phone number......................................................................................  
 
9. Race/ethnicity .....................................................................................................  
 
10. Marital status.......................................................................................................  
 
11. What is your current level of education? ............................................................  
 
12. Are you employed? .............................................................................................  
 
13. Which hand do you use to write with? (Right / Left) ........................................  
 
14. Would you be interested in participating in the next phase of this study for  
 
            research credits? (Yes / No) ...............................................................................  
 
15. Please provide the name and telephone number of a person who would know 
how to contact you in the future if you moved 
Name...................................................................................................................  
 
Phone number .....................................................................................................  
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APPENDIX B 
PARTICIPANTS’ SAMPLES 
The following sample summaries were not included in the individual chapters:   
AH’s Samples (see Chapter 5) 
Sampling Day 1 
September 17, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  At the moment of the sample, AH had just begun to read a text message from his friend on his 
phone.  During the expositional interview, AH was unsure about what was in his experience at the moment 
of the sample.   
 
Sample 1.2.  AH was driving and a semi-truck, with dust coming off the top of it, was coming in the 
opposite direction on the same road.  The investigators were unable to determine with any confidence at all 
what he was experiencing at the moment of the sample.  Perhaps at the moment of the sample he was 
seeing the dust, mostly focused on the dust itself; perhaps he was mostly experiencing a thought about the 
dust hitting his car like, oh damn, the dust is going to hit my car.  If there was such a thought, he seemed 
confident that it was not experienced in words; that is, he seemed confident that inner words did not play a 
role in his experience at the moment of the sample.  He may have also been frustrated by the fact that his 
car was going to get dirty, but that was not clear. The dust, or the thought or feeling thereabout, may have 
had a negative valence, but whether that was experientially present at the moment of the beep is unknown.  
He was also visually seeing the dust, but was unable to describe that experience further. 
 
Sample 1.3.  AH was using the internet on his phone and was about to click the log-in button for MySpace. 
At the moment of the sample, he was eager to log-on.  He described the eagerness as a feeling of being 
overjoyed to read his messages, but whether this was a thought or feeling or something else was not 
entirely clear.  He denied experiencing any bodily sensations related to the eagerness.  
 
Sampling Day 2 
September 24, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 5. 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 71. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 75.  
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 80. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 74.   
 
Sampling Day 3 
October 1, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 5. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 78. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 75. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 69. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 70. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 70. 
Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 73.   
 
Sampling Day 4 
October 8, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 5. 
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Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 76. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 71. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 77. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 83. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 69. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
October 15, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 79. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 73. 
 
Sample 5.3.  Occurred while AH was going to the bathroom.  He declined to discuss this sample, saying it 
was embarrassing. 
 
Sample 5.4.  Refer to page 69. 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 79. 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 74. 
 
BP’s Samples (see Chapter 6) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
October 28, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  BP had been watching TV.  At the moment of the sample, she was flipping through the 
channels and innerly saying, “Does it still come on?” referring to the show Arthur.   
 
Sample 1.2.  BP was on Twitter and had read an update declaring Coke as better than Pepsi.  At the 
moment of the sample, BP was thinking that Pepsi is better than Coke.  This was a thought without words, 
images, or any symbolic representation.   
 
Sample 1.3.  BP was innerly singing the song Weight of my Tears.  She was also innerly hearing the music 
to the song.  It was as if she was singing along with the music.  The music was an accurate replay of the 
song. 
 
Sample 1.4.  BP was reading her dad’s Facebook status.  She was taking in the words of the status but the 
meaning had not yet come to her.  In her experience, she was just reading the words of the page.  She was 
not gathering the meaning of the words as she was reading.  It was her understanding that, after reading the 
words, the meaning would present itself to her though this was not in her experience at the moment of the 
sample.  All that was in her experience was reading the words.     
 
Sample 1.5.  BP had read her ex-boyfriend’s status on MySpace and had just finished typing in her own 
status update as a response.  The last part of her status was yes, I went there.  At the moment of the sample, 
the notion that she had gone there was in her experience without words.  The meaning of the rest of her 
status was also present but not as salient as the notion that she gone there.  There were no words, images, or 
any other symbolic representation in BP’s experience.   
 
Sampling Day 2 
November 2, 2010 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 92. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 86. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 91. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 85. 
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Sample 2.5.  BP was walking on campus.  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly saying “I hope I 
don’t see anyone that I know.” 
 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 85. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
November 4, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 6.   
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 89. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 92. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 90. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
November 9, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 6. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 87. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 85. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 93. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 87. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 89. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 89. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
November 17, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 85. 
 
Sample 5.2.  BP had been thinking that she needs to study for her Psychology test.  At the moment of the 
sample, she was innerly saying “Today and tomorrow is homework day.”  There was nothing else in her 
experience. 
 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 87. 
Sample 5.4.  Refer to page 87. 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 85. 
 
Sample 5.6.  BP was innerly saying, “Why is he still talking about the same thing?” referring to her teacher.  
There was nothing else in her experience. 
 
CL’s Samples (see Chapter 7) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
September 16, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  CL had just finished typing the words “Chicken Fingers, Traffic,” as part of the title for her 
English class essay.  At the moment of the sample, she was trying to come up with the third and final word 
for the title.  The notion of chicken fingers, traffic, and blank was present to her at the moment of the 
sample.  It was as if she was waiting for something to fill in the blank.  She was also skimming through the 
ideas of the paper inside her head to find an important word to fill in the blank.  The skimming did not 
involve innerly seeing or reciting the essay.  She was also experiencing mental frustration at not being able 
to come up with a word.   
Sample 1.2.  CL was urinating and wondering if Jesse James also adopted Sandra Bullock’s child or if she 
adopted him alone.  At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing Jesse James and Sandra Bullock 
sitting across from each other on a long table.  CL was seeing this as if she was sitting at the head of the 
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table.  Jesse James was sitting on the left and Sandra Bullock on the right.  There was a woman presumed 
to be an attorney sitting next to Sandra Bullock and a man also presumed to be an attorney sitting next to 
Jesse James.  CL was aware of the presence of these additional persons but she did not really acknowledge 
them.  The inner seeing was in color.  Sandra Bullock was wearing navy blue, Jesse James was wearing 
black, and there was a circle crest on the unattractive tan colored walls.  There was a background notion of 
disgust present.  The urinating was not in her experience at the moment of the sample. 
Sample 1.3.  CL was typing a text message to her sister and feeling annoyed at her sister.  At the moment of 
the sample, she was experiencing annoyance as a physical sensation from her abdomen up to the top of her 
head.  This sensation was deep inside her body.  She was experiencing the same sensation in the trunk of 
her body and her head.  She also experienced slight tension in her body.  The typing of the text message 
was not in her experience at the moment of the sample. 
Sampling Day 2 
September 21, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 7. 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 97. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 98. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 96. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 99. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 107. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
September 23, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 7. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 96. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 96. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 100. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 98. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
September 28, 2013 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 7. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 103. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 97. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 102. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 104. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
October 7, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 99. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 102. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 105. 
 
Sample 5.4.  CL had been clicking the lock button on her iPhone with her pointer finger on her left hand.  
At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the picture on the screen of her iPhone of her with two of her 
friends.  She was taking in the whole picture and not paying particular attention to any aspect of the picture, 
a mostly idle seeing that indicated the phone was working with no messages.  She was also seeing her 
phone.  The clicking of the lock button was happening automatically and not in her experience. 
 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 101.   
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DH’s Samples (see Chapter 8) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
October 19, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  DH was waiting for the home page on his computer to load.  At the moment of the sample, he 
was seeing the whiteness of the screen.  He was also experiencing some anticipation of the page to come.  
The whiteness of the screen was more in his experience than the anticipation (an estimated ratio of 60:40).   
 
Sample 1.2.  DH was lying on the couch, focused on the spinning fan on the ceiling.  In his experience was 
the motion of the fan.  He was captured by the spinningness or blurry circleness of the fan. 
 
Sample 1.3.  DH was watching ultimate fighting on TV.  All that was in his experience was the fighting 
action on the TV.  He was following along what was happening on the screen. 
 
Sample 1.4.  DH was watching ultimate fighting on TV. All that was in his experience was the fighting 
happening on the TV. 
 
Sample 1.5.  DH had been making a left turn.  At the moment of the sample, he was noticing the 
illumination of a street speed sign.  He was attending to the sign for its brightness and not its speed 
regulation quality.  All that was in his experience was the illuminated speeding sign. 
 
Sample 1.6.  DH had been watching a TV show and the movie Valkyrie starring Tom Cruise was 
mentioned.  At the moment of the sample, DH was innerly seeing a black and white image of Tom Cruise 
wearing Nazi WWII type attire.  He was seeing Tom Cruise’s body directed to the left but Tom’s head was 
facing DH’s perspective (Tom Cruise’s head was facing left in comparison to his body).  This was a still 
image as if it was a snapshot of Tom Cruise; however, it did not involve a border or frame.  DH was not 
seeing anything in the background.   
 
Sampling Day 2 
October 21, 2010 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 114. 
 
Sample 2.2.  DH was watching TV and a woman had just said she was fabulous.  At the moment of the 
sample, DH was innerly saying, “yeah right.” 
 
Sample 2.3.  DH had paused the TV until his mother returned and there was an old woman on the  screen.  
At the moment of the sample, DH was noticing the wrinkles on the face of the old woman and her bright 
blue eyes.  He was attending to the wrinkles more (an estimated 60:40). 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 111. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 115. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 108. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
October 26, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 8. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 113. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 116. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 109. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 110. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 113. 
Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 111. 
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Sampling Day 4 
October 28, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 8. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 119. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 118. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 117. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 112. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 120. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 121. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
November 2, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 115. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 110. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 115. 
 
Sample 5.4.  DH had just finished watching Pay Per View previews and was sitting on his couch looking 
away from the TV.  At the moment of the sample, he was thinking that the movie Gladiator is a good 
movie.  He was also innerly seeing a man holding a sword with his right hand.  The sword was pointing 
down at an angle towards DH’s perspective.  The man was in a coliseum; however, DH was mostly 
attending to the man and not the coliseum.  He was also seeing the sand on the ground and the man’s 
shadow directed towards DH’s perspective.  The man was facing forward towards DH and his head was 
tilted downwards.  The seeing was a still shot in sepia color.  DH was unsure if it was the cover shot of the 
movie.  The thinking that the movie Gladiator was good ant the inner seeing were separate experiences.   
 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 112. 
 
NT’s Samples (see Chapter 9) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
January 20, 2011 
 
Sample 1.1.  NT was driving and making a right turn onto Eastern Avenue.  At the moment of the sample, 
he was visually monitoring the passing cars.  He also had some sense of the cars behind him, involving a 
sense of felt pressure or arousal of not wanting to crash.  He was also hearing a familiar song on the radio 
and anticipating the next beat of the song. 
 
Sample 1.2.  At the moment of the sample, NT was positioning his notebook onto the steering wheel.  He 
was also attending to the yellowness of a car in front of him. 
 
Sample 1.3.  NT was experiencing a sense of relaxation in his waist area (the front and sides of his waist).  
He was seeing the whiteness of his computer screen fading out.  He was interested in the whiteness of the 
screen.  He was also hearing his computer chime, indicating Windows was logging on.  He was interested 
in the chimeness, and not the computerness, of the sound. 
 
Sample 1.4.  NT was typing a question in an e-mail to his professor.  At the moment of the sample, he was 
experiencing power as a physical rush in his shoulders, arms, and hands.  He was also seeing the words he 
was typing appearing on the computer screen.  The powerness was more salient in his experience (an 
estimated 95:5). 
 
Sampling Day 2 
January 25, 2011 
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Sample 2.1.  NT was at a bar with his friend Shawna.  At the moment of the sample, he was pointing at a 
chicken strip with his right hand.  He was experiencing the sensation of his wrist moving, sort of flopping 
up and down as he rocked his finger back and forth as part of the repeated pointing at the strip.  He was 
also seeing his right hand pointing and a part of the chicken strip basket.  He was also experiencing a sense 
of direction or intention to give Shawna the chicken strip.  Shawna was speaking at the moment of the 
sample, but he was not experiencing that.   
 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 124. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 129. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 136. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 135. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 131. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
January 27, 2011 
 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 124. 
 
Sample 3.2.  NT was talking to Amy, his girlfriend, about a casino in Las Vegas he thinks is classy and not 
very noisy, Vdara.  NT was speaking at the moment of the sample.  He was just talking about the Vdara, 
and had no experience beyond that.  He was not experiencing himself as directing the words coming out of 
his mouth, rather the words were flowing out.  NT was conveying to Amy that Vdara is a nice casino, but 
the actual words NT was uttering were not in his experience.   
 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 131. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 124. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 126. 
Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 125. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
February 1, 2011 
 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 134. 
 
Sample 4.2.  NT was at a café looking at the drinks in the refrigerator.  At the moment of the sample, he 
was seeing the rows of Odwalla bottles.  In his experience, he was seeing the green and beige bottles, he 
was attending to the bottleness of the green and beige bottles and not so much interested in the colors.  He 
was also seeing intersecting white light rays illuminating the bottles.  [He was not certain whether the rays 
were actually physically present.  He had visual experience of them, but perhaps they were fabricated from 
the light and shadow portion of the bottles.] 
 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 126. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 129. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 133. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 127. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
February 3, 2011 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 126. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 130. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 130. 
 
Sample 5.4.  NT was in class.  He was experiencing a low level awareness of the sounds and sights in class; 
however, the sounds and sights were not present in his experience for what they were.  That is, they were 
experienced in a sensory way.  The sounds were voices talking, but the voiceness or the words being 
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spoken was not present—rather, he heard something like a hum or undifferentiated sound.  The seeing was 
similarly undifferentiated.  There was nothing else in his experience. 
 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 128. 
 
MM’s Samples (see Chapter 10) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
October 6, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  MM was on the computer website for her French homework.  She was entering her username 
on the sign in screen.  In her experience, she was making sure she was spelling her name correctly.  This 
involved a concentrated watching of the letters appearing on the screen.  MM was attending to the visual 
presentation of the letters on the screen, making sure the spelling was accurate. 
 
Sample 1.2.  MM’s roommate, Erica, had been telling MM she would take a nap the same time MM does.  
At the moment of the sample, MM was innerly saying, “she sleeps too much.”  The inner speech was in 
MM's own voice.  MM was also tracking what Erica was saying and her eyes were aimed at Erica eating a 
sausage; however, this was not in her experience at the moment of the sample.  All that was in her 
experience was her inner speech. 
 
Sample 1.3.  MM had been doing her French homework.  At the moment of the sample, she was writing the 
word “l’huile” (French for “oil”).  In her experience, MM was seeing the messiness of the word and 
thinking that her handwriting is messy.  MM’s thoughts consisted of the idea that she writes messy; 
however, this thought did not involve words, images, or any other symbolic representation.  The meaning 
of the word was apparently not present to her at the moment of the sample. 
 
Sample 1.4.  MM had been studying French vocabulary about automobiles, looking at a picture of an 
automobile in her French course book.  At the moment of the sample, MM was searching her memory for a 
way to relate the part of the car she was seeing and the corresponding English word.  In her experience, she 
was trying to figure out if the French 
word and English counterpart had any letters in common, as if the similarity of letters would provide the 
key to translation.  [MM reported that in general she experiences words letter by letter sequencing and 
typically isolates individual letters from the rest of the word.  For example, she often counts the number of 
letters in words; for example, in encountering this sentence, she would think 3 – 7- 3 – 5 – 6 – 3 – 6 – 2 – 7 
– 2 – 5 and so on.] 
 
Sampling Day 2 
October 8, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 10. 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 142. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 139. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 145. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 145. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 143. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 145. 
Sample 2.7.  Refer to page 146. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
October 13, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 10. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 139. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 139. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 144. 
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Sampling Day 4 
October 15, 2010 
 
Sample 4.1.  MM was sleeping.  She had been dreaming about her and her brother, Caleb.  In her dream, 
MM had spit her gum out and it landed in Caleb’s nose.  At the moment of the sample, in her dream, MM 
was seeing her brother’s face as he was screaming and MM was laughing out loud. 
 
Sample 4.2.  MM was sleeping.  In her dream, MM was sitting at her desk tapping a pencil and humming.  
The humming was a random kind of thing—not a melody.  All that was in her experience at the moment of 
the sample was the tapping of the pencil and the humming. 
 
Sample 4.3.  In bed but awake.  MM had been thinking about her roommate, Katie, telling MM about how 
Katie’s mother gets upset when Katie spends time at her aunt’s house because Katie’s mother thinks they 
are starting a new family.  At the moment of the sample, MM was innerly hearing Katie say the words “I 
don’t like Vegas” the way Katie’s mother had said them.  The innerly heard words were of Katie 
mimicking her mother.  This was an inner rehearing of something that had happened before.   
 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 141. 
Sample 4.5.  MM chose to skip this sample. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 141. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
October 20, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 146. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 143. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 147. 
Sample 5.4.  Refer to page 141. 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 142. 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 139. 
 
Sample 5.7.  MM’s Psychology instructor had been talking about research finding in which 75% of males 
consented to bring a female back to their room to have sex if asked.   MM was waiting for her instructor to 
say what the percentage of females would bring a male back to their room for sex if asked.  MM had read 
about the study the night before so she knew the percentage was zero.  At the moment of the sample, MM 
was waiting for her instructor to say the answer.  This was a mental waiting and impatience.  The concept 
zero was also somehow present in MM’s experience without words, images, or any other symbolic 
representation.   
 
MO’s Samples (see Chapter 11) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
October 12, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  MO had been running late to class.  She had just opened her classroom door and taken two 
steps in.  At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the student teacher teaching the class.  She was 
experiencing a visual noticing of the teacher.  There may have been other aspects; thinking the student 
teacher was cool, that it would be a fun class, nervous about being late, looking for a place to sit, etc.  MO 
wasn’t sure. 
 
Sample 1.2.  MO was hearing the repetitive, intervallic tapping of a pen to her right side.  The noise was 
annoying, but MO was not sure whether the annoyance was experienced. 
 
Sample 1.3.  MO’s teacher had been talking about civil rights and had said the name Ruther B. Hayes.  At 
the moment of the sample, MO was innerly saying “who would name their kid Ruther?”  The inner speech 
was drawn out and in her own voice, just as she would have said it out loud. 
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Sample 1.4.  MO was in class seeing her friend Lita look quizzically at her.  MO was wondering why Lita 
was looking at her in that quizzical way.  This notion was present in MO’s experience without words, 
images, or any symbolic representation.  It turned out that MO’s beeper had sounded but she did not hear it, 
even though she was using the earphone, and even though the beep was loud enough through the back of 
the earphone that Lita could hear it.  Lita’s quizzical look therefore turned out to be about the beep which 
MO had not yet heard. 
 
Sample 1.5.  MO was still in class and her beeper had again sounded but she had not heard it yet.  Her 
friend, Lita, had heard the beep and looked at MO.  At the moment of the sample, MO was seeing her 
friend and thinking that Lita must be looking at her because the beeper is beeping.  MO was also hearing a 
faint sound that would later turn out to be the beeper.  The beep seemed to ramp up, gradually at first but 
then faster.  We asked MO to ask Lita about what she heard, and Lita said she heard the beep sound 
immediately loud, just as the beep is designed. 
 
Sample 1.6.  MO was hearing the repetitive tapping of a pen.  This time she was just beginning to hear the 
pen and was not yet annoyed. 
 
Sampling Day 2 
October 13, 2010 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 154. 
 
Sample 2.2.  MO’s hands were resting on the table in front of her.  She was experiencing the sweatiness of 
her hands.  She was feeling the sweatiness of each hand independent of the other. 
 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 152. 
Sample 2.4.  MO chose to skip this sample. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 153. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 151. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
October 19, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 11. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 158. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 156. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 159. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 160. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 153. 
Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 157. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
October 21, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 11. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 156. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page154. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 154. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 151. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 152. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 152. 
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Sampling Day 5 
October 26, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 155. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 155. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 152. 
 
Sample 5.4.  MO had finished eating and was sitting in her car in the parking lot with her windows open.  
She had been hearing cars drive by her.  At the moment of the sample, she was hearing the contrast 
between a diesel truck and the rest of the cars.  MO was attending to the auditory characteristics of the 
truck and the cars, and attending to the difference between them.  The fact that it was a diesel truck was not 
in her experience at the moment of the sample.   
 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 152. 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 154. 
 
KA’s Samples (see Chapter 12) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
December 1, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  KA had realized that her hair appointment was scheduled at 11:00 am on January 11, 2011.  
Before the moment of the sample, she was experiencing a rising tide of feelings that preceded a thought.  
At the moment of the sample, she was thinking about how the synchronicity of the numbers (11:00 on the 
11th in the year 2011) made her feel good and connected to the universe. 
 
Sample 1.2.  KA was wondering if she had written her Narcotics Anonymous steps the best way.  This was 
a thought about the uncertainty of how she wrote the steps.  She was also feeling doubtful about how 
adequately she wrote the steps.  This was a mental emotion. 
 
Sample 1.3.  KA was thinking that she was sleepy but she was not going to sleep.  She was also 
experiencing a bodily sensation of tiredness. 
 
Sample 1.4.  KA was innerly hearing “Your hair doesn’t look good, you’re not going to have a good day.”  
The words were said in a fast and condescending manner.  They were in KA’s voice.  She was also feeling 
frustrated.   
 
Sampling Day 2 
December 2, 2010 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 167. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 163. 
Sample 2.3.  KA chose to skip this sample. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 170. 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 177. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 168. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
December 7, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 12. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 169. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 164. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 175. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 165. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 170. 
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Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 166. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
December 9, 2010 
 
Sample 4.1.  KA had been talking to her friend, Melissa, about an art walk Melissa had attended in 
Arizona.  At the moment of the sample, KA was innerly seeing a park.  She was seeing fluffy, green trees 
in the upper right of the image and grass underneath the trees.  She was seeing a walkway going across 
diagonally.  There were people on the walkway in walking positions but they were not detailed.  The 
people were small so KA was aware she was not very close to the image.  It was as if she was looking at a 
scene in which she was not herself present.  Sunlight was coming from the upper left corner; however, the 
day appeared cloudy.  KA was not seeing a sun or cloud.  KA also saw art booths to the sides of the 
walkway but she was not noticing any particular piece of art.  Most of her attention was directed at the 
scenery.  KA was scanning the image from right to left.  This scene was an illustration of what Melissa had 
been talking about.   
 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 168. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 164. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 167. 
 
Sample 4.5.  KA was watching TV and was absorbed in the television show she was watching.  There was 
nothing else in her experience. 
 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 172. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
December 14, 2010 
 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 171. 
 
Sample 5.2.  KA had been talking to her boyfriend on the phone about his laundry.  At the moment of the 
sample, KA was hearing her boyfriend talk.  KA was also innerly seeing her boyfriend’s room.  She was 
mostly attending to a green towel on the floor but she was not paying particular attention to the greenness 
of the towel.  KA was seeing the towel from a perspective slightly elevated from the floor.  She was also 
seeing his bed, comforter, and the dresser behind the towel; however, the towel was the most clear in her 
inner seeing.  KA was seeing this as if she was looking at a still picture.  Unlike previous images, KA was 
not interested in the seeing of the light.  She said the light source was to the upper left, and that that was 
indeed a fact of her boyfriend’s room, so the illumination was realistic, but she was not particularly 
attending to the light source in this sample.   
 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 173. 
Sample 5.4.  KA chose to skip this sample.   
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 177. 
 
JS’s Samples (see Chapter 13) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
September 21, 2010 
 
Sample 1.1.  JS had been reading a book for her History class.  At the moment of the sample, she was 
hearing the jingle of her dog’s collar.   
 
Sample 1.2.  JS had been peeing.  At the moment of the sample, JS was expecting that the beeper was going 
to beep.  This expectation was an intimation, a sense, that did not involve words, images, or any other 
symbolic representation. 
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Sample 1.3.  JS was driving to work to drop her keys off to her boss, Lucy.  At the moment of the sample 
JS was wondering if Lucy would ask her to stay and work.  JS had some sense of Lucy’s asking her, but the 
words were not present.  The driving (car in front of her, etc.) was not in her experience at the moment of 
the sample.   
 
Sample 1.4.  JS had been sitting across from her dad as he was reading the newspaper.  Her dad was telling 
her that there was an arrest warrant out for Lindsey Lohan, but, JS was not paying close attention to his 
speaking.  Rather, she was tracking the auditory characteristics of her dad’s speaking, and then the name 
“Lindsey Lohan” stood out from the rest of her dad’s sentence.  JS’s sense was that now that she heard 
“Lindsay Lohan,” she could backtrack and retrieve the meaning from the rest of the sentence that her dad 
had uttered, even though she was not aware of that meaning as he was speaking.   She was also seeing her 
father sitting across from her.  He was visually part of her experience (unlike the car of 1.3), but she was 
not paying particular attention to any aspect of him. 
 
Sample 1.5.  JS had been reviewing her homework.  At the moment of the sample, JS was innerly saying, “I 
don’t know how I am going to finish this by Thursday.”  This speaking seemed to be in her own voice, 
naturally inflected.  
 
Sample 1.6.  JS had been talking on the phone to her friend Barbara and they decided to go to the gym.  At 
the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the inside of the whole gym including equipment and 
people from an aerial perspective.  The seeing was in motion and color.  The seeing was a realistic 
recreation of the real gym but from a perspective that she had never actually seen.   
 
Sampling Day 2 
September 23, 2010 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 182. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 181. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 183. 
Sample 2.4.  Refer to page 180. 
 
Sample 2.5.  JS had been writing a paper when her mom knocked on her door and asked “How is it going?”  
At the moment of the sample, JS’s focus had moved away from her paper and was moving towards her 
mom.  JS’s attention was in transition from her paper to her mom.  She was aware of what her mom was 
saying but it was not yet the focus of her attention.   
 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 181. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
September 29, 2010 
 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 187. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 186. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 187. 
 
Sample 3.4.  JS was walking down one of the aisles in the grocery store when her mom had asked her if she 
could get rice.  At the moment of the sample, JS was saying “brown?”  There was nothing else in her 
experience: no thought about kinds of rice, no image of rice packages, etc. 
 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 189. 
 
Sample 3.6.  JS was sitting next to her parents on the computer looking for hotel rooms in New York for 
Thanksgiving.  Her dad had asked her how much they cost.  At the moment of the sample, JS was saying 
“739,” referring to the price of the room.  There was nothing else in her experience. 
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Sampling Day 4 
October 5, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 13. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 184. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 180. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 186. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 180. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 189. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 186. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
October 7, 2010 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 5 were included in Chapter 13. 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 188. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 184. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 180. 
Sample 5.4.  Refer to page 184. 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 185. 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 182. 
 
TS’s Samples (see Chapter 14) 
 
Sampling Day 1 
May 23, 2011 
 
Sample 1.1.  TS was standing, putting on his watch.  He was feeling a low level of anxiety about wasting 
time.  He was to pick up his friend from the airport and did not want to be early to waste his own time, but 
did not want to be late to waste hers.  It was difficult to tell how this anxiety/pressure presented itself to 
him at the moment. 
 
Sample 1.2.  TS was lying on his bed, tired but not able to sleep.  He clearly innerly saw three books on the 
counter of Reprographics, arrayed diagonally away from him.  He saw the shirt of the worker at 
Reprographics.  This was an accurate replay of a scene from earlier when the Reprographics worker had 
shown him examples of bound dissertations, asking him what color title he preferred.  TS was anticipating 
a feeling of pride/excitement that he would feel when he picked up his bound dissertation, but it was not 
clear whether this feeling actually existed at the moment or was merely somehow anticipated. 
 
Sample 1.3.  TS had seen a bag that belonged to his roommate, Samantha, next to a pair of shoes.  The 
seeing of the bag triggered a realization that Samantha had not yet unpacked.  At the moment of the sample, 
the notion that Samantha had not yet unpacked AND that TS would have were present in his experience.  
The two ideas were sequential with the latter overlapping the first.  They were not conveyed in words, 
images, or any other symbolic representation.   
 
Sample 1.4.  TS was sitting at his desk, updating his cover letter.  He had been pressing the backspace 
button.  At the moment of the sample, he was experiencing a pressure to get the cover letter right, to not 
make any mistakes.  This was experienced as a mental discomfort.  There was nothing else in his 
experience 
 
Sampling Day 2 
May 24, 2011 
 
Sample 2.1.  Refer to page 193. 
Sample 2.2.  Refer to page 191. 
Sample 2.3.  Refer to page 206. 
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Sample 2.4.  TS was sitting on the couch nearly finished eating his cereal.  He had a spoonful of cereal in 
his mouth (without the spoon).  At the moment of the sample, he was tasting the sweetness of the cereal, 
feeling the grainy/nutty texture of the cereal, and feeling the coldness of the milk in his mouth.  He was 
also seeing the living room including the wall, shelf, TV, couch, and carpet.  This seeing was part of his 
direct experience at the moment of the sample, but he was not paying any particular attention to any aspect 
of the living room--all items were visually equal in his experience.  He was also experiencing a pleasant 
sensation of satiation in his stomach, a physical sensation. 
 
Sample 2.5.  Refer to page 199. 
Sample 2.6.  Refer to page 201. 
 
Sampling Day 3 
May 25, 2011 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 14. 
Sample 3.1.  Refer to page 195. 
Sample 3.2.  Refer to page 201. 
Sample 3.3.  Refer to page 197. 
Sample 3.4.  Refer to page 203. 
Sample 3.5.  Refer to page 193. 
Sample 3.6.  Refer to page 198. 
 
Sampling Day 4 
June 2, 2011 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 14. 
Sample 4.1.  Refer to page 205. 
Sample 4.2.  Refer to page 193. 
Sample 4.3.  Refer to page 204. 
Sample 4.4.  Refer to page 196. 
Sample 4.5.  Refer to page 199. 
Sample 4.6.  Refer to page 206. 
 
Sampling Day 5 
June 3, 2011 
 
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 5 were included in Chapter 15. 
Sample 5.1.  Refer to page 204. 
Sample 5.2.  Refer to page 198. 
Sample 5.3.  Refer to page 200. 
Sample 5.4.  Refer to page 191. 
Sample 5.5.  Refer to page 197. 
Sample 5.6.  Refer to page 207. 
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